

GA-GN 1942

CONT'D

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CONT'D



January 24, 1944

The Honorable  
The Secretary of the Navy  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Frank:

I am enclosing a copy of the script written for Senator George to be broadcast to China. You will note that far from contradicting your statement, Senator George quotes at length from your remarks, and quotes them with approval. The newspapers do not appear to give the correct version of the Senator's broadcast, or what he may have told the reporters.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: Col. William J. Donovan

From: Irving Pflaum

This is the script written for Senator George to be broadcast to China.

You will note that far from contradicting Secretary Knox, Senator George quotes at length from Secretary Knox' remarks and quotes them with approval.

The attached Herald Tribune story does not appear to give a correct version either of the script or of what Senator George may have told the reporter.

Encls.

# Remarks Bulkeley

## Disregard Knox

### Radio Broadcast, Echoed by Roosevelt, Says U. S. Will Wage All-Out War in East

From the Herald Tribune Bureau

WASHINGTON, Jan. 28.—The Chinese people received today a most-urgent message of encouragement from Senator Walter F. George, Democrat of Georgia, re-emphasizing the importance of the struggle in the East. The message was an appeal to counteract the pessimistic effect in China of statements made here last week by Frank B. Rowan, Secretary of the Navy, before the United States Conference on the Pacific.

Senator George indicated that the United States was concentrating on the Atlantic struggle first, and that when Germany and Japan are crushed the attention of the United States will be turned to the Pacific.

The senator's message told his countrymen that the United States was not going to let Japan win in the Pacific, but was concentrating on other matters at the moment.

The senator's message was taken up by the Chinese people in his program. He said that the United States was not going to let Japan win in the Pacific, but was concentrating on other matters at the moment.

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(Continued from page one)

States Naval Academy at Annapolis from Texas—the family was living in St. Antonio at the time—and was graduated in 1933. The Air Corps attracted him and he went as an air cadet to Randolph Field, Tex. Lieutenant Bulkeley was no great shakes as a student flyer. "He cracked up two planes," his wife remarked. And while he was not discouraged, his superiors apparently decided he ought to defer further training for a while.

The next year 1934 found him an ensign on the cruiser Indianapolis. He was transferred from there to the aircraft carrier Saratoga, then to the battleship Utah, and next to the gunboat Sacramento, with the Asiatic fleet.

#### Met Wife on Destroyer

Somewhere in this interval Lieutenant Bulkeley found the time and energy to complete a six-months training course with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, which he passed with honors.

It was while he was stationed in the Far East that Lieutenant Bulkeley met and fell in love with Miss Alice Wood, the daughter of Captain Cecil Robert Wood, master mariner and British port pilot and port captain at Swatow, China. Mrs. Bulkeley was born in Swatow and passed most of her life there.

They met on Oct. 1, 1937, at a reception on the British destroyer Diana. "He was the youngest officer there," said Mrs. Bulkeley, "and naturally I started a conversation with him." A week later they were engaged, and a year later, in November, 1938, they were married at Swatow. A few months later Mrs. Bulkeley was called back to Swatow.

They are now just fighting a desperate war in the Philippines. They are in Manila and elsewhere. All the United Nations are united in their efforts and their hearts are in the East. That China, which has been a partner, may live on in the end. We will continue to support Japan.

**U. S. Exempts Koreans**

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FROM FIS

NY 22

GEORGE

U. S. Senator Walter F. George today (Tues.) gave strong reassurance of American aid to China. "We will withhold nothing to crush Japan and to assist China," The Senator said.

The message was prompted by recent Axis propaganda tactics. The Japanese radio has been protesting that United States aid cannot reach China in sufficient volume to alter the course of the war.

Senator George quoted Navy Secretary Frank Knox' speech to confute the Tokyo radio propaganda. The Secretary said: "There are endless lines of ships crawling over the waters of the earth...in the Atlantic and in the South Pacific ...carrying to us the numberless things our friends need everywhere -- our friends embattled with the common foe. These supply ships must be protected."

Senator George pointed out that this was conclusive proof that China will have the reinforcements she needs.

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1/30/42 KO 12:00 - no

NY DESK ATTN LAGERMAN VICTORY FOR CHINA BY MURRAY 1/19

Today "Victory for China" presents a special message to the Chinese people by Chairman Walter F. George of the United States Senate Committee on Finance. Senator George ~~was~~ is also a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and was formerly Chairman of this committee.

He speaks as a friend of China who has consistently supported the cause of China both before and since the war of the United Nations against the Axis. As a leader in the backing ~~the~~ President Roosevelt's foreign policy, he has been instrumental in shaping the defense and war program of the United States. ~~Senator~~

The subject of Senator George's message is "The Facts About Aid To China."

The special message of ~~United States~~ Senator Walter F. George to the Chinese people follows:

✓ "To the people of China:

"When the United States and Great Britain, ~~followed~~ followed quickly by 10 more nations, declared war on Japan, a spirit of jubilation mixed with grim determination swept through China. This was because of the prospect of large-scale aid, with ~~guns~~ guns, airplanes, ships and men, in the struggle which China had waged alone for nearly five years.

Add 1 - Victory for China - By Murray - 2/19

"Today, just a few weeks later, doubts of receiving such aid and cooperation have been voiced by Chinese sources. These doubts are not based on any actions by the United States or any <sup>of the</sup> ~~other/United Nations~~, ~~surviving nations~~ but entirely on some words spoken informally by Secretary of the Navy Knox in describing the relative importance to all of the United Nations of victory over Japan and Germany.

"I come to you today, people of China, because your doubts and fears are understandable to me, and yet are not extremely founded. When their basis is analyzed in the light of the plain facts, you will see that there is no foundation whatever for any doubt ~~think~~ of the comradeship and fullest cooperation of your sister nation across the Pacific.

"Both Tokyo and Berlin are delighted with this misunderstanding. They are doing their best to capitalize on it, sowing seeds of mistrust through their radio propaganda as much as they can. Tokyo, indeed, has gone so far as to make peace overtures to your nation, offering inducements to you to put an end to the devastating campaigns which your armed forces are now carrying on.

"But your great leader, Generalissimo Chang Kai-shek, was ~~sure~~ the very first to see and understand the full implications of the war that opened in December. Realizing that victory for China no longer meant a temporary casting off Japanese forces from Chinese soil, but the crushing forever of militarism in ~~China~~ Japan and her Axis partner nations, your

Add 2 - Victory for China - By Murray - 1/19

Government instantly declared war on Germany, Italy, and Japan alike. Your leader proposed almost at once a full military alliance of the United Nations, with a pooling of resources and a united strategy. It is unnecessary to tell you how far this program has progressed, with China taking a leading part in it.

"Since what time there have been many developments in the world-wide war. There have been victories and reverses for both sides, with the ~~present~~ total world picture showing gains on the part of the United Nations--gains to which the brilliant achievements of your armies in China have contributed in no small way.

"As to the policy being followed by the United Nations in the fighting of the war, from the point of view of the United States, it is not necessary to seek informal statements. The President of the United States himself defined that policy in plain words in his message to the United States Congress on January 7-- and every one of those words breathes the spirit of the union existing between China and the United States and our ~~many~~ other partners.

"President Roosevelt said in his message:

"We shall not fight isolated wars, each nation going its own way. These twenty-six nations are united not in spirit and determination alone but in the broad context of the war in all its phases." There in those few sentences the President answered any doubts and

Add 3 - Victory for China - By Murray - 1/19

fears strongly and flatly.

"Let us quote a little more from the President's message, to show exactly what our policy is. He said:

"Plans have been laid here and in the other capitals for coordinated and cooperative action by all the United Nations, military action and economic action. Already we have established, as you know, unified command of land, sea and air forces in the Southwestern Pacific theatre of war.... For the first time since the Japanese and the Fascists and the Nazis started along that blood-stained course of conquest, they now face the fact that superior forces are assembling against them. Gone forever are the days when the aggressors could attack and destroy their victims one by one, destroy them without unity of resistance. We of the United Nations will so dispose our forces that we can strike at the common enemy wherever the greatest damage can be done. The militarists of Berlin and Tokyo started this war, but the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it."

After quoting the President, Senator Walter F. George's message to the Chinese people continues:

"As a matter of fact, the point which Secretary Knox was trying to make was an endorsement of the policy of unity. It was of the most important issue facing the United States in that of shipping and conveying materials of war to China and other spots on the Pacific. Secretary Knox said:

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AAA 4 - Victory for China - By Murray - 1/19

"These are the endless lines of ships crawling over the waters of the earth--in the North Atlantic, in the South Atlantic, in the South Pacific--carrying to us the numberless things we need for life and war and carrying away the numberless things our friends need everywhere--our friends embattled with the common foe. These supply ships, these myriads of ships are long to and fro across the face of the earth must be protected."

"This protection which Secretary Knox insists upon means that China will have the reinforcements which she needs, and that you, the Chinese people, and your interests will be cared for by the United States to the limit of our power."

Senator George's message continues in these words:

"The events of this past week alone in the Pacific show that the United Nations are not just fighting a defensive war. In the Philippines, in Singapore, in Malaya, and elsewhere, all the United Nations are giving of their strength and their manpower to the end that China, along with the other partners, may live and win to the end--victory. We will withhold nothing to crush Japan and to assist China. Developments will demonstrate that England and the United States propose to give all possible assistance, in conjunction with China, in the war in the middle and southern Pacific area."

This ends the personal message from United States Senator Walter F. George to the people of China.

END WALTER GEORGE

"To the people of China:

"When the United States and Great Britain, followed quickly by 15 more nations, declared war on Japan, a spirit of jubilation mixed with grim determination swept through China. This was because of the prospect of large-scale aid, with arms, airplanes, ships and men, in the struggle which China had waged alone for nearly five years.

"Today, just a few weeks later, doubts receiving such aid and cooperation have been voiced by Chinese sources. These doubts are not based on any actions by the United States or any other of the United Nations, but entirely on some words spoken informally by Secretary of the Navy Knox in describing the relative importance to all of the United Nations of victory over Japan and Germany.

"I come to you today, people of China, because your doubts and fears are understandable to me, and yet are not correctly founded. When their basis is analyzed in the light of the plain facts, you will see that there is no foundation whatever for any doubt of the comradeship and fullest cooperation of your sister nation across the

Pacific.

"Both Tokyo and Berlin are delighted with this misunderstanding. They are doing their best to capitalize on it, sowing seeds of mistrust through their radio propaganda as much as they can. Tokyo, indeed, has gone so far as to make peace overtures to your nation, offering inducements to you to put an end to the devastating campaigns which your armed forces are now carrying on.

"But your great leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was among the very first to see and understand the full implications of the war that opened in December. Realizing that victory for China no longer meant a temporary ousting of Japanese forces from Chinese soil, but the crushing forever of militarism in Japan and her Axis partner nations, your Government instantly declared war on Germany, Italy, and Japan Alike. Your leader proposed almost at once a full military alliance of the United Nations, with a pooling of resources and a united strategy. It is unnecessary to tell you how far this program has progressed, with China taking a leading part in it.

"Since that time there have been many developments

-3-

in the world-wide war. There have been victories and reverses for both sides, with the total world picture showing gains on the part of the United Nations -- gains to which the brilliant achievements of your armies in China have contributed in no small way.

"As to the policy being followed by the United Nations in the fighting of the war, from the point of view of the United States, it is not necessary to seek informal statements. The President of the United States himself defined that policy in plain words in his message to the United States Congress on January 7 -- and every one of those words breathes the spirit of the union existing between China and the United States and our other partners.

"President Roosevelt said in his message:

"We shall not fight isolated wars, each nation going its own way. These twenty-six nations are united not in spirit and determination alone but in the broad conduct of the war in all its phases." In those two sentences the President answered any doubts and fears strongly and flatly.

"Let us quote a little more from the President's message, to show exactly what our policy is. He said:

"Plans have been laid here and in the other capitals

-4-

for coordinated and cooperative action by all the United Nations, military action and economic action. Already, we have established, as you know, unified command of land, sea and air forces in the Southwestern Pacific theatre of war . . . For the first time since the Japanese and the fascists and the Nazis started along that blood-stained course of conquest, they now face the fact that superior forces are assembling against them. Gone forever are the days when the aggressors could attack and destroy their victims one by one, destroy them without unity of resistance. We of the United Nations will so dispose our forces that we can strike at the common enemy wherever the greatest damage can be done. The militarists of Berlin and Tokyo started this war, but the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it."

After quoting the President, Senator Walter F. George's message to the Chinese people continued:

"It is a matter of fact, the point which Secretary Knox was trying to make was an endorsement of the policy of unity, is one of the most important tasks facing the United States to prevent that of shipping and conveying materials of war to China and other spots on the Pacific. Secretary Knox said:

-5-

"There are endless lines of ships crawling over the waters of the earth--in the North Atlantic, in the South Atlantic, in the South Pacific--carrying to us the numberless things we need for life and war and carrying away the numberless things our friends need everywhere--our friends embattled with the common foe. These supply ships, these swarms of ships crawling to and fro across the face of the earth must be protected."

"This protection which Secretary Knox insists upon means that China will have the reinforcements which she needs, and that you, the Chinese people, and your interests will be saved for by the United States to the limit of our power."

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-6-

with China, in the war in the Middle and Southern Pacific area."

This ends the personal message from United States Senator Walter F. George to the people of China..

7-20  
January 15, 1942

Mr. Louis Galantiere  
11 East 73rd Street  
New York City, New York

Dear Mr. Galantiere:

Thank you very much for the  
manuscript concerning Nazi fifth columnists  
and espionage which you forwarded to me.  
I have read it with a great deal of interest.  
In case we should find it necessary to  
interview the narrator, I shall let you  
know.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

edl:cmj



Jimmy this fellow is  
 (detention)  
 a notorious Earl egg. should  
 be avoided. Jimmy Burns  
 at State Dept. knows all  
 about him according to  
 Don.

His stuff is very hot  
 & good, almost Wallis style  
 according to Don. He names  
 places & people. This should  
 be duplicated & circulated to  
 radio & N.S. Also good  
 enough for Col. D. to read  
 normally. We would like 2 copies  
 for State Dept. & one for ourselves.

Wolfgang Gans zu Eder Putzitz

11 East 73rd Street,  
New York City,  
January 18, 1949.

Dear Colonel Donovan,

In the autumn of last year I spent some weeks talking to a German friend whose last post in the German diplomatic service had been that of counsellor of the legation at The Hague. Some of the things he told me, especially concerning Nazi fifth-columnism and espionage, I wrote out, in the expectancy that I might later re-write the material and thus get him a little money from the magazines. The first such article will appear in the February issue of Harper's.

It may be that some one in your Office -- perhaps you yourself -- would find it useful to have a look at the original material, which I send along under this cover.

The narrator's name is Wolfgang zu Putlitz. He is staying here with Ernst Angeli, for the time being, but can always be reached through me, in the event that your Office think him worth interviewing, on the score of the stuff enclosed.

Sincerely yours,

*Lewis Galantieri*

Lewis Galantieri.

William J. Donovan, esq.,

Washington, D.C.

*1 You may have noticed that we are running  
this letter over in the office*

11 East 75th Street  
New York City

*Wing disband*  
*- done for [unclear] [unclear]*

Although fifth columnism may be defined as the art of national disintegration, definition is made difficult by the fact that this activity is a repetition of a great number of separate strands. The press, the radio, the movies; trade regulations, labor regulations, social relationships, military and intelligence and espionage -- these are only some of the strands.

It would be a profound error to imagine that the fifth column of the Nazis was a great smoothly working machine, built according to a super-blueprint, a thing that "only those efficient Germans could think up." Its characteristic is not organization but diversity; not efficiency but determination. There is no doubt that the Nazi fifth column did come eventually to achieve a certain coordination, but muddle and duplication, though not externally visible, were the traits I distinctly saw in it, first as secretary of the German embassy in London, and later, in 1938 and 1939, when I was consul-general of the German legation at The Hague. One head, one directing agency, one central office in the Reich, the Nazi fifth column never had. Fifty is a likelier number.

There is first that special department of the Nazi Party known as the "Foreign Organization." There is Goebbels' propaganda ministry, working with press and film and radio agents in the non-German world. There is Goering's own staff of foreign operatives, travelling ostensibly as representatives of his personal newspaper, the well-known Nationalzeitung of

Brown, but to my knowledge frequently engaged in contact and observation on behalf of the aviation arm of the military establishment. There is the famous Bureau Nibelung, the private fifth-column agency of Hitler's Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was the agents of this bureau who, in England for example, were chiefly instrumental in the founding of the Anglo-German Fellowship into which they sucked such illustrious appeasers as the late Lord Lothian, Lord Londonderry, Lord Mount Temple, the late Lord Russell, and other innocents of the highest intelligence, or station, or doubt concerning the democratic processes. There is the Nachricht -- the <sup>original</sup> combined High Command embracing the land, sea, and air branches under a single authority in which the espionage and intelligence services are centralized under the direction of Admiral Canaris. And there is the Gestapo ubiquitous and ever-present Gestapo, permeating every arm and agency of the Nazi regime, -- for amongst the multiple functions of the Gestapo (the Secret State Police), one of the most important is the relentless frightening of German nationals abroad into the ruthless and unswerving performance of their duties as loyal Nazis. In this way the Gestapo has its hand in everything, including fifth columnism.

Besides these obvious instruments there are the foreign branches of what the Germans call "outward" agencies. They are of course too numerous to list, but among them is the Verband der Auslandsdeutschen (Association of Germans Abroad), operating out of Stuttgart; the Fichte Union and Dr. Johnson's Bureau, whose headquarters are in Hamburg; the Academic Exchange Service, which sends students and professors with foreign universities; and the schools established in many foreign countries with Nazi teachers and a Nazi curriculum. All such organizations have one point to one important fact, which is that "totalitarianism" is not merely a grotesque possibility, it is a "brutal" reality. If, for example, all the professional and social organizations in the United States

were guided by strict political principle and spied upon by an American Gestapo -- the dentists, the history teachers, the osteopaths, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Institution, the Bible societies, the lodges and fraternal groups -- this would be but a beginning of what totalitarianism represents. And every one of these associations that worked in foreign countries would be a fifth column agency before it was anything else -- exactly as the German archaeologists digging <sup>last spring</sup> ~~recently~~ in Syria were fifth columnists first, and scientists only afterwards.

In the past, such organizations were represented outside Germany by people of good will who, not being in Nazi hands, were certainly harmless and may even have been useful to the world at large. By 1933 most of the decent Germans in these posts had been forced out and replaced by Nazi party members. But even where some secret anti-Nazis remain, they are helpless to do otherwise than serve as Nazi agents so long as they cling to their German nationality; and the reason is that somewhere in the organization, somewhere in the country in which they live and work, there is a man or group of men whose orders they are forced to take, whose power could break them, at whose glance and word they tremble. And that man is by no means necessarily an agent of the Gestapo: that man is -- but who he is, is the substance of my story.

You have never heard of Dr. Betting. There is no reason why you should have. He is not a great man, merely a representative one. His like exists in every country where an appreciable number of German nationals reside. As to Dr. Betting is (an American, I do not know), and as I intend to speak only of what I have seen with my own eyes, and know of my own knowledge, I shall not speak of fifth columnists in the United States, for I have nothing about it. But I do not believe ~~it is~~ <sup>it is</sup> that there is ~~not~~ a Dr. Betting in every Latin American country where clusters of German nationals, some of them rich and influential, reside, work, and

early in business. I know that the South American Buttings employ exactly the same methods as my Butting employed; and because the story <sup>I</sup> have to tell is by and large the story of how the Nazi fifth column works in Latin America, I thought ~~as~~ as telling it in these pages.

## II

I have already said that in 1936 I was counsellor of the German Legation at The Hague. Few countries were more important in the pre-war Nazi strategy than Holland -- and for every good reason. Holland possessed a frontier on the North Sea from which attack upon England is immeasurably easier than from the German coast. With its independent shipping lines for arm and mail as well as goods, Holland was the ideal base for Nazi espionage operations against both England and the Americas, as well as the natural port of entry for the merchandise which the Nazis needed and preferred to buy through Dutch purchasing agents. The Dutch themselves were rich in goods indispensable to the Nazi war economy, both in their domestic industries and in their colonial empire. Their commercial relations with Germany were so intertwined that these countries could scarcely live without each other. And there were over 100,000 men and women of German nationality -- not refugees, but loyal German citizens -- resident and working in Holland. For all these reasons it was imperative that the Nazi party members in the Netherlands be rigorously organized, and their knowledge and influence employed for the destruction of the Dutch people. This was Dr. Butting's job.

It was not a job at which any man could work openly. The Dutch government was democratic, therefore it permitted the existence of a Dutch national-socialist party, and that party even had a handful of representatives in the Dutch Parliament. But Germans resident in Holland were forbidden by law to organize politically. This being so, both their

organization and their leader had to work under cover. The cover for the Nazi party organization was an outwardly social and cultural body that went by the innocent name of Reichsdeutsche Gemeinschaft, the German Citizens' Association. Every member of this association was a member of the Nazi Party of Germany. The president of the association was Dr. Butting, -- and the cover furnished Dr. Butting was an appointment as attaché of the German legation at The Hague.

Dr. Butting was by profession a nose and throat specialist in an unimportant south German town. His practice had been small, his income insufficient, and his grudge against the world prodigious. He had first become a Nazi, then an ardent Nazi, and in the course of time an agitator in Austria. Among the unfortunate Austrians he had acquired much skill in the art of national disintegration (which is to say, fifth columnism), that, rising in the Party ranks, he was eventually rewarded with the high and lucrative post of Landesgruppenleiter, or National Group Leader, for Holland. As diplomatic attaché, he was my subordinate -- or would have been had he ever taken part in the legation's work. As Party leader for Holland he was in absolute fact the unswerving king of every German national sentiment in that country. He reported solely and directly to Bohle, who was at one and the same time head of the Party's foreign organization and Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Thus Butting had a double grip on us of the legation. As between Butting and Count Zech, our Minister Plenipotentiary, there was no question which of the two was, in Bohle's eyes, the more trustworthy and more useful to the Nazi cause. Because Butting was the very model of a Nazi high executive, the pattern of the intellect and efficiency by which the world is to be ruled if the Nazis are not destroyed, I must say something more about him. I beg the reader to believe that I shall speak objectively, and quite without malice.



Dr. Betting was a true social revolutionary. Not only did he and his good wife sincerely despise titles and everything that smacked <sup>high</sup> of <sup>good</sup> living; not only did they refrain with almost inhuman self-discipline from ~~much~~ good cheer and good things to eat; they hated all the oppressors of the poor, including the bourgeois employer class. Betting honestly considered himself the defender of the humble and a great worker in their cause. The ~~hundred~~ thousand Germans in Holland were regimented by him; he held them in the hollow of his hand and terrified them, -- but only for their own good and in order to preserve them from exploitation by "Jewish plutocracy." For this reason it was with a happy heart that he directed what I may be allowed to call the Tammany aspect of Nazism (carried out in this case by the ladies' and other auxiliaries of the Citizens' Association) -- visits to the sick, coal for the indigent, beer evenings and other get-togethers for the various German communities in the Netherlands.

Meanwhile, a positive genius for inefficiency and disorder inhabited this little man. He never personally put a letter into an envelope but it was the wrong envelope. He never borrowed a file from the legation but it became lost forever. It was through his carelessness that the presence of a <sup>A. M. M. M.</sup> <sup>British formation</sup> spy <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>was</sup> revealed to the Dutch, as their former minister, van Kieffene, reports in his recent book, ~~Disarmament over Holland~~. His letters and dispatches were written in phrases of such wild obscurity and peculiar illiteracy that only another fervent Nazi, attentive to the lingo of the Party, could by Hitlerian <sup>conspicuous</sup> ~~guidance~~ guess their purport. He was the sort of man who, having agreed to something on Monday, would forget that he <sup>had</sup> agreed, and declare with perfect good faith on Tuesday that you must have misunderstood him, -- how could he have agreed when all his ~~ambitions~~ <sup>ambitions</sup> were to the contrary! And again his orders were given in a language so muddled that they

would not be carried out — with the result that the very clerks who took the orders were in the end rendered haphazard and inefficient through working for such a chief.

Yet it was a fact that Butting got things done. By power of will, by persistence, rage, trial and error, despite his ignorance and incapacity, and at the expense of immense waste and undisciplined energy, he got things done. In nothing was he more typically Nazi than in this.

### III

In 1938 the German legation owned two houses in The Hague. Both were of course the subject of diplomatic immunity and therefore inviolable as concerned search and seizure by the Dutch police. I shall call the house in which Dr. Butting had his office House No. 2.

What went on in House No. 2? It had been remodelled and was divided like a two-family house — vertically, not horizontally; but between the two halves there was a communicating door. One side the house was Dr. Butting's. The other half housed the Nazi military intelligence agent for Holland. I shall come back shortly to Dr. Butting. First I must say something about this second German man.

One day in June 1938 I received an official visit from the German military attaché at Brussels. He was accompanied by two army colonels, Fritz Berlin. They had come to inform us that a civilian agent of the military intelligence would henceforward work out of The Hague, and that it would be useful if he could be accorded diplomatic status as an attaché of our legation. (At that time, and until the spring of 1958, there was no representation of the High Command resident at our legation. The London embassy attended several Holland as regards air and navy, the Brussels man as regards the army.)

"Do you think the Dutch will stand for it?" I asked.

"Oh," they answered; "we have already spoken to the Dutch, and they have agreed. He told them that this man could operate only in England, although making his headquarters here, and promised that he would not work for or against Holland."

I said to myself that either the Dutch were very naive, or the military men were lying to me and had not spoken to the Dutch at all. If they were not lying, would the Dutch let their fellow democrats, the British know, I wondered.

My visitors asked if I would agree to the appointment they had in mind. So at the legation were already somewhat embarrassed by the presence of Dr. Butting on our list. Not socially -- though Butting in a top hat and his good lady in elbow-length gloves looked more like a pair of fierce Victor Victor than anything else. The embarrassment was professional. What Butting did on his own was no business of ours, but he had a habit of pestering us with a thousand pleads -- insisting for instance that we protect the Dutch foreign office against the publication of a caricature of Hitler, the presence of an anti-Nazi book in a Dutch shop-window, the showing of an anti-Nazi film; all petty nuisances in which he was invariably supported by our superiors in Berlin on instructions they received from their superiors -- Party headquarters. With this in mind, and also with the professional jealousy of the career diplomatist, I refused my consent. The army men did not insist, and we compromised on my agreeing to the appointment of their man as auxiliary clerk in the legation. Thus it was as a humble scribe, and not as an accredited diplomatist, that an important secret agent of the Nazis was certified to the Dutch Government. Typical of Nazi self-assurance was that although the man did not possess diplomatic status, he took it anyway, and his car carried a diplomatic license plate -- with Dutch compliance.

That this man was later called himself in 1937 I have forgotten,

but in my time at The Hague he went by the name of Schulze-Bernett. Like the others practicing his trade, he had a code name too. He was that very "Jonathan" mentioned in van Kieffens' book as a spy "whose identity was never revealed."

We at the Legation always referred to Schulze-Bernett as S.B., and I must say that S.B. was not a bad fellow. Of medium height, dark haired, with a hooked nose, he had bright blue eyes that looked out fixedly from beneath black eyebrows. He would sit habitually with his head on one side, staring with a steady blank gaze at a corner of the ceiling. I used to find myself imitating him unconsciously: it gave me a queer feeling of being some one else, of being suddenly a primitive, empty-minded, yet determined some one else. S.B. spoke fluent Dutch, which it appears he had learned as a planter, or a clerk on a plantation, in the Netherlands East Indies. How he came by his second Bureau job I have no notion. He certainly bore none of the earmarks of a military man. But he was more attractive than Dr. Butting: a little sliver, physically not quite clean, but gentle and modest, and never unbearable.

With S.B. we had a great deal less to do than with Dr. Butting. His trade was espionage, and we were to him not much more than a post office. One of the Legation ciphers had been put at his disposal, to which he alone had the key. Letters and packages that came for him were in the custody of the chief clerk until he chose to turn up. When he arrived, he would take away what he wanted, lock up the rest in his own safe, and be off again. His communications to and from Berlin went by diplomatic pouch of course. Indeed this he seemed not to stand in the special need of our services.

This is as good a place as any to explain the rôle of the German diplomatic officer -- <sup>from September 1939</sup> at least, in the larger scheme of the world -- in the last stages of espionage and fifth columnism. I should say -- there

-10-

are exceptions, no doubt, but this has been my experience -- that the last place to look for Nazi underground workers is among the <sup>Secret</sup> career officers of the ~~present~~ diplomatic service. Of course there are spies and fifth column workers attached to diplomatic and consular offices. But the real operatives are almost never to be found among the <sup>old</sup> career men who entered the service in the ~~imperial days~~ <sup>imperial days</sup>, for the good reason that these older career men have never been trusted either by the Party or by the new army clique -- those two partners in the ruinous government of the Third Reich. <sup>Scapa Offici, as</sup> A person listed on the embassy payroll as auxiliary clerk, or furnace man, or messenger might be in reality the head of the Nazi show in that country. If so, he would rarely been seen in or around the embassy or legation; and certainly his work would never be reported to the ambassador or minister, and it would never be reflected in the diplomatic files.

The older career men serve the Nazis as camouflage and decoys, and this is the reason why, up to the war at any rate, they were retained by the Party men who despised them. My own chief at The Hague, for example, was Count Zech, a son-in-law of the one time imperial minister, Bethmann-Hollweg. It was as Bethmann-Hollweg's son-in-law, as a reactionary, as an old ~~friend~~ <sup>friend</sup> of the Dutch, that Betting used to revile him. Yet Count Zech was kept at his post for the very reason that, <sup>from</sup> the dirty work <sup>went on</sup> outside the legation and not in it, his respectability was useful to the Nazis as camouflage. All the leading Dutchmen were his friends, and they tended to say to themselves that "so long as old Zech is here, the threat is not so great." Why did a Dutch man resist? Merely because the heads of our service hoped desperately that if they stayed they might prevent the more serious outrages; believed that if they left everything would be worse, and the German people would be ~~placed~~ <sup>placed</sup> ~~under~~ <sup>under</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~control~~ <sup>control</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~Nazi~~ <sup>Nazi</sup> ~~party~~ <sup>party</sup> ~~representatives~~ <sup>representatives</sup>.

It goes without saying, meanwhile, that the career men were made use of by the special agents in one way or another. They were friendly with

-11-

*(pretending to be as tough as they were, and doing what they did, but a little easier with them, but good in this way that to have a man, as a problem, at one time that he would be changed.)*  
 some of us, especially if we were not in the same position as they were.

*In this case,*  
 they would loosen up and tell us a good many things. But we never almost never knew the whole story about anything they did. In the London embassy under Ribbentrop there were actually two sets of personnel. As who were career men would refer to the other set as the "staff" men, that is, the Bureau Ribbentrop men. *Main important work was not reported* They were reported to the foreign office in Berlin, and perhaps they knew a lot that we never dreamt of. In a sense this was the position at The Hague.

Not all of S.B.'s correspondence was with Germany, and of his Dutch correspondents by far the most interesting were his financiers, the Rotterdam banking firm that styled itself Rodan, incorporated. If you will consult the British (not American) Bankers' Almanac for 1930-40 you will learn that Rodan was established in 1910, that its president is *syndicate* H.J.J. Heugmans, and its managers are H. E. von Goerschen and Dr. H. E. Eversmeyer. Its London correspondents, you will observe, are *Wattman's Sons' and Company.*

S. B. was a spy, and I have no doubt a very good one; but the Rodan group were as pretty a collection of fifth column agents as you could wish to consider. H. Heugmans puzzle could fit together more satisfactorily than the S.B.-Rodan picture.

"Heugmans!" I said to myself when first I saw the connection. *My Heugmans is a highly respected name in Cologne, not a Dutch name at all. Don't it to Cologne that S.B. seemed so frequently to deliver his reports and take his orders from the German Bureau man who has a desk in the banking company called Heugmans and Heugmans. Of course it is! Yes this Heugmans! -- and now I know Heugmans for a moment -- this*

Smuggler must be a Dutchman. He puts four initials in front of his name; and while the East Indians also do that, in Europe it is only the Dutch who are so considerate of the feelings of their godparents. But of course he is more useful to the Nazis as a Dutchman than he would be as a German, -- and very likely he has lived in Holland and been a Hollander for many years.

"He has been a Hollander," I went on, "precisely as his correspondent, <sup>aka</sup> Kleinwort, has been an Englishman for years and years." Surely in the British Government would bother old Kleinwort to-day, for he must be near eighty years old. Therefore I need not scruple to recall that when I approached Kleinwort's son-in-law in London after the war had started, to ask if he couldn't do something towards financing <sup>"Free"</sup> an anti-Nazi group in Britain, he assured me with sincere regret that it was impossible "because the old man is so violently pro-Nazi, you know."

Of Rotterdam I knew nothing, but the jigsaw piece marked "Herr van Geercken" fit exquisitely into the puzzle. Geercken was one of a number of former army officers who, after the war of 1914-1918, had found jobs in Holland and settled there. I used to see him at the legation on days when he personally would deliver sacks of gold coin or packets of bank notes -- one packet contained a quarter of a million guilders, say \$100,000 -- triple-coupled and addressed simply "Jonathan." There was always something strange about Geercken's evident care to avoid meeting A.B. Jonathan personally, as if not even we at the legation should suspect that he might keep suspicious company. Yet now, at the end of 1938, when I was returning to my post from a Christmas holiday in Germany, and had run into Geercken in the trade, he turned himself upon me and talked at length about his retirement visits to the High Command in Berlin -- especially, I g. guess, to Admiral Canaris' intelligence and espionage headquarters. (The High Command was located in the street called

-18-

Bundlerstrasse, and was generally referred to by the street name, just as the German foreign office was always referred to as the Wilhelmstrasse.) Gersonsen reported to me with extraordinary indiscretion what he knew of Bundlerstrasse opinion about political matters, wammam and I had the impression that he would like me to let some one in high place know that he, Gersonsen, was a good egg, was on "our" side, and so on.

Even more curious was the way in which this impression was confirmed by the chatty German train conductor after Gersonsen had left my compartment. Seeing him leave, the conductor, an old acquaintance, had begun to talk about him.

"That gentleman must be on bad terms with the Gestapo," the conductor remarked.

I was rather startled. "What makes you think so?" I asked.

"Well," said the conductor, "for one thing, he goes back and forth all the time between Holland and Germany, and he never takes the same route twice in succession. He is always crossing the frontier at a different point."

"Trying to avoid some one?" I suggested.

The conductor nodded. "The Gestapo, I'll bet."

He went on. "Another thing I don't understand is this. He's a German, isn't he?"

"Of course," I said.

"Maybe he is and maybe he isn't," said the conductor, enjoying his little triumph. "I mean, he used to carry a German passport, and now for sometime he has been travelling on a Dutch passport."

Such things had happened before to my knowledge, therefore I was not so astonished as I might have been. Gersonsen had certainly been hiding long enough in Holland to arrange for Dutch citizenship and a Dutch



-14-

passport. What was slightly peculiar about his situation was that, on recommendation of the High Command, he was at the same time permitted to retain his German nationality. "Legitimate" passport tricks were common in the Nazi espionage and fifth column system. For instance, every now and then we at the legation would receive a letter from the Wilhelmstrasse written "at the request of the High Command", which meant at the request of the German Bureau. It would inform us that certain Nazi agents would turn up at The Hague to whom we were instructed to deliver new German passports bearing indication of a fairly long Dutch residence. These persons would be coming from Germany in transit across Holland on their way to work for the German Bureau in England or the Americas. Thus an innocent Dutch residence was substituted for what, in British or American eyes, might be a suspicious German-Holland residence, and an innocent business connection in Holland was substituted for a perhaps suspicious official connection in Germany.

The web centering at Cologne could doubtless be followed thread by thread round the world. There is in Cologne a highly respected banking family called Dolstmann. This family is closely related to that other Cologne banker, Schroeder, at whose house Hitler and Fagen held their secret meeting in the course of which the first sold out his social revolutionary convictions to big business and the army, and the second sold out democratic and aristocratic Germany -- including his then chief, Schleicher -- to the Nazi thugs. A young Dolstmann, whom I used to see at parties in London when I was at our embassy there, turned out to be in the employ of them. Then there was Hallackret, also a member of a Rhinish banking family, and brother-in-law of Schleicher. This Hallackret had been a good figure actually in the German embassy in Paris. Suddenly, in August 1933, he turned up as Austrian representative of the Baden firm. Of

-15-

course he and Deichmann might readily have been innocent instruments of the Nazi banking agents; yet there was something curious about the concentration of Cologne talent in the Rotterdam bank called Wodan -- particularly as Cologne was the center of Nazi espionage operations for western Europe and, <sup>if my own h.</sup> ~~Germany~~, overseas.

Such, then, were S.B.'s bankers -- a firm with which the legation did no business and where the legation had no account. As for S.B.'s crew, I am reasonably certain that he worked with only a handful of pals in Holland itself. There was a mysterious individual called Paarmann who, I know, was in Holland on a Cameris mission. Paarmann was certified to the Dutch (under their labor regulations) as a clerk in the German Railway Information Bureau at Amsterdam -- one of the scores of offices formerly maintained by the Nazis in the interest of tourist service all over the world. (This bureau, incidentally, was a favorite form of cover for Nazi underground ventures abroad.) But Paarmann was, unlike S.B., a man of distinguished appearance, and his means were presumably greater than the salary of a tourist-agency clerk, since he lived in the most fashionable and expensive suburb of The Hague, a sort of Lake Forest, or Burlington, or <sup>Count Valley</sup> ~~Shore Park~~ called Wassenaar. He at the legation saw him very rarely, and it is my guess that the railway bureau saw him not at all.

Closer to S.B. was one Jake (pronounced Yapps), who was listed as S.B.'s chauffeur and was in reality his wireless expert. There are two things of interest to say about Herr Jake.

As this is written, in August 1941, the newspapers report that the Argentine Government has ordered the German Ambassador at Buenos Aires to bring back to Berlin a 500-w. wireless transmitter whose presence in the diplomatic pouch was revealed as the chance result of a postal regulation. It was just such an instrument that Herr Jake had installed and used to operate in the attic of S.B.'s half of House No. 2, in code

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The "attache" cannot be other than Dr. Buiting; for until the summer of 1939, when we were assigned a naval intelligence officer, there was absolutely nobody else round the legation who worked in any sense directly with S.B. But Buiting was not S.B.'s chief. S.B., indeed, had a very important post, with more than Holland for his province. The true situation was this.

S.B. may have had as many as a dozen subordinates working in Holland, all sub-agents of the Cameris Bureau. These were professional spies who knew their trade. But they could not possibly know Holland as intimately as was required by the strategy of the German High Command, as it was revealed following the invasion of May 1940. For this, not a dozen but perhaps several hundred sources of information were necessary. And it is at this point that Buiting and S.B. come together. Through his German Citizens' Association, Buiting had a pair of hard eyes, a pair of hard ears, in every town and hamlet of the Netherlands. They were the eyes and ears of his minor party officials. Whenever S.B. needed information concerning something concerning a corner of Holland which his people had not yet explored, or was anxious to check information relayed to him by one of his own people, he would go to Buiting.

"Have you anything along such-and-such a canal?" he would ask; "or is such-and-such a town."

Buiting always had.

"And so was the fellow's word," S.B. would say. And having driven out to ascertain the fellow (most often a party member, but sometimes a Hollander), having interviewed him and been completely satisfied with him, S.B. would mark him down as a *Vertrouwensman*, a man to be trusted. Through such a man he would learn, among other things, which of the Hollanders in the locality might be considered "reliable." The *Vertrouwensman* would not,

however, became a German sub-agent. If he were a Hollander, he would continue his work for the Dutch National-Socialist Party run by Mussert and Bart van Tuenningen. If, as was infinitely more likely, he were a German, he would go on working intermittently for S.S., but would continue his direct and normal Party service as fifth columnist, that is, as a man who, standing well in the Dutch community in which he lived, was able to spread Nazi doctrine and win sympathy for the Nazis of Germany and their way of life.

Incidentally, I ought to say that everything done by the Nazis is double-checked -- and even triple-checked, if we take account of the Germans. That G.B. learnt from one of his own people he checked with a Dutchman; and what the Dutchman was reported was unfailingly checked with an S.S. man, or by S.S. himself.

"I know every stone in Holland," S.S. once boasted to me. By "stone" he meant canal, lock, bridge, viaduct, culvert, highway, by-road, airport, emergency landing field, and the name and location of Dutch Nazi sympathizers who would help the invading army when the time came. Had Dr. Belling's Party organization not existed under the innocent cover of the Gliders' Association, S.S.'s knowledge of Holland would have been as nothing compared with what it was. Thus the Gliders' Association served a double purpose: it was indispensable for espionage at the same time as it supplied the primary function as a fifth column agency. Or, to put it more fully, there is no such thing as fifth columnism divorced from espionage. Spies and saboteurs, they came to the same thing; and when you permit fifth columnism, "more propaganda", you are at the same time intensifying the espionage carried out against your enemy. All through Latin America this situation is present.

-18-

## IV

The dispatch already referred to in which I found the name of Jahn mentions that the Nazi organization in Panama "is reported to number in its party membership virtually every one of German nationality in the Nation." The important words in this statement are "German nationality." They remind me -- since I am speaking for Americans -- that, contrary to popular belief, the case of foreign citizens who happen to be of German birth or descent from a far less reliable instrument of Nazi action than those residents of a foreign country who are still citizens of the Nazi State.

Of course there are many American citizens of German origin who are sympathetic with the Nazi cause. Some are sympathetic because they are simple-minded believers either in the myth of German <sup>racial</sup> superiority or in the myth of Nazi social achievement, or both. Some are sympathetic because for one reason or another they have had a hard time in America, and their adherence to the Nazi idea is a cheap fashion of taking their "revenge" on the country in which they failed to make good. Many thousands are sympathetic because, being of German origin, it is unavoidable that they should feel in their hearts a warm generous impulse to side with Germans instead of with Englishmen or Russians, so long as America herself is not at war. These are people who, never having lived in the inconceivable horror of Nazi oppression and Nazi grand and petty tyranny, really believe that the Germany they know and love still exists, and that everything said against the Nazis is just the old calumny of Germany by her enemies.

Also, then, are the thousands American citizens of German origin who work with the Nazis. First, individual Goebbels and their like in banking and business, who have a material stake in the Nazi success, either because they still own German property or because they are being paid American money and still are making Nazi business. Secondly,

individual fools and hothands, or criminal types happy to pick up a bit of Nazi "easy money." Obviously these latter are material for the purposes of Nazi agents in mass the Americans; but not collectively, merely individually; not as intelligent cogs in an organized machine of which they know themselves to be a part, but as mere tools earning the small pay and the great contempt of their Nazi employers. Could there be a more complete failure than Fritz Kahn's Band of German-American citizens? Does not the very threat for publicity and boasting of its fifth-rate leaders show how futile and anticlimactic the Band was, compared with true fifth columnists, the ones described? The Nazis were far too shrewd to bank the Nazi whole-heartedly, and the reason was this. The American citizen of German origin is useless to the Nazis ~~as a weapon~~ because the Nazis have no direct and unbreakable hold over them. On the other hand, over the German citizen resident abroad, even the German who secretly loathes the Nazi regime, the Nazis exercise a terrible hold, and they exercise over such Germans a severe and brutal discipline. The real strength of the Bettings, in Berlin America as in Holland, lies in their power over German nationals. It is easy to show how that power is exercised, and what results it produces.

A little later I shall run hastily over some of the endlessly varied activities carried on in Holland by the Nazi Party under its cloak as a German Citizens' Association, particularly because this may throw light upon the work of the Nazi fifth column in the neighborhood of the center of its control in the Western Hemisphere. At this point I want to make a sufficiently vicious report of the Betting procedure.

There was a continuation of German schools in Holland -- a high school in Amsterdam and perhaps a little primary school in other cities. German teachers, but also the citizens of Hollanders and of some members of the

diplomatic corps, attended these schools. The schools were subsidized by the Nazi Government. Their teachers were sent out from Germany and were all Party members. The curriculum was prescribed by Berlin and was exactly that taught in Nazi Germany. Such schools, it is well known, flourish throughout Latin America.

Now the great danger of these schools -- apart from the poisoning of young minds with ludicrous notions of race and history, and Nazi doctrine generally -- comes from the fact that, more than any other category of Germans living abroad, these school teachers are completely under the thumb of the Gestapo. They are not merely Germans and Nazis, they are civil servants participating in a hierarchy and a pension system in which they cannot afford to lose their rank and all the benefits accruing from their past service. Therefore, if a Gestapo instructs them to nourish the seed of anti-American feeling that lies in many a Latin-American breast, they will do so. If they are ordered to undermine the confidence of an employer (the father of one of their pupils) in a given employee, even by lying about him, they are bound to obey the order -- particularly as the fundamental legal and moral motto of the Nazi State is, "Right (or law) is that which is useful to the German People" (*Recht ist das, was dem deutschen Volk nützt*). Next, in the first place men of the highest respectability, and in the second place almost the only literary members of the Party abroad, they can make extremely effective use of the propaganda material furnished them by the agents of Goebbels and Himmler. In Latin America, for example, since they can, with utmost assurance, compare full employment in Germany with unemployment in the United States, and later "peace" in Germany with slavery in the United States, to show the "superiority" of the Nazi system. (Of course they do not add that the Nazis have won the war, and that the United States has lost only since



1940, and that Nazi labor "peace" is the "peace" of prison workers.) They can cite figures to display what great quantities of goods Germany normally buys from a given Latin American country in contrast to the small quantities bought from the same country by the United States. Literate people such as the readers of this magazine can have no notion of the astonishment which with which illiterate people are filled when the most commonplace facts are suddenly revealed to them -- with a little twist of the truth that the ignorant do not see. And it is upon the illiterate that the Nazis count as their easy victims in foreign countries (as at home).

In Holland three teachers had still another function. Dr. Butting maintained at House No. 2 an enormous ~~index~~ card file, in which he registered everything that his agents knew about the German population of Holland, as well as about non-Germans. Having no wish to draw attention upon himself by the presence of a large clerical staff in House No. 2, he obliged the teachers to do his clerical work for him after hours. Here was an instance of the sort of pressure a Butting could <sup>not</sup> bring to bear upon anyone not a German national, no matter how much that person loved Germany and wished to defend the Nazis because there had once existed a Beethoven and a Goethe. And here, along the information which a Butting would never want a German-American to know the existence of. In every aspect, this was almost Party work.

One of the most pitiful and skillful aspects of Dr. Butting's contribution to Holland was the control he possessed over the German working population, even those who were indifferent to politics or secretly anti-Nazi.

He had in Holland, you will recall, at least 100,000 Germans who had not surrendered, and by and large did not intend to surrender, their German nationality. As teachers, children, clerks, waitresses, common

laborers, or even housemaids, they were all required by Nazi law to be members of the Labor Front. The Labor Front, you may have forgotten, is that Nazi government department which has replaced the outlawed labor unions of Germany, and administers the workers' insurance, benefit, and pension system first instituted among us by Bismarck in the 1880's. In and out of Germany, every German worker must carry a Labor Front card and must have entered on that card the monthly contributions he makes to the Fund out of which the benefit payments are ~~disbursed~~ disbursed.

Consider what a boon this represented to Dr. Butting. Who in Holland shall collect these social contributions? Who but the Party members? From whom collect? From every single German in Holland below the status of an executive or proprietor of his own business. Thus, leaving aside the refugees, who had lost their nationality, every German man and woman in Holland was known to Butting's Party men; every one was identified and his personal history summarized in that vast card file upon which the teachers spent their evenings.

Now to be a German citizen and to be known to the Nazis is to be in the power of the Nazis. As long as you do not surrender your nationality, the Buttings are able to coerce or blackmail or bribe you into doing their bidding. They can break you, or they can induct you into the Party -- exactly as those west-pocket Bohemian girls choose. That you happen to reside outside instead of inside Germany makes no difference. You are their man; and this is of course especially true of the poor, for the poor by definition live in uncertainty, have no influential friends, and stand in constant dread of authority -- whether it be the rent collector or the police.

I remember that in the winter of 1944-45 Butting had received orders to repatriate to Germany, because of the war-economy labor shortage, literally thousands of German housemaids who had been working in Holland.

The great stamp card file was consulted, and Butting himself decided <sup>which</sup> ~~what~~ women were to go and which were to be allowed to remain. Those who were most "useful" to the Party stayed; and I know personally that the German maids in the household of the Dutch prime minister, Wynneer Colijn, were <sup>to stay</sup> ~~allowed~~ as a special favor to the ministry. Since the papers of these women had to be examined, it was to our legation that they were brought in dozens twice a week. We had a large room at the back of the house into which they were herded. I used to call that room the Slave Market, and had ~~you~~ seen it filled with those hundreds of pale, drawn, unhappy faces you <sup>there</sup> would have agreed that ~~that~~ was no other name for it.

These girls knew what was ahead of them. They did not want to ~~work~~ the hard state by doing rough work on farms, for which they were unused, or heavy work in industry, for which they could be hastily trained. They ~~who~~ had lived in rich, well-fed Holland had no mind to live in the thin ~~small~~ economy that they ~~had~~ <sup>had</sup> bestowed upon the Germans. They had no wish to surrender the savings they had put away in sound Dutch guilders in exchange for hard rations of uncertain purchasing power. But what could they do? They knew nothing of the law of nationality. They were aware that if a Dutch lad married you, you became Dutch and thus escaped this transportation to what was in effect a national prison camp. But it wasn't every day that a Hollander married one of these girls; and aside from this there was no way out for them.

Later, after the invasion of Holland began, I was told that some of these girls, because of their knowledge of certain regions of Holland, had been among the parachute troops who dropped out of the Dutch skies in May 1940. That may or may not be true; I can only say that some of the women I saw in the Slave Market impressed me as ~~clusters~~ <sup>clusters</sup> for that kind of service.

It was not far different with the men of German nationality somewhere. If you didn't toe the line you lost your job. And what then? Holland, like all countries without a war economy, had her share of unemployed. Jobs were scarce, and the foreign unemployed were instantly deported by the Dutch, who had no wish to extend the dole to them. So you found yourself back in Germany. What sort of work could you get in Germany if you were in Batting's black books? Labor camp work, and no other

But there were other reasons than terrorism why you should submit to Dr. Batting. There were these little <sup>every day</sup> practical reasons which play so large a part in our lives that we never think of them as decisive, never second than the importance they possess. For example, you -- and the women too -- enjoyed certain advantages by being a "good" German, that is, at least outwardly a Nazi sympathizer. The Nazi "Social Department" of the Citizens' Association through which your Labor Front dues were collected, also furnished you sports, recreation, and entertainment through its local branches. If you had to send money home to your family in Germany, "the boys" knew where you could get a favorable exchange rate for your guilders. Suppose you were in Berlin, and were home to Germany for Christmas. You could get out of Holland all right, but the only way to be reasonably sure that you would be allowed back was to impress the "the boys" with the idea that you could make yourself useful to them. So you spied on your employer; you answered questions about what went on in your shop; you told "these boys" that the ~~submarine~~ <sup>submarine</sup> ~~engineer~~ <sup>engineer</sup> ~~standing~~ <sup>standing</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~whose~~ <sup>whose</sup> house you worked was being transferred to east-and-west a place next month; you let them know what <sup>about Hitler</sup> ~~Hitler~~ <sup>about Hitler</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~offering~~ <sup>offering</sup> ~~agent~~ <sup>agent</sup> ~~had~~ <sup>had</sup> ~~said~~ <sup>said</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~Hynhear~~ <sup>Hynhear</sup> ~~B.~~ <sup>B.</sup>, the old man, whom at the time you were a waiter. It didn't seem to you that by this system ~~you were~~ <sup>you were</sup> ~~being~~ <sup>being</sup> ~~trapped~~ <sup>trapped</sup>, -- merely that you stood in a little better with "these boys" and had made a

friendly given came for a moment into a Party official's eye that ordinarily was cold and suspicious. If, two months later at the club, you chanced to overhear that the shipping man was no longer agent for the German line his family had long represented, it meant nothing to you, -- unless you were a very clever lad in which case you were on the way to being one of "the boys" yourself.

And as the Betting organization worked upon the humbler German people in Holland, so they were able to work upon the humble Dutch people. What I am about to tell will find no analogy in Latin America, but it is still of contemporary significance because the same trick is being played to-day upon the humbler people of France.

It was in 1938. That German labor shortage of which I have spoken was serious. The Dutch, for their part, were still experiencing an embarrassing degree of unemployment. The Nazis decided to import labor from Holland. In the Dutch labor ministry there was a highly placed civil servant, van Heeren by name, who was a ferociously enthusiastic admirer of Nazi Germany. Betting and his friends had seen to it that van Heeren and his wife were often invited to Germany at government expense. As the lady was apparently very intelligent, the van Heerens managed to get themselves pretty heavily into debt to German shops -- which debts, I was told, were settled by the kindness of their Nazi friends. What else van Heeren may have done up to, I happened not to learn; but it is a fact that his own Dutch police put him into prison -- or, would, too late -- in the spring of 1940. It was with the aid of this van Heeren, and with the advice of another member of the Dutch anti-socialist party, that the Dutch unemployment records were carefully culled for men to be put to work in Germany. A selection was made of those young men who were at once the best looking and most intelligent among the Dutch unemployed.

The young men were shipped off to Germany and given work at fair wages. The foreign exchange regulations were relaxed in their favor, and they were permitted to send home to their families, in Dutch guilders, up to two-thirds of their pay. They were decently housed, quite well fed, and generously entertained with free beer, movies, and dances, sometimes three evenings a week, by the officials of the "Strength Through Joy" <sup>Movement</sup> or one of the other Nazi agencies for keeping up the spirits of the Nazi slaves at home. With their habitual cunning, the Nazis rotated these Dutch unemployed. They would keep a man in Germany, in these favorable conditions, not above six months, send him back, and replace him by another. The total turnover, I recall, was about 80,000 men.

Then one of these men returned to Holland, and found himself again out of a job, he was more than ever dissatisfied with the government and employers of his own country, and was then ever an admirer of the Nazi ways. Often he became a member of the Dutch national-socialist party; and even if he did not, he became at least a non-resister of the German invasion. The wives of these men, meanwhile, who suffering through their unemployment had suffered not only from want, but also from the despondency and ill-temper of a husband humiliated by the thought that he could not make a living for his family, were perhaps more pro-Nazi than their husbands. Thus, the woman who came twice a week to clean my house at Scheveningen, and whose husband had been a six months' brick in these circumstances, said to my servant: "I don't care if the Germans invade us. My husband says they are certainly better than the government and the bosses we have. Let them come. At least they'll give us work."

The spirit of this movement was something so extraordinary that it could have been fostered only in the perverted imagination of its Nazi organizers. I know -- because I saw them with my own eyes -- that in September 1939, after the Nazis had declared war against England and France,

-18-

actually hundreds of Dutchmen appeared at our legation in The Hague to offer their services to Nazi Germany in any capacity -- many of them suggesting espionage. Such was the intensity of the delusion implanted in thousands of Hollanders by the months they had spent in Germany. No at the legation had orders simply to take the names and addresses of these volunteers, put them into sealed envelopes, and turn the envelopes over to the intelligence agent, S.B. It was not until Holland was invaded in May 1940, many months later, that I realized what S.B. had been able to do with these fellows. Certainly they were among the many-minded <sup>of my second division, 1st and 2nd</sup> ~~of my second division, 1st and 2nd~~ Hollanders who helped to welcome, shelter, and guide the German paratroopers in when they saw the saviors of their country.

<sup>from one country to another</sup>  
I want to ~~say some further words about the Dutch~~ before I leave this subject. <sup>The Dutch</sup> Their army fought magnificently against unbentable odds. The Dutch people were in an immense majority loyal to their queen and their way of life. The number of those who were deluded by the Nazis, or who sold out to the Nazis, may have been as small as 200,000 or as great as 250,000 out of say 5,000,000 adults in Holland. <sup>the number</sup> ~~of this number~~, only some can be called traitors in the usual sense, for many of them must have believed that they were acting in the true interest of the nation. In themselves, these 200,000 or 250,000 men had no power. The Dutch Government was not in their hands. The Dutch army was not theirs. The banking and business community was by no means completely Nazified. The strength of this country was created directly and absolutely by Nazi fifth columnism, and the real danger of fifth columnism is not that it makes converts but that it makes traitors.

It was Nazi fifth columnism which saw the weaknesses in the Dutch democratic and capitalistic structure and exploited them. Because you are democratic and capitalistic, they promised, you have unemployment. Because of this your arms factory trade has dwindled. Because of this you have

-29-

governors who are weak and cowardly and not leaders of men. Thus Nazi fifth columnism influenced the non-Nazi Hollander by making him skeptical of the value of his traditional Dutch institutions. Without being actually disloyal to these institutions, the non-Nazi Hollander was not entirely sure that they were worth defending. He was not absolutely certain that they would not, in reality, be swept away by a "wave of the future" as the Nazis were constantly telling him they would be. So he became not a Nazi, of course, but a passive non-resister, a man unsure of himself and of his world. This you may take to be gospel -- it is not the converts but the doubters, the non-resisters, who explain the collapse of their nations. <sup>And the ~~standards~~ <sup>first decision</sup> product of fifth columnism is not the convert, I repeat, it is the non-resister.</sup>

I have more than once emphasized that German citizens are resident in foreign countries in large number. These are people who hope sooner or later, when the world has quieted down, and when they have made their little fortune abroad, to go home to Germany to live. So long as the Nazis were going great guns, a camouflage organization like the German Citizens' Association had a quite special attraction for these Germans.

Whereas in Germany itself the Nazi Party has been closed since 1945, and virtually no new members admitted, it is still possible for a "deserving" German living abroad to attain to the honor and achieve the material advantage of ~~membership~~, or Party member. Out of 80,000,000 inhabitants there are only some 8,000,000 Party members in Greater Germany. So you see without saying that, each on his own mental level, they constitute the propensities and the preferred class of present-day Germany -- exactly as the limited number of members of the Communist Party in the USSR constitute



the preferred and governing class in that other one-party despotism. Therefore, these Germans who cling to their nationality while they live abroad cannot but yearn to become Party members and enjoy the solid dollars-and-cents advantages of Party membership in the mother country. Any one of them who possesses the least tendency to unscrupulousness can be led round by the nose, if only the promise of Party membership is dangled before him as an eventual reward for his services to the Butting of the country in which he resides.

The Party organization in Holland (as in any Latin American country) followed that at home as closely as its smaller numbers would permit. Under Dr. Butting served a corps of district leaders. Each district leader had his cluster of precinct captains, so to say. And each precinct captain was in command of his troops. In solemn imitation of the Party bureaucracy at home, the Party in Holland was administered by a large staff which included an almost comical variety of specialists (some of them high ranking Party dignitaries). Did a German football team arrive to play against a Dutch team? The Amsternarr, or sports warden, met them with a band at the railway station, organized a cheering section, and arranged for the fraternization of Dutch and German teams and enthusiasts at a great beer bust after the game. Did a delegation of Nazi schoolteachers come to attend a convention with their Dutch colleagues? A Schulnarr, or school warden, himself a disorganizer and Party leader, was on hand to aid in demonstrating that one could be a Nazi without ceasing to be a pious Christian and a son of culture. Was there an exhibition of German fine printing in Holland? A Buchnarr, or book warden, herded the Dutch publishing trade to the show, indicated who among them were important enough to be given complimentary copies of expensive books, and arranged that a German speaker at the evening banquet should say flattering things about the Dutch press.

-51-

Indeed, the means of action at the disposal of Dr. Butting were without end. One was the Nazi Youth Movement. Since Holland lay alongside Germany it was natural that this movement should have its initiators among the Dutch, and should be used to further enthusiasm in the Netherlands for the Nazi way of life.

There was a vigorous, self-made industrialist in Rotterdam, Jough by name, who financed Dutch youth camps on the Nazi model. Mynheer Jough was a man who wished his workers well with all his heart. They were given their lunch and furnished recreation, sport, and entertainment without stint under his sternly charitable eye. They had good wages, and nothing was denied them except independence of spirit and the possession of their own souls. Butting, ordinarily so wrathful against the capitalist employer class, was delighted with Mynheer Jough. It was hard for a Dutchman to be anyone enthusiastic in our little Butting, but of Jough he would exclaim: "There is a real man, a man of our own kind!"

Jough had one great delight in life, which was to attend the annual ~~Willemsdag~~ the Four Days' March, in which about a hundred Nazi youths and the same number of Dutch youths tramped and camped round Holland in the happy fraternity of the making out-of-doors. This circus always closed with a review of the future common father, before a smiling Dr. Butting, a hearty and happy Mynheer Jough, and a tiny general of the Dutch army, still in active service, whose rank was something like ~~Major~~ Major. The general, I am sure, was present in the line of Nazi duty, and not out of Nazi enthusiasm.

The March that I went down to witness in August 1936 was a very gay affair. The group after the march -- for they were competing in the making of fun and sport -- the boys strode through the villages hung with Dutch and Nazi flags and crowded with spectators whose faces beamed with joy.

delight at the sight of all these healthy attractive lads — as if here really was true fraternity, true internationalism, a true promise of peace on earth.

Again it was a little thing, a minor species of fifth columnism; yet what could go deeper than the implanting of this cheerful impression of the innocence and decency of the Nazi spirit? I have spoken to many Americans who travelled through Germany in the years between 1935 and 1939. Shortly as they used to extol Mussolini as the great man who caused the Italian trains to run on time, so they would praise Hitler because the youth of Germany, walking in the woods, strumming its lutes and singing its folk-songs, proved that justice and freedom were the outstanding characteristics of the Nazi regime. Of the poisoning of minds against all foreigners including these Americans themselves, of the corruption of souls and of daily life, these travellers saw nothing; and it goes without saying that no one dared tell them anything. Between these youths and their true life as Nazis there was approximately the same relationship as between ~~immature~~ American summer camp children ~~and the home~~ <sup>from which</sup> they really live in.

Before I move on to a more important topic I must tell a story of absolutely eye-opening Nazi cleverness in propaganda, a vast scheme in which we at the League found ourselves involved.

The Baron Ribbentrop had his own foreign press and propaganda service, very much to the disgust of Goebbels, who deemed this his exclusive province. Over this (and much else) <sup>via</sup> the great man would struggle constantly, and it was part of the present cunning of Hitler that he would never pronounce a final decision between them. By this refusal to judge between his allies, Hitler was able to keep them all fearful lest

they were slipping in his esteem, and therefore more anxious than ever to demonstrate their loyalty to him.

In the summer of 1939 Ribbentrop particularly enraged Goebbels by radically cutting up his own teletype machines in the foreign embassies and legations, for the transmittal of German news. This served a double purpose. It cut squarely <sup>down</sup> into Goebbels' domain, and it furnished spot news with Nazi coloring to the foreign press long before most <sup>4. 20. 1939 - Nazi</sup> other foreign press agencies could pass along matter to the local newspapers. But my story concerns something other than press service.

At the time these machines were installed, the Bureau Ribbentrop had another brainstorm. It conceived the notion of mailing out dull and outworn propaganda material to hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of non-Germans. The business was almost as complicated as it was comical.

First, all missions abroad were instructed to send to the foreign office at Berlin lists of foreign names and addresses. We at The Hague collected the local telephone directories, club and association lists, Who's Who in the Netherlands, and like sources, and shipped them off. Next we began to receive, personally delivered by diplomatic courier, pouches stuffed with thousands upon thousands of envelopes. These envelopes contained the propaganda material -- endless speeches by Hitler, and other things no one but a student or a fanatic would read. The envelopes bore no indication of the sender, and were addressed in German female hands by women who had miscollected every other name of person and street. Since the lot we received for mailing from Holland was addressed only to people in England and France, I took it that the Dutch addressees received their reading matter from the legations in France or England or Switzerland.

Clearly, this mail had to be stopped. How to buy 100,000 or 200,000 first-class stamps for a legation a Dutchish business, especially in a small country like Holland. Dr. Hettling was summoned to the rescue,

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## VI

The Citizens' Association was dominated by perhaps fifteen leading Nazis resident in Holland. Some of their purposes they carried out through the association itself; others were effected through collateral organizations whose directors were more respectable and less obvious Nazis than the vulgar Dr. Batting, though still working closely with him. For instance, there was the Dutch counterpart of the Anglo-German Fellowship, now called the German-Netherlands Society <sup>by the English, this was a better name, and it</sup> (~~Deutsch-Niederländische Gesellschaft~~). It was a curious thing that whereas the Anglo-German group was led, on the British side, by titled Englishmen, the Dutch-German society was represented on the Dutch side almost altogether by business men. The Court of the Queen of Holland inclined to be old-fashioned and severely exclusive. <sup>It had its Nazi sympathizers</sup> — the very rich Count <sup>offspring</sup> Dussanbourg, for example — but they were totally without influence at court, and the entourage of the Queen was throughout absolutely above suspicion.

Thus, the president and other officers of the German-Netherlands Society were all representatives of the Dutch business world. At their dinners stood the important members of the German business community in Holland. The fraternization between the two elements was complete, but on a strictly business foundation. At their lunquets, certain conventional phrases were pronounced concerning the racial affinity between the two hostile peoples; but the chief stress was laid upon the commercial interdependence of Holland and Germany, upon Holland as Germany's gateway to the Atlantic, and so on. I recall sitting at one of their dinners beside a British landowner who accused me with emotion that he would not have been so de villed the German market for his onions, now that the British were no longer buying them. The film cheese producers used the same language. Shortly in sight a Latin-American exporter thank his stars

for German buyers: when neither the Americans nor the English were in the market for his product. It was all innocent enough on the Dutch side. They would entertain Fant, the Nazi Minister of National Economy, when he came to Holland. They held dinners for German commercial missions, and for the delegations who arrived to discuss the German-Dutch debt-clearing program; but it was all in the line of trade.

The Nazis had been extraordinarily clever about going ~~deep~~ deeply into debt wherever they could. There is a saying among us that "It can money is to be weak." The contrary was true of the Nazis. "You have only to buy more from us and clear off your credits," they would say smoothly to the Dutch banks and chambers of commerce. Their aim was always to make the Dutch dependent upon German sources of industrial supply. They would take Dutch orders readily, in order to keep the Dutch out of other markets, and then would fill the orders or not, as it might suit their bank. For example, they never let the Dutch buy airplanes anywhere but in Germany if they could help it; and I am reasonably sure that all, or nearly all the Dutch war planes were Fokker-Wulfs from Germany, probably delivered in insufficient number. Another example: The Dutch were trying in the late spring of 1939 to place orders for artillery pieces. The French and the British, when they had approached, could promise only limited delivery. When von Papen, the German military attache at Brussels, got wind of the negotiations, and immediately pressure was put upon the Dutch to break off with the others and contract for Krupp guns -- ~~despite the~~ <sup>despite the</sup> promise of delivery that the French and British dared not make. (Presumably the same procedure was used in dealing with Germany's Italian and Latin American creditors.) Considering the late date of the order, I suspect that some of these guns were actually delivered to Belgium, and it is even likely that it was never intended they should be

*can only have been*

delivered. It that late date the true intent was that the Dutch be as little equipped for war as possible. Incidentally, Dr. Butting was a party to these negotiations; and it speaks eloquently of the number and variety of strings in his hands that I never had the least idea how he happened to be involved in what, on the surface, does not seem to be a fifth column job at all.

There was in Amsterdam a prime fifth column center called The German Chamber of Commerce for the Netherlands. Its officers were exclusively German and Nazi, and its president was a certain Dr. Flasche. Flasche was one of the High Fifteen of the Citizens' Association, a key man who served as a gushing fountain of information for the spy, S.B., even more than for Dr. Butting. It was he, as well as one Sperling, head of the German railway bureau which I have already mentioned, who were the chief consultants and sources of data for the special war-economy attache assigned to maintain within our Amsterdam consulate in 1939 to make a complete census of Dutch business properties. The same sort of census was taken by the same sort of specialist in other European countries; and it was thanks to the information they gathered that the High Command was able, after the invasion, to see that German supplies of raw materials and manufactures were promptly supplemented by the stocks present in the invaded countries. The same data, also, told the Nazi profiteers what foreign properties to "buy up" with the paper currencies they issued in the invaded countries and showed upon the classification of the properties they acquired.

Another task carried out by Flasche and Sperling had to do with the activities of S.B. Because it was a High Command job, and not a straight fifth column job, it was S.B. and not Butting who was instructed to appoint German business men in Holland as agents for a purpose which I shall describe.



and it was Flecke and Sperling who nominated these agents out of the German Chamber of Commerce membership. Not as a committee, but individually, each ignorant of the fact that others were also working for the High Command, one German business man was appointed by U.S. agents for the quiet purchase of oil supplies on Nazi behalf; another was being employed to engage cargo space in advance for the import of war materials to go to Germany; a third was sent into the market to pick up gold coin; and so on. All this was arranged in May and June 1939 when, having taken Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had made up their minds to risk war that summer and were hastening their final preparations.

Dr. Flecke's position in Dutch as well as German business circles in Holland was absolutely unassailable; even had he been attacked in the Dutch press before September 1939 it is probable that every decent business man in Holland would have cried 'For shame! The man is being persecuted!' Not only was this before the invasion of May 1940 the Dutch police arrested Flecke as a Nazi spy -- and, incidentally, expelled the notorious Dr. Zitting. I mention this not to attack Flecke personally -- for my story deals with bigger things than personalities -- but to let the reader see that no quarter is too respectable, no circle too sanctified, to be infected with espionage, with treason (as in the case already cited of van Rooyen), and with fifth columnism. There was in the Dutch civil service a Jew, even, who tended to the German colony in Holland, who sat always at the guest table when the German-Netherlands Society or the German Chamber of Commerce gave a banquet, presided the greatest reception for the Nazis, and was in the end awarded a Nazi decoration by Nazi himself -- although after something of a battle amongst the Nazis. The man's name was Hirschfeld; his function was the drafting of commercial treaties between his government and foreign governments; and he was the highest man to whom a civil servant can aspire -- substantial

permanent Assistant Secretary of Commerce. Yet by reason of some quirk in his nature, the man was doubly a renegade -- to his nation as a Hollander, to his people as a Jew.

A minor aspect of Fiesche's function -- if any aspect of fifth columnism can be called minor -- was to flatter Dutch business men, for example by whispering to them that Minister Fusch, on his last visit, had asked specially about them. When the Utrecht Fair was held -- the greatest annual event in Dutch business -- it was Fiesche who saw to it that the right Hollanders were decorated with the Order of Merit of the German Eagle, the final reward reserved for meritorious foreigners. He was always present at the process where it was determined which Dutch business men should be awarded the signal honor of an invitation to the annual Congress of the Nazi Party at Nuremberg -- though the Dutch national-socialists decided the semi-finals, and Himmler's approval was necessary for the final decision about the list.

The simplest fashion in which the Nazi fifth column worked upon the Dutch business world was to eliminate executives unfriendly to the Nazi regime from business and to replace them by their own tools. In the beginning the process was more or less haphazard, the Nazis being still uncertain how far they might go. As an actual plan, it matured only in 1939. In that year, for the first time, it was determined to get rid of Jews wherever possible: including Germany. As there was scarcely an important Dutch firm without Jews among its officers or directors, Holland was immediately affected. After the Jews came other undesirables, from the Nazi point of view. And the interesting thing is that it was not the propaganda men but the military intelligence men who first saw the advantage of removing undesirables and replacing them by "safe" people in strategic positions.

Dr. Buiting and his colleagues of the fake Citizens' Association worked upon both Germans and Hollanders. It must be borne in mind that ~~there was scarcely any~~ <sup>few</sup> ~~business~~ <sup>firms</sup> in Holland that was not in some measure dependent upon the German market and a German connection. This was especially true of the numerous Dutch commission houses, import and export businesses, agency and factoring firms, and transport and insurance companies. A large part of Holland's shipping and transit trade was done for German account. Wherever a Dutch business man turned he found himself faced with the problem of Germany. And of course this was particularly true of the banks.

The German in Holland who was not amenable to the dictation of Buiting and his friends had no chance whatever to stay in business. ~~He was threatened~~ He was threatened ~~firms of all with the loss of his passport. Here is a threat so serious~~ that Americans, citizens of a really free republic, can hardly grasp its import. It puts a man before these alternatives: either go back to Germany, or declare yourself a refugee and cut yourself off from your country and your family at home. And this particular German a job with a German firm in Holland? He was fired automatically. With ~~an~~ a Dutch firm? A word in the proper ear and the man was out of work. Was ~~him~~ he the agent of a German principal? Buiting had only to write to Rohle, in Berlin, that ~~was~~ ~~J. Rotterdam agent of the German firm J. was~~ ~~right~~ ~~Barlaam~~ ~~is~~, not trustworthy. A peremptory note from Rohle (Party headquarters) to the German firm in question, and J's agency contract was immediately rescinded. Was the man proprietor of his own business? As he was a German, his business was seen to have a German basis of connection, and he was promptly seized. His source of supply was blocked, his credit line was withdrawn by the banks, his market was closed to him. In one way or another the

-41-

*was just on the floor down:*  
 German in Holland, ~~had these alternatives placed before him:~~ Come in with us or blow your brains out! Fifth columnism has its tragic <sup>descent</sup> side even for the German; and I cannot but believe that many a German business man in Latin America is to-day playing a part he loathes and of which he is ashamed. The reader will forgive me if I add that I say this without partisanship. It is simply in the nature of things that not all the Germans in the world can fail to see the hideousness of the Nazi regime, not all of them can wish to conspire against the whole world and have fools enough to dream of conquering it.

Now was it much harder to get at the Dutch, -- not of course in their strictly Dutch enterprises, but wherever there was any connection at all with Germany. Assume a Hollander who for years has had a profitable connection with an agent for a German firm. If his agency was valuable to him -- as in the case of a machinery distributor, a shipping firm, an oil importer who sold his product in the German market -- that man had absolutely to live in the good graces of Dr. Butting and his friends, or go out of business. Butting might be suspicious of the man, or not like his face. If so, he would shuffle up one of his lieutenants.

"Get something on so-and-so for me," he would order; and the lieutenant, having interviewed a German lad working for the agency, would report back that the Hollander had spoken mightily of the inferior quality goods ~~being~~ <sup>being</sup> sent into the German market he handled, or that his wife went to a Jewish dentist. (You don't believe that about the Jewish dentist? I myself, who went to a Dutch -- not Jewish -- barber, had to refuse ~~refused~~ <sup>refused</sup> services from Butting because I did not give my trade to his Negro German barber in the Hague.) ~~But for years had been getting~~ <sup>But for years had been getting</sup> ~~that I was a Jewish dentist, Butting, who was very clever and~~ <sup>that I was a Jewish dentist, Butting, who was very clever and</sup>

~~... and that I would go to a German as soon as I could not otherwise...~~  
 Then, soon after, that agent was replaced, his successor was bound to be  
 a Hollander who knew which side his bread was buttered on. A man who would  
 do as he was told.

How would Butting hesitate to put in an incompetent Hollander --  
 if the man was a good Nazi and useful to the Party. The Dutch national-  
 socialist leader, Mussert, might drop a word to some one in Berlin. Or  
 it might be Roel van Tellingen who spoke, Mussert's partner and rival --  
 for all Nazis are at one and the same time partners and rivals, standing  
 shoulder to shoulder against the world with their knives drawn, ready to  
 cut each other's throat. The Dutchmen would say to the Germans:

"Look here, I have a wonderful fellow in Rotterdam, a great Party  
 worker. He's down on his luck and needs a job. See what you can do for  
 him. It could help us a lot."

By the grapevine, the appeal would reach Butting's desk. In a  
 couple of weeks the Dutch Nazi would have been given a small agency. His  
 pals would think him a great fellow -- yesterday unemployed to-day  
 representative of a German firm, no less! And he would say to his pals:  
 "You see the sort of thing the Party could do for everybody if only we  
 got rid of this anti-Nazi government of ours!"

The reader can imagine that this sort of dictation to Dutch  
 business and disruption of Dutch business personnel irritated and disturbed  
 the Hollanders against talking. To what lengths the Nazis in Holland went  
 I saw in the case of the great worldwide Dutch shipping agency, Willem H.  
 Muller & Co. This venerable firm had for many years been agent in Dutch  
 territory for a number of European navigation companies, including the  
 German lines -- Hapag, and North German Lloyd. When the Nazi fifth column

-15-

got well under way, and was going great guns, it was determined to inform the Muller company that the personnel of its board of directors was unacceptable to the Nazi Government and would have to be changed. The pretext was that the Nazis could not have "untrustworthy" people, some of them Jews, directing an agency which represented German lines. I imagine that the Mullers rose in their wrath and told the Nazis what they could do, for no change was made. Negotiations went on for months, the Mullers, <sup>fighting</sup> fought the Nazis too in too; and the last I heard about the case was that the Nazis had been forced to give way at least to this extent, that they were begging the Mullers to incorporate a separate company for the German-lines agency and set up a board of directors that would be half Muller and half Nazi. If these negotiations dragged out to May 1940, then of course they came to nothing, and the Mullers were dictated to by the invaders, not argued with.

I may have hinted, meanwhile, that Dr. Butting was not the sort of man with whom the real leaders of Dutch business would consent to deal. I mean by real leaders, for example, Foreigner van Vlieningen, the predecessor of Mr. Thomas J. Watson as President of the International Chamber of Commerce, and Hendrick Gouw de Jongh, another Hollander of unquestioned probity and character. Not only were these men too intelligent and experienced in business affairs to be impressed by a Butting, ~~they~~ their good will did not necessarily to the Nazis for a Butting to be allowed to tamper with them. Somebody with more mass bombing and distinction, ~~than~~ with more subtlety, came out broadcasting his fire against the capitalist system and to be sure to approach Hollanders of their quality and their number. This was the sort for whom the German Ribbentrop was cut out.

They were curious fellows, the Ribbentrops too. Their principal

characteristic was a combination of good breeding with some flaw or other thing made them not quite suitable for Party membership. Rittmeister (cavalry captain) Nickel, for example, the Ribbentrop man for Holland, had Jewish blood and was therefore not a Party member. He wore a glass in his eye, was distinctly a "gentleman" and something of a swell, and the way in which he affected a tolerant contempt for the Nazis was both charming and impressive. "My dear fellow," he would say in substance to the members of the German-Netherlands Society, "you know of course that in Germany I dare not open my mouth. But here in Holland, and to a man like you, I can talk freely. Believe me when, speaking as a good German, I give you my word that the Nazis are swine. Not all of them. Not all of them, <sup>the few, after all, are really a good man, a person.</sup> But practically all of them. Swine." And he would chat amiably on until the moment came for him to slip into his discourse the falsehood he wanted you to be impressed by and to repeat everywhere. "Must" it could come forth. Now, my dear chap? Impossible. I know for a fact that the Nazis haven't got eight days' oil supply in Germany. How can they make war?" And he would add hastily: "But for heaven's sake, don't tell anyone I said so! It's as much as my life is worth to be talking like this." It is a fact that Captain Nickel actually made this statement about oil in late August 1939, one week before Ribbentrop provoked the second world war. A German or a Dutch might know too much to believe it; but most of the members of the German-Netherlands Society were not of their class, and they were impressed.

These big Dutch business men whose affairs were constantly being threatened with suspension depended for aid upon them by the Germans and the Dutch, but had one means of defense: they were obliged to maintain the Party leaders in Germany in order to be able to go over the heads of these sublimos. (Is it a fantasy, a

Crane arranging to maintain friendly relations with Ribbentrop, with Schoedt and later Funk, with Mees, with Bohle (Mees' subordinate and Bittling's superior). They had to be able to go to Berlin and argue that the black-market must be called off and the pretext they invariably gave was one that invariably worked. "If this is permitted," Feather could say, "your Dutch business must inevitably suffer, and your income in Dutch guilders must inevitably dwindle." The one thing that the Nazis were shorter of than anything else was foreign means of payment, sound international currencies like the guilder, the Swiss franc, the pound sterling, and the dollar. Only with such currencies could they pay cash for essential imports in those parts of the world -- the United States for example -- where they had been unable to arrange barter agreements and had no credit. Thus, up to a point at least, the big Dutch business men -- but only the big ones -- had a mode of defense they could count on against the Nazis.

It follows from this that there was something excusable in the appeasement policy of the Featherers and their kind, and in their endeavor to make as good terms with the Nazi leaders. They wanted no war; they <sup>desired</sup> to prevent disturbances to the world at large; they took no pleasure from those savings or from the contacts they had to maintain with Berlin. To say frankly what they wanted peace quite as much because they were patriotic Hollanders, we know that trade was the life blood of the Dutch people, as business they had a private material stake in the continuance of the existing order. They took, perhaps without realizing it, almost exactly the line that the German business men themselves had taken from 1914 on. But, as in the case of the German business men, the <sup>fact</sup> <sup>was</sup> that these Hollanders were <sup>not</sup> <sup>at</sup> <sup>all</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>same</sup> <sup>as</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>German</sup> <sup>business</sup> <sup>men</sup>. They said to themselves that even the worst case,



-46-

even if the Nazis took them over, Dutch workmen would at any rate have employment; they, the leaders of Dutch business, would at any rate be taken into partnership by the Nazis; and the new order in which they ~~to~~ their place would at least not be communism, and might not be very different from the existing order. But they were wrong, on three counts.

First, the pickings left by the Nazis to their partners -- whether German business men or others -- are small pickings indeed. Secondly, for a first class business man, a decent income, even a large income, is not enough. The man who is not tied to the tail of the Nazi cart has some a free agent, free to ~~manage his business~~ <sup>be his free lord</sup> his talent, his imagination, and his energy ~~to the full in the running of~~ his business, is bound to gear at the vitals of any big business man caught in the Nazi machine, and make his life miserable. To the smaller executive, the man used to carrying out the big man's orders, it makes little difference; and as a rule that it is the <sup>firm's</sup> ~~company's~~ <sup>and remains</sup> ~~small~~ <sup>small</sup> executive who is an enthusiastic Nazi or Fascist sympathizer. But of the ~~big~~ <sup>really</sup> big man this is not true. May also did Fritz Thyssen run away from his country and his ~~own~~ <sup>Thyssen's</sup> family business ~~because~~ <sup>because</sup> he was ~~offending~~ <sup>offending</sup> with the stupidity of seeing incompetent Nazis crowded into his management by a corrupt and greedy governmental gang; was bound hand and foot, helpless to render that prodigious, that in a way beautiful structure, the United Steel Works of Germany, from the ruin then so threatening it at the hands of that war-mongering monstrosity, the Nazi Party, which he was too important enough to finance as a bulwark against communism.

And the third point is this, that the Nazis will surely be ~~overthrown~~ <sup>overthrown</sup> before even they and their junior partners shall erect a New Order and begin to enjoy the fruits of their illusory victories of 1940-41.

It does not matter that the Soviet Russians may be too weak for them. It does not matter that the United States may not jump into war with both feet. Such circumstances would hasten the Nazi overthrow; but that overthrow will come in any case.

Those who assume that the Nazis may found an enduring order forget entirely what the peoples of Europe are. The peoples of Europe are far too advanced in civilization, too self-respecting and independent in spirit, too stolid and ingenious to remain for any significant length of time the slaves of a New Order which they know to be bent upon their enslavement. The Europeans are not gentle and unsuspecting South Sea Islanders. They have seen chains before, and they know very well that chains are not mere bracelets and necklaces. They are not primitive Redskins helpless against firearms. They themselves have forged firearms; and as soon as they have got their second wind they will fight this tyrant with all the resourcefulness that the mind of civilized man can command. They will begin by sabotaging, and they will end by destroying their Nazi masters.

Anybody, German or non-German, employer or worker, who has put his money on the Nazi horse is bound to lose it. Not because European man has a vision about liberty and democracy, not because he bothers his head to remember the struggles of the past in which his liberty and his dignity were disastrously won. Theories of history do not concern me, and I am not discussing them. I am discussing a reality, which is this: Unknown to themselves, -- to the peasant, the laborer, the clerk, the mechanic, the small-shop merchant, -- there lives within them a spirit that is already saying to Hitler, "No! There is some dirt we will not eat!" It is this spirit that will overthrow Hitler as it overthrew Napoleon.

Despite Nazi denials, we are already hearing the voice of that spirit from every corner of Europe, and we should hear it from Germany in

-48-

Germany if the Nazi war clamor did not drown it out. Sooner or later, that voice will say that form of government these men shall live under. And it will not be the appeaser who will be consulted about that form of government. Not because the appeaser's "class emotion" will deny him a right to a voice, but because the patriotic members of his own class will brush him aside. It is to be thought that the Czechs in exile, the Poles in exile, the Free French, the Serbs in exile, the Germans in exile will welcome into any restored government of Europe those of their compatriots who succumbed to the Nazi lure, or sold out their peoples to the Nazi power. When Europe is restored to freedom it will be even gladder than it is now that <sup>the first and most essential</sup> ~~it is now that it is now~~ the true instrument of the men of property, to fight with his people against the Nazi domination. Only then will his people accord him a share in the world to be restored, and only then, out of respect for him, out of recognition of his position, will his people fight with him against all other forces that seek to destroy impose regimentation and suffering upon mankind. It is not by the Nazis that the men of property will be preserved from communism. If he is wise and loyal, his own workers will preserve him.

## VII

I have still something to add, both by way of summary and conclusion, and concerning myself and my kind.

That fifth column is a three-ring circus, built one ring inside the next. The innermost ring is represented by the normal espionage and intelligence service of the military establishment common to all governments. The middle ring is the Nazi Party organization with its infiltrated agencies operating on foreign soil. And the outermost ring is the semi-organized activities of the workers and business men in the non-German countries where the Nazi spies and fifth columnists are at work.

\_\_\_\_\_

[illegible]

-10-

As for the government ring, a nation whose social and economic house is in order will not need to fear that its own nationals will willingly collaborate with foreign fifth columnists. When orders are flowing in the order books, and workers are opening weekly pay envelopes, neither employers nor employed will take time to listen to subversive talk on the street radio or the street-corner, or to discuss among themselves what ought to be done about "the situation." This is the basic, the fundamental problem. A healthy society is immune to fifth column poison; a sick society will be killed by it.

As for me personally, I am a German refugee. Not a Jewish refugee. Not an involuntary refugee. Had I chosen, I might have remained for many years in that diplomatic service in which I represented first the German Republic and then the Third Reich until the war broke out in September 1939. My I chose otherwise is a story I shall tell another day.

There are two reasons for the publication of what I know about that fifth column. The first is that I wanted to show who the fifth columnists were, and to show that in by and large there were no *bona fide* German refugees among them. Certainly there are fake refugees in the Nazi spy system. Certainly there are occasional scoundrels who, being refugees, have nevertheless allowed themselves to be bribed or blackmailed into serving the Nazis. But these regrettable circumstances cannot be held and should not be held against the great mass of honorable *bona fide* refugees living abroad.

Secondly, I seek to dispel the fear of the Nazi fifth column. Not that it is unfounded. Far from it. My story shows in considerable detail how dangerously effective it was in the Netherlands. But what was really true in the Netherlands, and what I seek to do is to tear the veil from this

Finally, I seek to expose the error in the notion that the Nazi successes are the product of a stupendously efficient and smooth-running organization against which the best remedy is an equally stupendous mass of human, technical, services, agencies, and the like. The real strength of the Nazis is not their efficiency (though I will except from this the General Staff in its strictly professional aspect). Their real strength is their fanatical will, their tireless persistence, their concentration upon objectives which are not the objectives of your daily life but are the objectives of their daily life. You have your day's work to do, and the notion of war is, <sup>in your</sup> machinery, an auxiliary endeavor. Their day's work ~~is war~~. But quite apart from the question of war, your strongest remedy against them is to ~~be~~ <sup>to</sup> work as hard to make men believe that they have no other choice, as they believe as passionately that Germany is worth defending as they believe it is worth destroying. Your real remedy is to make men believe that Germany is worth defending and not of this machine can give a notion that Germany is worth defending.

April 27, 1948

The Honorable  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you very much for your letter of  
April 17.

I am glad to know that the situation which  
existed in connection with the operations of the  
General Amalgamated Film Corporation has been so  
promptly and comprehensively dealt with, and that  
this corporation may now be safely treated on the  
same basis as any other American company.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

W. J. Donovan



## TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

April 17, 1942

Dear Colonel Donovan:

You will recall that on January 10, 1942, the Department forwarded to you a memorandum relating to a number of situations found to exist in connection with the operations of General Aniline and Film Corporation, at that time owned and controlled by German interests and operating under Treasury Department supervision.

We called your attention to the fact that the Osolid Division of the company was in an unusually good position to obtain defense secrets, inasmuch as its sales and service men (in some instances German aliens or German-born American citizens) had access to many defense plants and Government offices; that the Agfa Ansco Division of the company processed and developed official Government films of a confidential nature; and that the company in general could be used as a cloak for subversive activities in many respects.

Since that time the situation has changed materially and the purpose of this letter is to bring you up to date.

The Government took title to the foreign-owned shares of the Corporation on February 18, 1942, and has installed a thoroughly competent American management of unquestioned loyalty. Some forty-odd executives and employees of the company have been removed because of doubts as to their loyalty, and the Department and the management are proceeding as rapidly






2.

as possible with a program calculated to remove every vestige of German control or influence.

Although the reorganization of the affairs of the company, particularly the elimination of all personnel of doubtful allegiance, has not been completed, I can say with confidence that the situations described in the memorandum accompanying our letter of January 10, 1942, have been corrected, and that you may safely deal with the corporation on the same basis as any other American company.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "H. M. Nathan".

Secretary of the Treasury.

Col. William J. Donovan,  
Coordinator of Information  
Twenty-fifth and E Streets  
Washington, D. C.



## TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

January 10, 1942.

Dear Colonel Donoan:

Secretary Morgenthau sent the attached memorandum in regard to General Aniline and Film Corporation to the President last evening.

This morning he directed me to send a copy to you and the other interested departments and agencies of the Government having contracts or dealings with this company, with the suggestion that steps be taken to eliminate situations of the character described in the memorandum.


Sincerely,

*W. F. L. L.*

Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. William J. Donoan  
Coordinator of Information  
Twenty-fifth and E Streets  
Washington, D. C.

Attachment



Secretary Morgenthau

M. M. Foley, Jr.

**SECRET**

January 7, 1942

Since our entrance into the war we have had a group of Treasury people under Joe O'Connell supervising and investigating from the inside the General Aniline and Film Corporation, which has been blocked under the freezing order. Several months ago we prevented the sale of this company to General Dyestuffs because we were convinced from our study of the German dominated industrial setup in this country that General Dyestuffs, like General Aniline and Film, was part of the I. G. Farbenindustrie, the huge German dye trust.

Our investigation to date has disclosed serious situations affecting the national interest.

1. The Ogilvie Division. This division, headed by F. W. von Maister, who came to this country direct from an association with German Zeppelin Works and Malibash Auto Works, has succeeded by several devices in providing access for its men -- often German aliens or German-born Americans -- to the drafting rooms of about 3500 industrial plants, including defense installations and Government experimental laboratories, and in amassing valuable industrial information; the device used was the leasing, and then the continuous servicing, of a reproduction or blueprinting machine. The corporation has also succeeded in obtaining contracts for the microprinting of United States Government archives. We already have found documentary evidence that United States Navy information so obtained has been transmitted to Germany by the corporation.

2. The American Division. It has been found that this company has succeeded in a variety of ways in obtaining access to confidential military files of the United States Government. For instance, a company laboratory, in charge of a German alien assisted by two other

- 2 -

SECRET

German aliens, was found to be developing and processing films of experimental United States Army tanks, taken at the Aberdeen proving grounds. A related field under current investigation is the use of Agfa-Anso for the development of military and reconnaissance film of value to the German Government. For instance, the company's laboratories were used in 1930 and in 1940 for the development of film taken in the Andean region between the Canal Zone and the Pacific Coast by a so-called "scientific" expedition sponsored by the German Government.

3. The Company as a cloak for subversive activities.  
The fact that the company has over 8000 employees and expends about \$50 million annually, provides the German Government, through H. G. Farben, with unusual opportunities for the concealment of German agents and expenditures for propaganda and other subversive purposes. For example, a person, educated in Germany and a confessed Nazi Party member both in Germany and the United States was sent by the company "to the Homeland" to undergo training in various subjects with the avowed purpose of enabling him to become the "confidential assistant" to the head of the film and camera division of the company. Other instances have already been discovered where young Germans of military age were given temporary employment in the company after which they left for China and Japan for purposes not yet established.

The facts in these cases have been turned over by us to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to Army Intelligence. We are continuing our investigation and expect to be in position, in the near future, to make specific recommendations as to personnel and other changes which should be made in the public interest.

(Initialed) E.H.F.Jr.



February 5, 1942

Dr. Isaac H. Gale  
Coordinator of Information  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Gale:

Pursuant to the understanding entered into with the Department of State, I have pleasure in confirming your designation as special representative of the Coordinator of Information in the Far East. Under the circumstances now prevailing, your headquarters will be at Chungking. But should conditions make it advisable, you should take appropriate steps to preserve your mobility and establish your headquarters elsewhere.

Special information representatives of the Coordinator of Information assigned to the Far East will report to you and operate under your direction.

Other officers appointed by the Coordinator to the Far Eastern theater of operations will be directed to maintain contact with you in order that a coordinated service may be established in the Far East.

In the event that a general representative should be sent to that area to supervise and take charge of all work there by all branches of this office, you shall report to and be governed by the instructions and orders of such general representative so designated.

You are requested to keep in as close communication with the Coordinator of Information as circumstances will permit.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
as - Secretary of State, Mr. Stuchsen, Mr. Harly, Mr. Mygatt,  
Mr. Rogers and Mr. Evans.

Gale 217-  
X 1111

Dear Mr. Shaw:

Subject: Esson M. Gale

Referring to my letter of November 17, 1941, it is now desired that Mr. Gale proceed to Chungking and it is suggested, for your consideration, that he should be appointed Special Assistant to the Ambassador, and I should be glad if you would inform me if this can be arranged.

Mr. Gale can travel via Pan-African Airways plane scheduled to leave January 6th, if passage can be arranged.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

Honorable Howland Shaw  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

November 27, 1941

Dear Mr. Shaw:

Subject: Mr. Eason M. Gale

Referring to my letter dated November 27th, it is desired that the Department of State arrange payments to Mr. Eason M. Gale, to be charged to the account of the Coordinator of Information, as follows:

A salary of six hundred dollars (\$600) monthly to commence from December 1, 1941.

A per diem allowance of ten dollars (\$10) to commence from the date of his arrival in Hongkong.

Transportation and such other allowances for travel as are ordinarily granted by the Department to its Foreign Service Officers.

Your kind attention will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

W. J. Donovan  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

W. J. Phillips/ED



GARTH, SHELDON H. 13,182

x Grouitch, Mabel

6 December 1945

NAVAL COMMAND, OSS

In answering the attached letter from Madame Grouitch, it would be helpful if you could indicate to us whether your records show that Lt. Garth is being transferred to OSS and, if so, what the status of the transfer is.

C. A. Bane  
Lt. (jg) USNR



PENSION PLANNING COMPANY  
PENSION, BONUS & PROFIT-SHARING PLANS  
527 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.  
MURRAY HILL 2-1800

December 29, 1943

Mr. Robert Thrun  
Assistant to the Executive Officer  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Thank you very much for your letter of December 18

indicating that you have taken such good and prompt  
care of the application of Mr. Gendel.

With my personal thanks,

Sincerely,

*Mayer M. Goldstein*  
*MB*

MB:WM

(25)

18 December 1943

Mr. Meyer M. Goldstein  
527 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Goldstein:

I am replying to your letter of December 7, 1943, due to the illness of Colonel Doering.

Mr. Gendel telephoned Colonel Doering's office shortly after your letter arrived and, through that office, interviews were arranged for him with our Personnel Procurement Branch and with the head of a Division which we thought might be interested in Mr. Gendel.

As we explained to Mr. Gendel at the time, no request for his services may be made until he has completed his basic training. After that time it is possible that we shall request his transfer. We cannot make a definite commitment now because our ability to use him efficiently depends largely on whether or not approval is given to a projected program. If the program is approved, Mr. Gendel should be very valuable to us.

Thank you for calling him to our attention.

Yours very truly,

Robert Hurst  
Assistant to the  
Executive Officer

*The [unclear] [unclear]*  
[unclear]  
[unclear]

For Mr. [unclear]

PENSION PLANNING COMPANY  
PENSION BONUS & PROFIT SHARING PLANS  
527 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK CITY  
MURRAY HILL 2-800

December 7th, 1943

O. C. Deering, Jr.  
Lieutenant Colonel, AUS  
Executive Officer  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your letter of December 2nd, with reference to Mr. Milton L. Gendel.

He just came in with the enclosed letter of his dated December 7th, stating that he had been reclassified 1A and thought that this might facilitate his use by OSS rather than hinder it because being in uniform and subject to the direction of OSS he could be assigned to do any undertaking, it deemed wise.

As his letter indicates, he was going to be in Washington on Thursday, December 9th and so I took the liberty of asking him to telephone your Secretary to see if you might be inclined to have him talk to anyone while in Washington. I hope you will not consider this presumptuous under the circumstances.

With my personal thanks, I am,

Sincerely,

*Meyer M. Goldstein*  
Meyer M. Goldstein.

MMG/jl  
Enclosures

## CAMOUFLAGE ENGINEERING CO., INC.

136 EAST 57 STREET - NEW YORK CITY - TELEPHONE PLAZA 3-3780

December 7th, 1943

Mr. Meyer M. Goldstein  
327 Fifth Avenue  
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Goldstein:

Yesterday, notice arrived from my Local Board informing me that I have been reclassified in 1A; that of course affects my application to the OSS.

However, it has occurred to me in the light of my interview with Mr. Armstrong (in the course of which I expressed willingness to serve in uniform) that my new status may make it simpler for the OSS to sign me up. In the case that they decided to have me work for them, OSS was planning to have me serve in uniform; as I shall be in the Army shortly want that facilitate things both for them and for me.

On Thursday, December 9th, I expect to be in Washington, and I would welcome the opportunity to find out from OSS their attitude toward this new situation. I think, therefore, that on Thursday I ought to take the liberty of telephoning General Donovan's office to ask for an interview. Would you agree with that?

Thank you again for the interest which you have so kindly taken in my problems.

Sincerely yours,

  
Milton L. Gendel

13,130

Gendel, Milton

x Goldstein, Moyer

4 December 1945

COLONEL CONNELLY

Attached is a letter from  
Mr. Moyer M. Goldstein, addressed  
to General Demovan, regarding Mr.  
Milton L. Gendel.

Could you ascertain from  
the various branches whether there  
is a position which calls for Mr.  
Gendel's particular qualifications?

Also attached for your infor-  
mation is a copy of Col. Doering's  
reply to Mr. Goldstein.

G. A. Bane  
Lt. (JG) USNR

(2/5)

2 December 1943

Mr. Mayer M. Goldstein  
 Pension Planning Company  
 387 Fifth Avenue  
 New York, New York

Dear Mr. Goldstein:

In General Donovan's absence your letter of November 26, 1943, with reference to Mr. Milton L. Gandel has been referred to me for reply. We are very grateful to you for calling Mr. Gandel to our attention and for the information which you have given us about his background and qualifications. Your letter and the attached memorandum have been referred to the branches of this organization who might be interested in a man with Mr. Gandel's qualifications. I shall let you know as soon as we have further news to report.

There is one point which Mr. Gandel may wish to consider carefully. It is the policy of this agency not to request draft deferments for any of its civilian employees, with very few exceptions of the most urgent nature, and for this reason it is quite possible that Mr. Gandel would be re-classified if he were to join us here.

Yours very truly,

C. C. Deering, Jr.  
 Lieut. Colonel, AES  
 Executive Officer

LEW:BLACK

FROM: Paul Bremer

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 244.44

Date Rec. 7/2/43

[illegible]

Should be reported in correspondence with number in To column.  
or under date's sheet under each account.  
including entries by date in To column.  
should include in the next immediately before further routing  
of documents. Each change as indicated in Comments column.  
If entry is required to Registry,  
indicate the document's sheet.

# SECRET



## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

**SECRET**

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. Gen. William F. Donovan,  
Director, OSS

DATE: 2 September 1944

FROM: Earl Brennan

SUBJECT: Sardinian Personnel

Referring to your recent oral request concerning people with underground connections in Sardinia or people otherwise familiar with this island, I wish to advise that aside from Lussu, on whom I have already advised you, and in addition to the personnel who are already connected with our organization, I know of only two men who could possibly be considered in this category.

One of these has been suggested by one of our friends in the Italian Socialist Party who has been invaluable to us in the recruiting of agents in the past. This man, we find, falls into the classification of "small fry" politically and has no real underground connections in Sardinia. We believe that he would be little or no help to us.

The second is a Mr. Dino Giacobbe, who undoubtedly has certain Sardinian political connections. I attach hereto copy of a memorandum from Mr. DeVecchi of our New York office concerning this man. In view of the information supplied by Mr. DeVecchi and other information which we have, I believe that it would be extremely unwise to have dealings with this party, and I strongly advise against it.

18443  
H.B.

Attachment

**SECRET****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

22986

C  
O  
P  
Y**INTEROFFICE MEMO**

**TO:** Major Rice  
**FROM:** R. DeVecchi  
**SUBJECT:** DINO GIACOBBE

**DATE:** August 27, 1943

Complying with your request I obtained the following information on the above subject.

**Name:** Dino Giacobbe  
**Aliases:** Felice Angelo; Armando Giacobbe; Felice Armandino Giacobbe; Dino Jacoby.  
**Born:** January 14, 1896 at Dorgali, Italy  
**Height:** 6' - weight approximately 175 pounds - black hair, brown eyes, ruddy complexion.  
 January 23, 1943 was reported at 92 Appleton St., Boston, Mass. c/o Mrs. Ella Cassidy; next 759 Cherokee St., Bethlehem, Pa. He left this address on March 10, 1943 leaving forwarding address c/o 92 Fifth Avenue, New York City. It is stated that he can always be reached c/o Miss Helen F. Murphy, 64 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston.

The British Consulate reported that he had been communicating with individuals in Italy through an intermediary in Buenos Aires, and for this reason was suspected of espionage. The investigation, though still pending, shows nothing wrong on the part of the above subject.

He entered the United States illegally as a political refugee from France and is reported as anti-fascist in both the U.S. and in Europe. He is reported to have received support from the Mazzini Society of New York City. From the records of the Deportation Proceedings, file No. Ellis Island 99642-632, it shows that after investigation it was decided not to deport Giacobbe and he was eligible for departure from the United States at his own expense, and that he was a member of the anti-fascist Giustizia and Libertà Movement.

He registered as an alien in Boston, Registration No. 5280178. The records reveal that he was granted a license to travel by the U. S. Attorney's office in Boston. He gave as references various prominent individuals in Boston - a former assistant attorney general, a prominent Boston lawyer and also Prof. Gaetano Salvemini who is presently a professor at Harvard University.

**SECRET**

- 2 -

He is reported to be an engineer by profession but worked in the United States as a tailor's assistant having obtained the position through an official of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union. He was reported to have been an officer in the Italian Army. On leaving Italy he commanded a battery in the Loyalist Army during the Spanish Revolution in 1938. His employment record in the United States is satisfactory. He has no police record and no credit record is available.

R. D. V.

**SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D CX Sardinian  
Chicago25 August 1943  
8 A.M.

From: Mr. Negro.

The following notations were made after your telephone message last night.

Dino Giacobbe is probably the best-informed Sardinian now in this country. He is intimately acquainted with all aspects of Sardinian life. He may still be living in New York. Since he has frequently been approached by Italians and Americans with regard to political activity during the present war, it may be assumed that he is acquainted with a variety of plans that have been entertained with regard to political activity in Sardinia or Italy.

It appears that a certain Mathieu, said to be a Sardinian, is employed by MO. I have had occasion to wonder about his background, etc., but I have not pursued inquiries to anything like a satisfying point because I thought it was not of concern.

I have not made a comprehensive study of Sardinian elements in this country as I once had hoped to do.

It is worth remembering that North Africa - Tunisia, Algeria - is "full" of Sardinians.

Mrs. O'Donnell

8-13-43

Returned. Many thanks.

JM

John McGruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS — Intelligence Service  
(8436)

General McGruder

I got the  
in return.  
And you  
sent (copy of  
for him) and  
return  
your  
good

EXEMPTED FROM LINGERING INQUIRY FROM COLONEL B. J. DAYLORD FROM  
PARCELARIA

CONFIDENTIAL

through my report on the take over of the island.

When we went in with the 7 company, and General Strickland and I flew in on 2-4-4. We went in in an APC with 12 - 15th Air Corps and missed the PRISON by the minutes.

You have never said anything like the underground language and underground communication, especially to anyone in the area. All told by the 43 Command for the island. The story, however, was not given by the Italian Admiral in command, who should be given some consideration for this. A 100th. tank in the diesel was not used. There are tanks by the island. The plane would have been shot to bits. Why - why all the time have not never any employment?

The destruction of the tank complete - some evidence in terms of military equipment. Large by tanks in the island very great - more in damage to communication than in communication. They should have been shot down in the air. This was effective for the enemy system. But the island could have been held by 5 to 6 light troops with communication and would have stayed in their cover pits till we lifted our tank and much damage and with the tanks in their area would have slaughtered our troops - killed by 100th. Communication, food, water, medical supplies for months.

Now is the most important point - other conclusion - the whole place a litter of equipment and communication which can only mean a complete lack of the will to give up the island. The whole military and civil population remains in the island in every way - only one could desire to move down and as they look out the island and then returned to with open arms and helped to put everything in working order. This was a significant step towards the end of the war.

As the result of the island, the end of the war.

- 2 -

The food stuffs of prime quality - the German food stores - Danish butter -  
 Danish chicken, sausage, mineral water, popovers in fine tin foil.

All equipment of top grade except sand guns. The signal center searched but  
 revealed a very well organized and intricate system of RIF with direct trunk lines  
 to all important points in Sicily.

As to staff affairs the group has done well but even this small island shows  
 the need of organization and careful planning for even the earliest stages. Identical  
 planning must be made at once and RIF plans to direct movement and evacuation of  
 the captured assets. No trouble about food or health. Most important to have a  
 C.I. chief at the right hand of the Commander to make quick decisions and ~~carry them~~  
~~through.~~

One of the worst problems - our own troops picking up (ours & captured), our  
 own equipment, (food, bullets, cartridges, guns), enemy equipment. It would be wise  
 to issue strong orders based on this before arrival.

SECRET

X War Dept

Office of The Adjutant General  
Washington, D.C.

AD 211-Gibbons, Henry, Jr.  
(19 Jul 43) PO-A

JHD/111/115  
Sr. 7 107

Subject: Reversion Orders.

29 Jul, 1943.

To : Director, Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

SECRET  
Auth: [Signature]  
Initials: [Signature]  
Date: 29 Jul 43

To : First Lieutenant Henry Gibbons, Jr., OJ68721, MC

1. The Secretary of War directs that First Lieutenant Henry Gibbons, Jr., OJ68721, MC, proceed on temporary duty from Washington, D. C., to Chungking, China, effective upon departure in compliance with this order. He will proceed from Washington, D. C., to New Delhi, India, via Navy transport, reporting upon arrival to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China-Burma-India, for transportation to destination. Upon arrival at Chungking, China, he will report to the Director, Office of Strategic Services, for duty and upon completion of this temporary duty, he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C. TOW 1-1000 P 432-02, CJA 0425-24.
2. Travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft, Army or naval transport, commercial steamship, belligerent vessel or aircraft and rail is directed from New Delhi, India, to Chungking, China. TD by air from New Delhi, India, to Chungking, China, is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission. A baggage allowance of fifty-five (55) pounds, to include all personal effects, clothing, medical kit, canteen and emergency rations, is authorized while traveling by military, naval or commercial aircraft.
3. In lieu of subsistence, a flat per diem of \$7.00 is authorized while traveling outside the continental limits of the United States, and for a period of temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States, in accordance with existing law and regulations. When Government quarters or billets are furnished and sleeping facilities are available, per diem allowances are suspended.
4. Personal baggage to be shipped will be limited to one hundred seventy-five (175) pounds, and an express baggage allowance of one hundred seventy-five (175) pounds (official equipment) is authorized while traveling by water.
5. Prior to departure from present station, he will be equipped with at least: gas mask; 1 pistol, auto. 45 cal. M1911; 1 holster, leather, 45 cal.; 1 pocket; magazine, double-throw; 1 belt, pistol; 1 pocket, first aid; 1 pouch, first aid pouch; 2 magazines, auto (clip) 45 cal.; twenty-one rounds cartridge, 45 cal., and 1 M1, automatic, pistol. Field equipment will be obtained at destination.
6. Officer is authorized to wear civilian clothing in the performance of this mission.

SECRET



7. Reimbursement for expenses incurred in connection with the performance of strategic services will be made to the Air Department by the Officer making payment in connection with the voucher, showing the amount paid, amount of the voucher, showing the amount paid, amount of this order. The copy of the voucher is transmitted to The Adjutant General's Office, stating that the enclosed copy of voucher is furnished for the purpose of reimbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.

8. Officer should advise his correspondents that mail will be delivered to him at APO 400, c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y. Immediately upon arrival at destination, he will complete and fill ID AGO Form No. 204, Change of Address Card, to advise friends and relatives of his permanent APO address. He will send a completed ID AGO Form No. 204 to the theatre postal officer.



*[Signature]*  
Adjutant General.

Encls.

Distribution:  
Officer (4)

Officers Branch, Record Section, APO, Room 2429, Munitions  
Hq. & Hq. Detachment, Office, Strategic Services (5)  
OIC, Rehabilitation APO, 164 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2)  
CG, APO 879, c/o PE, NY, NY (AIRMAIL)  
CG, APO 885, c/o PE, NY, NY (AIRMAIL)  
Plans and Budget Section, Operations Br., APO, attn: Maj. W. L. Miller, 2007, The Pentagon  
Army Postal Service, Room 3341, Pentagon  
Operations Div., WDAS, WDGO, Pentagon  
Postal Officer, APO 879, c/o PE, NY, NY (AIRMAIL)  
The Quartermaster General, Room 2067, Tempo D



(25)

JUL 12 1943

Chief, Accounting and Bookkeeping  
Division  
General Accounting Office  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Warner

Dear Sir:

I wish to advise that authority to issue and sign "Requisitions for Disbursing Funds," Standard Form No. 1027, has been delegated to Mr. H. H. Woodring, Chief, Finance Branch of the Office of Strategic Services. Mr. Woodring, who is an Authorized Certifying Officer, will be required to issue "Requisitions for Disbursing Funds" from time to time in order to have available funds to cover expenditures made by the Office of Strategic Services.

It will be appreciated if all "Requisitions for Disbursing Funds," Standard Form No. 1027, signed by Mr. H. H. Woodring may be honored by the General Accounting Office.

Very truly yours,

*Ed. Duxton*

H. Edward Duxton  
Acting Director

28 June, 1943

Colonel Emmett F. Connelly, A.U.S.,  
Chief, Field Operations Branch,  
Officer Procurement Service,  
4748 Munitions Building,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Spike:

Your letter to General Donovan has  
been referred to me, as he is out of the country.

I know he will be very appreciative  
of your remarks about our mutual friend Gamble,  
and I take this opportunity to express to you  
my very sincere thanks for arranging for his  
transfer. I know he will be a great help to  
the Office of Strategic Services.

I am also very glad that we were able  
to effect his promotion promptly.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES J. CRISTON  
Special Assistant to the  
Director, OSS

CC:1

WAR DEPARTMENT  
ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
OFFICER PROCUREMENT SERVICE  
WASHINGTON

28 June 1943

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,  
Director, Office of Strategic Services,  
Administration Building,  
45th and E Streets,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:


As you know your special assistant, Mr. Charles S. Cheston, after discussing the matter preliminarily with me arranged with General Danielson, Director, Officer Procurement Service, for the transfer of Lt. Colonel Edward W. Gamble, Jr. my executive officer, to the Office of Strategic Services. My small part in consenting to this transfer was not accomplished without running the gamut of mixed emotions.

From the standpoint of being willing to give up a top notch, intelligent and extremely conscientious officer my selfish inclination was to say "no", but when I considered that duty with your Service gave him a bigger opportunity to serve his country, and that the Army could capitalize to a greater extent on his superior ability then of course I could only say "yes".

I am sure you will find that Colonel Gamble combines the highly desirable qualities of loyalty, initiative, amenability to discipline, intelligence and devotion to duty that are the basic ingredients of the Superior Officer.

With his severance from this Service it seemed not appropriate to forward these personal observations to you.

Sincerely yours,

  
WILLIAM F. CONNELLY,  
Colonel, A. U. S.,  
Chief, Field Operations Branch.

July 8, 1943

Mr. J.E. Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

In General Donovan's absence, I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 24, 1943 in which you made inquiry concerning Mr. C.R. Gilardi.

Mr. C.R. Gilardi was recently authorized by one of our Branches to proceed to New Orleans with several officers of OSS in an attempt to recruit certain Italian and French speaking personnel.

Mr. Gilardi's mission was duly authorized by the Chief of the Branch in question.

I trust this is the information you desire. I am,

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Austin  
Assistant Director

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE 8 July 1943

TO: Colonel G. Edward Duxton  
 FROM: Ellery C. Huntington Jr.  
 SUBJECT: SO Operations - AFHQ - C.R. Gilardi

1. In reply to your memorandum of 1 July 1943 and Mr. J.E. Hoover's letter which was enclosed of June 24, 1943, I am attaching a proposed reply to Mr. Hoover.
2. Mr. Hoover's letter is returned herewith.

*Ellery C. Huntington Jr.*  
 Ellery C. Huntington Jr.  
 Colonel, AUS  
 Deputy Director - PW Operations

Attachments

*G. E. Duxton*  
 Major, SC-100

To: \_\_\_\_\_

We have no record of the  
 man mentioned.

M.G.D.

This man has been  
 taken with SI -  
 may be employed by it  
 suggest referring  
 to Mr. [illegible]  
 by [illegible] [illegible]

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

JUN 21 1963

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER


Brigadier General William J. Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
25th and E Streets, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

The New Orleans Field Division of this Bureau has received information that one C. R. Galardi has stated to a confidential source of this Bureau that he was an intelligence officer employed by the Office of Strategic Services and that he was interested in obtaining approximately six boys of Italian descent who spoke the Italian language fluently for training in espionage work in Italy. He indicated that it would not be necessary that these boys be American citizens.

It would be appreciated if you would advise me whether you do in fact have an individual named Galardi employed in the above mentioned capacity.

Sincerely,



SECRET

March 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Leo J. Brady  
FROM: Mrs. Murray

Mr. Hughes is in receipt of your memorandum of March 17th with regard to Charles Gilardi. Unfortunately the memo you planned to attach to your memorandum was not attached. Mr. Hughes will await Mr. Gilardi's telephone communication but meanwhile we suggest you forward the original memo.

O.H.

*Int -*  
*3/18/43*

*X18093*



March 17, 1943

~~MEMORANDUM~~

TO: Mr. John C. Hughes  
FROM: Leo Brady

Mr. Carlos Gilardi, memo attached,  
phoned today asking to see the Colonel. As the  
Colonel's schedule this afternoon is rather  
crowded, he has suggested that you might be kind  
enough to interview Mr. Gilardi after his return  
to New York. He has, therefore, suggested to Mr.  
Gilardi that he communicate with you and ask for  
an appointment.

LB

**SECRET**

27 August 1943

MEMORANDUM TO CARLO RICHARD GILARDI

SUBJECT: Orders

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to Algiers, where you will report to Colonel William A. Eddy, U.S.M.C., who is in charge of all OSS activities in the North African Theater. You are, thereafter, to act under Colonel Eddy's instructions.

2. Authority is hereby granted to carry such secret and confidential documents as may be necessary to the proper performance of your mission. These documents may be shown to authorized persons, but must remain in your possession at all times until they are delivered to their addressees, if any.

William J. Donovan  
Director

**SECRET**

23 August 1943

MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF READING OFFICE

SUBJECT: **SECRET**

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to Lisbon, where you will report to Colonel William A. Eddy, U.S.A., who is in charge of all OSS activities in the North Atlantic Theater. You are, thereafter, to act under Colonel Eddy's instructions.

2. Authority is hereby granted to carry such secret and confidential documents as may be necessary to the proper performance of your mission. These documents may be shown to authorized persons. You must remain in your possession at all times until they are delivered to their addressee, if any.

William J. Donovan  
Director

cc: Mr. Eddy  
Mr. Tolson

*Approved, NATO.  
L. W. B. [Signature]  
[Signature]*

June 1, 1948

From: The Director of Strategic Services.  
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel.  
Subject: Arch S. Goriach

1. Mr. Goriach is applying for a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve. He is employed in the Office of Strategic Services.

2. He is hereby released for service with the armed forces.

3. If qualified for appointment and is appointed, it is requested that he be certified and ordered to the Office of Strategic Services for assignment.

4. Mr. Goriach is recommended as being qualified under Special Program No. 55-44.

5. The nature of Mr. Goriach's duties will be such as to warrant a waiver of any non-graduate physical defect and it is requested that such waiver, if required, be granted.

6. Mr. Goriach's address is:

Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

William J. Donovan.

WJD/200

*Germany*  
*Steel Mills*  
*OWI*

May 28, 1948

Mr. Malcolm Morrow,  
 Chief, Staff Specialists  
 Bureau of Special Services  
 Office of War Information  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Morrow:

✓  
 Referring to your letter of  
 May 18, 1948, we are returning herewith  
 the original letter received from Mr. Walter  
 F. Garrick under date of May 7, 1948. Arrange-  
 ments have been made for Mr. William Kip of our  
 Topographic Intelligence section of the Europe-  
 Africa Division to interview Mr. Garrick in  
 New York this week.

We are very deeply indebted for  
 your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan,  
 Director

*Original letter of*  
*Garrick attached*

*2 copies to Langer - 5/20*

## COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/20

TO: Dr. H. L. Lanyon  
FROM: Gen. DeLoach  
SUBJECT: W. P. Garrison.


Topographic Intelligence is asking  
Mr. William Kij to interview Mr. Garrison  
in New York this week. This will  
suffice for our immediate needs

End

## OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

May 13, 1943



General William J. Donovan, Director  
Office of Strategic Services  
25th and E Streets, Northwest  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

In compliance with a telephone conversation between Mr. Day in your office and Mrs. McMillan of this office, we are sending you herewith for consideration and reply a letter from Mr. Walter P. Garrick, 76-46 Austin Street, Forest Hills, New York.

Mr. Garrick's letter refers to information and knowledge he has regarding steel mills and other important industries, railroad centers, public utilities, transportation systems, power centers, armories, and camps in Germany.

We shall appreciate your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

*Melinda Morrow*

Melinda Morrow  
Chief, Staff Specialists  
Bureau of Special Services

*Letter ref. to  
HARRIS 5/30*

Enclosure

*To  
Austin Langer*



## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: GENERAL DOROVAN  
 FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL  
 SUBJECT:

DATE: MAY 11 1943

We have been advised as follows concerning Rear Admiral William A. Glassford.

At the beginning of the war he was with the fleet in the Pacific near the Philippines. He successfully maneuvered his ships out of danger and was able to proceed to other areas. He is thoroughly familiar with the Far East.

Subsequent to his Pacific command, he was made Commandant of the 6th District at Charleston, South Carolina. He was then sent to Bahar and Oram as an observer for the President. He has a comprehensive knowledge of North Africa.

"Unofficially" he made a trip to Iran. We helped him at that time by giving him a survey of the country which he used as a basis for his observations in the Near East. Admiral Glassford is a close friend and associate of Admiral Hart and the so-called "inner group" of old-line Admirals in the Navy.

*W. A. K.*  
 W. A. K.

cc: General Burton  
 General Magruder  
 Colonel Huntington  
 Mr. Langer  
 Mr. Shepherdson



## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: GENERAL DONOVAN  
 FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL  
 SUBJECT:

DATE: MAY 11 1943

I received a request from the Department of State to call for the purpose of meeting Rear Admiral William A. Glasford, who has been appointed personal representative of the President with the rank of Minister, at Dakar. It is my understanding that he will be head of all military and civil activities in that area.

My conversations with Admiral Glasford indicated the fact that he was at present developing the establishment of his organization. He was vaguely aware of OSS activities and requested me to provide for him some basis for the organization and purposes of an intelligence service to be included under his direction. I expressed our willingness to cooperate with him in every way and proposed a meeting with General Donovan and others of this organization best qualified to provide him with the guidance and assistance which he was evidently seeking. Admiral Glasford is now planning to depart for his post in Dakar the end of this month. He expressed the willingness to devote as much time as might be necessary to conversations with General Donovan and others here in OSS.

It may be of interest to note that this meeting with Admiral Glasford resulted from a series of conversations which I have had with Berle, Shaw and others in an effort to establish OSS representation in Dakar. Previously such requests had not been viewed favorably, owing to the fact that U.S. interests in Dakar and the status of that entire area had not become yet sufficiently defined.

May 11 1941

Pursuant to your instructions, I am endeavoring to make an appointment for you with the Admiral at a time mutually convenient.

Admiral Glassford can be reached at the Navy Department, Extension 5054, any morning, or in the office of Mr. Henry Villard, Extension 2037, at the State Department in the afternoons.

*R. Q. K.*  
*W. H. H.*

cc: General Magruder  
Colonel Burton  
Colonel Huntington  
Mr. Sheperdson  
Mr. Langer

P.S. An appointment has been fixed with Admiral Glassford for Wednesday, May 12th, at 11 a.m., in General Sumner's office. I have arranged to meet Admiral Glassford. He will find it impossible to remain for luncheon that day, but expressed pleasure in the suggestion that he might have lunch with General Sumner sometime before his departure.

SECRET

Carl Brannan has any interest  
in this man because  
he is only passable in  
radio & in Italian. They  
have often better qualified.  
However, if you would like to  
have either or both of them  
train him, they will be glad  
to do so. Done - 920448

Act  
Carl Blair & [unclear]  
the time for visiting him in [unclear]

Galassi, Gerard - 11,479

55 WALL STREET  
NEW YORK

November 5, 1943

Dear Bill:

I just find that young Gerard Galassi  
is in Boston on a very short furlough. He  
has to be back in Fort Wayne, Indiana,  
Rear Field, on Wednesday. I think your  
people have already interviewed him so  
perhaps it is not necessary for you to do  
anything further in that regard but I just  
wanted to let you know that he is avail-  
able and possibly could fly down to Wash-  
ington if your people wanted to fix it up  
for him to do that.

His address is #1 Walker Terrace,  
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Telephone Kirkland  
8788.

Sincerely yours,

*Flory*

Brigadier General William J. Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
2400 and E Streets  
Washington, D. C.

*William J. Blair*  
*Hq. 459 Bomber Group*  
*Wentworth Field*  
*Mass*

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan  
 FROM: Lt. Colonel Lowman  
 SUBJECT: Gerard Calasai

DATE: 11/5/43

Colonel Bigelow called me to say that Mr. Floyd Blair had inquired again about Gerard Calasai.

When this matter was originally brought to my attention by you, I asked Mr. Brennan if he would be interested, since in all probability the fact that the subject could speak Italian would be of more interest to him than to us.

At the time, as now, we had sufficient base operators for our own needs and the pressing need was for the agent operators.

Mr. Brennan had somebody interview him in a hospital somewhere out in the Middle West and reported back that he was unavailable for duty because of illness. One of his lieutenant's who handled the matter is now abroad, but advised me that they would get in touch with him at such time as he might be available.

I have his file before me which I borrowed from Mr. Brennan's office. It consists of approval of his security by the Security Office.

According to a report of the classification officer, it states that he reads and writes Italian fairly well. That as a radio operator he is passable.

Since Mr. Brennan did not seem to have any continuing interest in continuing him, and if for any reason you still feel that we should take him and train him for base station work, we would be glad to follow through on it. This would depend on locating him. We have no idea how to do this and wondered if you cared to write Mr. Floyd Blair to find where he was located and if he is still in this country under training.

PC  
 missed to  
 James - 6/4

55 WALL STREET  
 NEW YORK

October 8, 1943

Dear Bill,

You might like to pass on the enclosed letter about Gerard Galassi to Colonel Bigelow. He knows that I was responsible for suggesting him to your organization but has not mentioned the matter, even to me, until the present time. I gather he is all right to do any sort of job except one that requires a lot of physical Army work.

Sincerely yours,

Flayd

Brigadier General William J. Donovan  
 Office of Strategic Services  
 25th and E Streets  
 Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

Monday Oct 18<sup>th</sup>  
 7.30 Knicker-  
 bocker Club -  
 Business letter!



X Blair, Floyd  
Pfc. Gerard G. Galassi  
Flight D, 1st R & EPU  
Troop Carrier Command  
Baer Field,  
Fort Wayne, Indiana

October 2, 1943

Mr. Floyd G. Blair  
55 Wall Street  
New York, New York.

Dear Mr. Blair:

It is now more than a year since I paid you my last visit at the Bank prior to entering the service. I had high hopes then of making some sort of record for myself comparable to what Marie has done in the Navy, of winning a commission by earning it, but the past year in the Army has been an experience of enlightenment - little else. It has been accompanied by a long series of personal disappointments topped by an extended illness which still threatens to jeopardize whatever military future remains for me. Not only that, but in all this time, I don't feel I have performed any service for my country as a contribution toward the prosecution of the war. Except for a brief interval of ten days early in May, from the end of April till the end of August, I was hospitalized, here at Baer Field with rheumatic fever. When finally released, I was told I was unfit for any sort of tactical or heavy work for a period of six months. I took an Officer Candidate School physical examination last month, but was told that because of my recent illness and because I am on "light duty" for six months, I would be disqualified from applying for OCS for an equal period on medical grounds.

Yet, I continue to be classified as a radio operator (solely because I graduated from an AAF radio technical school, as Regulations so provide), which is a tactical job, and I am not yet assigned permanently to any unit or organization after nearly a full year in the Army.

However, during the past two or three weeks, on my own request, after talking with a Flight Surgeon and Classification Officer, I have been given a temporary job with the A-3 (Intelligence) Office of the Reception and Final Phase Unit to which I have belonged while at this



field. It is a step in the right direction, but it is only a temporary job, and I have no idea how long it may last. Not only that, but since it is only temporary and since I am not actually assigned to the office, I have no chance for promotion and receive no recognition for my work other than verbal appreciation from the officers in charge. It will continue to be this way for so long as I remain classified as a radio operator and am unassigned. The Captain under whom I am presently working has expressed a desire to have me permanently attached to his office, but he does not know if it is possible in view of my present classification. However, he has said he will see what can be done. But, I may well find myself in just such a state of doubt and uncertainty until my six months' period of light duty is up.

This is why I am still interested in knowing how I stand with reference to the matter for which I was interviewed, as a result of your kindness and trouble, the first week in May of this year. Nothing was told me concerning the duties it might involve except that it was related to intelligence work which appealed to me, and it also seemed to evidence recognition of my background and education.

I should have written long before to acknowledge once again your kindness on my behalf except that I was pledged to say nothing to anyone. I am still interested in winning a commission and shall continue to be so long as I must be in the service. My long illness last summer was a keen disappointment to me, for I well realized that because of it I lost out again. Now I am writing, first, to express my belated but none the less sincere thanks for your efforts in my behalf, and, second, to apprise you of my present situation and inquire if there is still any chance for me in this latter connection.

With Best Wishes,

Sincerely yours,

*Heard*

*File, Mr. Hart*  
May 4, 1943

Miss Rita Hart  
Secretary to Mr. Dreyfuss  
501 Madison Avenue  
New York, N. Y.

Dear Miss Hart:

In answer to your inquiry, we did receive Mr. Dreyfuss' letter of April 8th and General Donovan asked one of our men here to get in touch with Mr. Gabriel. We understand this has been done.

Thank you for your interest in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

*John M. Tamm*

Secretary to General Donovan



April 22, 1945

Copy to Brig. Gen. William Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
2304 A E Streets N. W.  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

We did not want to bother General Donovan again  
but wondered if you could tell us if our letter  
of April 8th introducing Mr. Gilbert Gabriel  
ever reached General Donovan's desk.

Mr. Dreyfuss would appreciate your letting us  
know about this and if by any chance you are  
not familiar with it, we would be delighted to  
send another copy.

Very sincerely,

*Rina Marx*

Secretary to Mr. Dreyfuss  
MHC

\* Oney/US, Henry

April 8, 1943

T. Fred Donovan

Ed Taylor -  
What time?  
see

Brig. General Wm. Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
20th & N., S. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Don't know  
how but he should be  
with me  
EJY

Dear General Donovan:

My very good friend Gilbert Gabriel has just returned from  
working up the Office of War Information in Alaska. He  
has asked me if I would introduce him to you as he is anxious  
to make a new connection in the Government service.

For your information:

He has worked with G-2 (Col. Cartner) in Alaska  
He was asked by Col. Cartner to accept a Majority  
Previously, while in the New York O.W.I. office (under  
Ed Stanley) he wrote the first booklets published  
by that office on the Four Freedoms -- which the  
President later asked to have put into his  
White House library.

You will probably remember him as the well-known  
newspaper man and author  
He has also spent a good deal of time in Hollywood  
with Paramount doing scenario work.

I hesitated bothering you with this request for an appointment  
for Mr. Gabriel, and would not do so unless I felt I was  
doing you both a service in introducing you to one another.

If you would let me know how to arrange such an appointment,  
I will gladly take care of conveying your message to  
Mr. Gabriel.

Very truly,  
Ed Taylor

**CAPTAIN DANIEL HENNINGSEN GLOSTERMAN**

(Born July 4, 1896)

Residence--Dunbar Park, Oakland, Indiana

1914 July 4, enlisted, Private, Battery "A", IND. N.G. September 6, Battery Clerk, Battery "A", IND. N.G.

1915 January 12, Sergeant, (Chief 3rd Gun Section) September 30, First Sergeant until

1916 April 3, Elected and commissioned 2nd Lieutenant, Field Artillery IND. N.G. Assigned Battery "A" (Duties, Senior Second Lieutenant, Reconnaissance Officer and Battalion Inspiring Officer)

June 18, Reported for duty Mexican Border Service, Battery "A" Azusa, Indianapolis.

June 21, to June 25, Rendezvous, State Fair Grounds, Indianapolis, Indiana.

June 25, to July 7, Mobilization of 1st Battalion, Batteries, "A", "B", "C", Ind. Field Artillery, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.

July 10, to duty on Mexican Border, Camp Pecos, Grants, Texas. (Duties, Battery Reconnaissance Officer, Senior Officer in command of Combat Train for Artillery under direct command of Col. Ballard, Cavalry, with advance guard during entire field maneuvers. Special intelligence officer and inspection details.)

1917 January 6 to January 9, Returned to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana with Battery "A" under Major Robert H. Tyndall.

January 10 to January 12, Temporary assignment Post Adjutant, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.

January 12, Reported for duty Mexican Border Service.

January 12, to January 15, Reconnaissance, Field Artillery, IND. N.G. Assigned Battery "A". (Duties, Special Officer under Adjutant General, State of Indiana, in addition to regular duties, Senior Artillery Inspiring Officer of the Battalion, inspecting each month Batteries "B" and "C".) (Duties, and general intelligence work after the 1st of April 1917 under orders of Adjutant General, State of Indiana. Senior inspecting officer in command of inspected area of terrace district at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.)

June 25, to June 28, Mexican Border Service. Rendezvous at Indiana State Fair Grounds, Indianapolis, Indiana.

June 28, to July 7, Mobilization of 1st Battalion, Field Artillery, called for purpose of training in Officers School.

July 10, to July 15, Reconnaissance, Indiana Field Artillery and assigned to duty, 150th Field Artillery, 2nd Division, Headquarters Division, U.S.A.

1917

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/12 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100230005-4

August 2. Commissioned by President of United States Captain of Field Artillery (1st INF.) National Guard in service of United States.

September 18. Camp Mills, Long Island. (Duties, -reported 150th Field Artillery, to Division Chief of Staff, Col. Douglas MacArthur, and Brigade Commander General S. F. Sumner. Special duties, Senior Captain on 1st General Court, in War time, which sat at Camp Mills until division sailed October 17.)

October 18. Sailed U.S.S. Lincoln. (Special duties, -liaison and inspecting officers with army commander aboard ship, General S. F. Sumner and Captain, of the ship, James Stouting during the entire voyage.)

October 21. Arrived St. Nazaire, France.

November 11 to December 27. Camp, Fort Guisan, Brittany, France.

December 27 to January 8. Fourth Army School, British Expeditionary Forces, St. Omer, France.

1918

January 8 to January 14. Inspection duty with inspecting officer Fourth Army S.E.F. (Duties, inspection of balloon and airplane observation. Started at army headquarters, corps headquarters, division headquarters.)

January 15 to February 12. Assigned for special duty at front with 19th Siege Battery (6 guns 8" howitzer) R.F.A. Gun position in the town of St. Omer, France, Major F. A. Jones commanding. (Duties, Battery Commander with Major Jones directing entire month. Observation Officer directing fire. Liaison Officer with observation squadron in rear. Liaison Officer with 19th Balloon Company assigned to observe for 19th Siege Battery.)

February 13 to February 14. Fourth Army School, St. Omer, France, and Fourth Army Headquarters.

February 15 to February 16. Camp Fort Guisan, Brittany, France, returned to duties as Regimental Adjutant.

February 17 to June 12. Department's Executive, Recombat Sector, Champagne. (Duties, Regimental Adjutant and Assistant Chief of operations for regiment.)

July 1 to July 21. Recombat Sector, Champagne-Marne under command of General John Gurney, French Army. Regiment assigned to position with 19th French Division. (Duties, -Detailed operations officer under the heavy artillery commander of the 19th French Division in which capacity made inspection of all heavy artillery with the division commander and General Gurney. In addition to duties as Regimental Adjutant of the 19th R.F.A.)

July 22 to August 12. Executive Area-Marne, Chateau-Thierry. (Duties, -Regimental Adjutant until August 11.)

September 1 to October 1. St. Omer. Assigned to command Battery of 19th Field Artillery, 2nd Battalion. (Duties, -Commanding Officer, Major William Spence.)

October 1 to January 1. 19th Field Artillery, 2nd Battalion. (Duties, Commanding Battery 19th).

**Page 3--Military Service--Captain Daniel Independence Glessbrenner**

**1918**

October 12 to November 11, Meuse-Argonne Offensive, first and second phases and Sedan. (Detachment, Commanding Battery "D").  
 November 11 to November 21, Army of Occupation, France.  
 November 22 to November 23, Army of Occupation, Belgium.  
 November 23 to December 1, Army of Occupation, Luxembourg.  
 December 1 to April 6, 1919, Army of Occupation, Germany, Station  
 and Munster.  
 December 12 to March 12, Commanding Battery "D".

**1920**

March 12, Commanding 2nd Battalion, Batteries "C" and "D", 150th  
 Field Artillery.  
 April 12, Detached for U.S. on U. S. S. Leviathan from Brest, France.  
 Detachment, Stationing Officers for Army aboard ship  
 during voyage, Chief in command of Decks "A", "B", "C"  
 and "D".  
 April 25, Arrived New York.  
 April 26 to May 27, Camp Maxwell, New Jersey and Camp Zachary  
 Taylor, Kentucky.  
 May 27, Released out of service from Camp Zachary Taylor. Captain  
 of Field Artillery, Commander of Battery "D" and 2nd  
 Battalion 150th F. A.

**MEMBER MAY 27, 1919.**

- 1919** Member of Rainbow Division Veterans Association and Indiana's life member of its National Executive Committee since the formation of the association at Bad Neuenahr, Germany, February 1919.
- 1919** Member of American Legion since September 1919.
- 1920** Post Commander of John Shidmore Post of American Legion.
- 1923** Vice-President of National Rainbow Division Veterans Association and Chairman of Executive Committee for holding their annual reunion convention at Indianapolis on July 12-15, including distinguished guests General John J. Pershing, General Henri J. E. Gouraud, with Col. William J. Donovan, National President of the Rainbow Division Veterans during the year 1922-23.
- 1925-6** Post Commander of the Indianapolis Memorial Post #3, American Legion.
- 1925-6** Member of Distinguished Guest Committee State of Indiana, American Legion.
- 1938-9** National President of Rainbow Division Veterans Association.
- 1941** December--VLS Member Marion County Civilian Defense Staff in Charge Industrial Resources and Production.

#### **MEMBERS OF FAMILY**

##### **Now in Military Service:**

Air Cadet W. A. Vonnegut, Squadron 20, Air Force Training Center, Santa Anna, California. (Orphan Cousin living at Gleschrenner household: Voluntary, enlisted)

Private B. I. Gleschrenner, Jr., Field Engineer Regiment, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana (Non-Voluntary enlisted)

##### **Other Members:**

Wife - Edna E. Gleschrenner  
 Daughters - Emily L. Gleschrenner  
               Mary E. Gleschrenner  
               Catherine E. Gleschrenner  
               Jane E. Gleschrenner

**Page 5--SUCCESSION BUSINESS DETAILS ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARY  
DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES WAR DEPARTMENT, MARINE  
CORPS, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1931.**

- 1931-1942** November 12, became Secretary-Treasurer of Harmon-Harrington Company, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana in which capacity have been one of three senior executives. From that date principal efforts of this company have been to develop commercially and for military purposes all-wheel drive trucks and truck laying vehicles. Constant contact and associations with all officers of the army in the different divisions, such as Quartermaster, Ordnance, Field Artillery, Marine Corps, has been maintained during this period, 1931 to date.
- 1931-1942** Personally assisted President A. W. Harrington of this company, studying and formulating policies of the future motorization and mechanization of the army in connection with all United States Government contracts held by the company since 1931 to 1942.
- 1933-1939** During this period, 1933-1939, due to the efforts of President A. W. Harrington who acted in the consulting capacity for the Persian (Iranian) government, our company furnished motorized artillery equipment and armored vehicles for the Persian Army. Several staff officers of the Persian Government assigned to our company, worked out with the writer their tables of organization for artillery and mechanized armored forces.
- 1934-1939** Inspection trips were made annually in 1934-39 to the Camp of the 36th National Guard Division at Fort Knox, Kentucky, Major General Robert H. Spadell, Commanding.
- 1939** Since September 1939 our company has played a large part in supplying the motorized equipment and armored tanks to the Netherlands East Indies Government during which period the writer has conducted and spent much time in all conferences with the general staff purchasing officers of the Netherlands Purchasing Commission representing the Royal Netherlands Government in New York City.

Since 1939 have conducted and participated in the conferences with staff officers of the following foreign governments:

Iranian Government  
 Netherlands East Indies Government  
 Russian Government  
 Persian Government  
 Spanish Government  
 Chinese Government  
 Indian Government  
 Great Britain (armored force representatives)  
 Canadian Government (armored force and field  
 artillery representatives)

Section  
TRAINING

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON

D-5790

RM

Director,

Office of Strategic Services.

My dear Colonel Burgess:

There has been received your letter of April 26, 1943, as follows:

"Please refer to my letter of March 25, 1943, wherein a request was presented for authority for the Office of Strategic Services to use pay-roll forms identical to U.S. Form Nos. 43 and 44, approved by your office on January 7, 1943, and December 16, 1942, respectively.

"As a result of conversations between representatives of the Finance Branch of the Office of Strategic Services and Mr. Clougher of the General Accounting Office, it has been determined that Pay-roll and Individual Savings Account Forms as approved by the Comptroller General on April 2, 1943, for the use of the Office of Civilian Control will meet the needs of this office. We are, therefore, desisting of requesting the request set forth in my letter of March 25th to the extent that the Pay-roll and Individual Savings Account Forms identified as U.S. Form No. (Washington) as approved on April 2, 1943, be authorized for use in the Pay-roll Section of the Office of Strategic Services.

"It is desired that the copies of the Pay-roll Form be assigned GPO Form numbers 211, 212, 213, and 214. The Individual Savings Account should be assigned GPO Form number 215. For your convenience, there are attached samples of the 'Pay Roll for Personal Savings' and 'Individual Savings Account' forms which this office desires to use in connection with pay-roll preparation by machine process.

"We would appreciate receiving your approval at an early date in order that we may continue this, the new form as soon as possible."



- 2 -

The proposed individual earnings record is substantially similar to the form approved by this office for the Office of Civilian Defense, except as to the spacing in which to reflect the employee's full name and as to the position of the title of the form. In the interest of uniformity with the form approved for the Office of Civilian Defense, the title has been placed at the bottom of the form and provision made for showing the individual employee's full name.

With respect to the proposed payroll form, for which the designating symbol and numbers GDS-141, 141a, 141b, and 141c are requested for the original and copies thereof, it is suggested that since the submitted form is identical with Standard Form No. 1079a-Revised, the standard payroll form approved by this office should be used without change in the form designations, viz, standard forms Nos. 1079a-Revised, 1079b-Revised, 1079c-Revised, and 1079d-Revised. Some of the payroll form is to be processed by interlocked carbon, clearance for the printing thereof outside the Government Printing Office may be requested from the Public Printer, and supplies thereof ordered under the standard form designations.

Subject to the above-stated changes and comments, GDS Form No. 141 (Revised), "Individual Earnings Record", is approved and it is suggested that when printed four copies of the form be furnished this office.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Vincent C. Wilcox

Comptroller General  
of the United States

Enclosure

March 26, 1943

The Honorable Lindsay C. Warren  
Comptroller General of the United States  
General Accounting Office  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Warren:

In order to permit the Office of Strategic Services to maintain essential and required records in connection with the payment for personal services without the employment of additional personnel in our Fiscal Office, we are desirous of adopting bookkeeping-machine posting of salary record cards. Standard Form No. 1102, "Individual Earning Record" and Standard Form 1013, "Pay Roll for Personal Services" are not adapted to the Remington Rand Bookkeeping Machine which we propose to use.

Authority is, therefore, requested for the Office of Strategic Services to use a form identical to W. D. Form No. 43 (Remington), approved by Comptroller General, U. S., January 7, 1943, such form to be assigned OSS Form No. 80 and forms identical to W. D. Forms 44, 44a, 44b, and 44c, "Pay Roll for Personal Services," approved by Comptroller General, U. S., December 10, 1942, which would be assigned OSS Form Nos. 101, 101a, 101b, and 101c.

Funds for the 1944 fiscal year for the Office of Strategic Services will be included in the War Department request for appropriation which is an additional reason for the Office of Strategic Services desiring to use forms identical to those in use by the War Department.

To expedite the handling of our salary records and pay rolls, we will appreciate approval at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

WJDonovan:kmt

cc: Colonel Donovan  
Mr. Woodring  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Egan  
Commander Vanderbilt  
Mr. Barnes

William J. Donovan  
Director

The Honorable Lindsay C. Warren  
Comptroller General of the United States  
General Accounting Office  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Warren:

Please refer to my letter of March 25, 1945, wherein a request was presented for authority for the Office of Strategic Services to use pay-roll forms identical to W. D. Forms Nos. 43 and 44, approved by your office on January 7, 1945 and December 10, 1942, respectively.

As a result of conversations between representatives of the Finance Branch of the Office of Strategic Services and Mr. Slaughter of the General Accounting Office, it has been determined that Pay-Roll and Individual Earnings Record Forms as approved by the Comptroller General on April 8, 1943, for the use of the Office of Civilian Defense will meet the needs of this office. We are, therefore, desirous of amending the request set forth in my letter of March 25th to the extent that the Pay-Roll and Individual Earnings Record Forms identified as "W. D. Form No. 43 (Birmingham)" as approved on April 8, 1943, be authorized for use in the Pay-Roll Section of the Office of Strategic Services.

It is desired that the copies of the Pay-Roll Form be assigned GSA form numbers 181, 181a, 181b, and 181c. The Individual Earnings Record should be assigned GSA form number 182. For your convenience, there are attached samples of the "Pay Roll for Personal Services" and "Individual Earnings Record" forms which this office desires to use in connection with pay-roll preparation by machine process.

We would appreciate receiving your approval at an early date in order that we may commence using the new forms as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

WJH:dring:md

Attachments  
col General Donovan (5)  
Alexander Vanderbilt  
Mr. D. H. Gann  
Mr. Vile Ruffin  
Mr. J. Ridge Nichols  
Mr. E. E. Woodring

William J. Donovan

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

**MOST SECRET**

DATE February 1, 1943  
FROM

TO MYLDC RMT  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

(FOR ACTION)

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR INFORMATION)

SECRET

SECURITY, SECRETARIAT

INCOMING HEADING

ACKNOWLEDGE  
PRIORITY  
ROUTINE  
DEFERRED

**RECEIVED**

11325. Mexico: report on Frank H. Orleans.

The Embassy does not believe that Mr. Frank H. Orleans, a former clerk at the Embassy, should be entrusted with handling any secret and confidential material. Mr. Orleans is now in the United States and has been appointed to a position with the Army Air Corps Command at Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio.

Revelay

(This telegram is a reply to an inquiry from Patterson Field Headquarters, and might well be kept on file in case Orleans should, at a later date, seek employment with (SS).)

NY

**MOST SECRET**

TO: 1/1/43 1144 4-4

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16 10000 1

*Copy for Col Donovan*

March 2, 1943

Pvt. John A. Gault  
Battalion 12 - Battery E  
Platoon 1  
Port Austin, Virginia

Dear Pvt. Gault:

Correspondence from Mr. Edmond W. Lee, 2nd, to Colonel William J. Donovan, the Director of the Office of Strategic Services, stating that you are in possession of a collection of pictures of various parts of the world, has been referred to the Pictorial Records Sub-Division for attention.

Will you please be so kind as to inform us as to the areas covered by your collection, the approximate dates the photographs were taken, and where the photographs are at the present time. Upon receipt of this information, it may be necessary for us to get in touch with you for the purpose of reproducing that part of your collection which might be of service in the war effort.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Very truly yours,

John Francis Langan  
Pictorial Records Sub-Division

JFL:GLA

**HOTEL SENATOR**  
12TH AND L STREETS  
SACRAMENTO - CALIFORNIA

Jan. 5, 1943.

Dear Bill,

This will introduce to you, although I believe you already know him, my friend Frank Gigliotti of La Mesa, Calif. formerly welfare and relief commissioner of California.

Frank is coming to your office on some national defense matters in connection with your office, and I wanted you to know of this first-hand.

I have known Frank for several years, and wrote you about him a year or so ago. He is a real chap and a good friend of mine.

Many regards and every good wish for 1943, Bill.

As always,

Bill Argent

RECEIVED - 12/10/43 BY TELETYPE - INSTANT RESERVATIONS NO CHARGE

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2  
PRES D O OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO  
(CIB)

Branch Office, G-2, WDC & FA  
San Diego, California  
January 7, 1943

Mr. James Murphy  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

This will introduce Mr. Frank B. Gigliotti,  
who has a background and information which I believe will be  
interesting to Colonel Donovan and to others in your organi-  
zation.

He already is well acquainted with Major Bruce  
and Mr. Brennan.

Very truly yours,

*Carroll T. Harris*  
CARROLL T. HARRIS  
Lt. Colonel, CE

CTH/  
lc

*Frank B. Gigliotti*

Branch Office, G-2, WDC & FA  
San Diego, California  
January 2, 1948

Mr. James Murphy  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

This will introduce Dr. Frank E. Siglietti,  
who has a background and information which I believe will be  
interesting to Colonel Danovan and to others in your organi-  
zation.

He already is well acquainted with Major Bruce  
and Mr. Cronson.

Very truly yours,

CARROLL T. MORRIS  
Lt. Colonel, GS

CCM/  
ls

Send him to  
see Major Wells  
G. v



1/10/41  
X-1000

1/10/41 8/5/41

To: Colonel Donovan  
From: F. L. Mayer

Attached is a translation of a memorandum from our London Office, which, according to our source, was written by General Giraud during his captivity as a prisoner of war. General Giraud is understood to have given a copy to Marshal Petain on his return to France after his escape.

We have had our London Office make every effort to confirm the credibility of this highly interesting document, with the result that there is every indication of its authenticity.

We are also reliably informed that G-2 knows of the existence of a memorandum by General Giraud of a similar nature, but have thus far not been able to lay their hands on it.

F.L.M.

Enclosure

REPORT ON THE CAUSE OF THE DEFEAT  
OF FRANCE IN THE PRESENT WAR

- I. Introductory Discussion of the Subject: pp. 1 to 5 inclusive.
- II. "Military Causes": pp. 6 to 21.
- III. "Social Causes": pp. 21 to 29.
- IV. "Political Causes": pp. 29 to 35.
- V. Conclusion: "Could We Have Won?"

SECRET

## THE CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT

France was conquered. In six weeks her army was forced to lay down its arms, although from 1914 to 1918 she first resisted, then pushed back and finally overthrew a German army just as strong proportionally as the army of 1940.

What are the causes of this unforeseeable defeat, unheard of in the history of France?

To discover these causes honestly, to state them frankly, and to find suitable remedies should be the aim of every Frenchman proud of the past, aware of the gravity of the present and filled with indestructible confidence in the future. Our history shows us too many examples of catastrophic ruin followed by extraordinary revival for us to remain crushed and resigned.

A great nation like France has a role to play in the world. Our motto is not "France above all", but "Gesia Dei per Francoe" (God works his way through France), and we prefer the second to the first.

France entered the war in 1939 with a land army of

- 20 active divisions,
- 8 North African divisions,
- 3 colonial divisions, and
- 3 light mechanized divisions,

forming the peacetime army. To these were added at the mobilization

- 20 divisions Series A,
- 20 divisions Series B, and
- 15 colonial or North African divisions,

making a total of approximately 90 divisions.

The active divisions included 7 motorized divisions relatively better equipped than the corresponding horsedrawn ones. In the Series A divisions, the officering by active cadres was weak, and equipment was not as good as in the active divisions. The Series B divisions had as cadres from active service only Colonels, some of whom came from Mobilization Centers or Administrative Posts that had not prepared them for so difficult a command as that of a regiment composed entirely of reservists. They had no anti-tank equipment at all.

**SECRET**

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

A-102

-2-

The average age of the troops in the active divisions was 25 years, in the Series A divisions, 30 years, and in the Series B divisions, from 35 to 40. Most of the men had had only a year of military service. Their training left much to be desired.

The North African peacetime divisions were excellent troops, but handicapped by their French reservists. Those formed at the mobilization were not of as good a quality. The colonial divisions had neither the training nor the cohesion needed in European warfairs. Although capable of individual acts of heroism, they were poorly prepared for resistance to the death.

The divisions of horse or motorized cavalry were magnificent units conserving the traditions not of the cavalry, but simply of the army, with a sense of authority, a love of their calling, and a taste for chances. Perhaps it could be proved that there were still too many horses and not enough armored cars. However that may be, both kinds sacrificed themselves heroically, and their exploits in Belgium added some glorious pages to the history of the French Army.

The tanks were not divided into divisions; each army having two battalions of R35 tanks. Until the beginning of 1940 the other R35, H39, D2, or D battalions were in the G. d. Q. reserve. Starting January 1940, two armored divisions were formed that had time neither to be amalgamated nor to be trained. A third Light Mechanized Division (D. L. M.) had, however, been formed at the end of 1939. It figured very honorably in the cavalry corps in Belgium.

I am purposely omitting here all questions of armament and equipment. We shall come to this later.

The Air Force included formations peculiar to that branch and others attached to the land forces, although of course retaining its special status and a quasi independence. It was an imposing array of Generals, General Staffs, and Services. Unfortunately it only lacked planes!

At no time during the war, and in no theater of operations could one have the slightest illusion as to the number or quality of the planes, the general attitude of mind, or the coordination between land and air troops. We had neither pursuit planes nor bombers nor reconnaissance planes.

The total number of pursuit squadrons did not exceed twenty, or a maximum of 750 planes. There was no day bombing at all. For night bombing there were only a few hundred old planes. As for reconnaissance, on May 1, 1940, it reached

**SECRET**

barely twenty modern planes per army, or a total of scarcely 200.

When one thinks of the fantastic sums poured into the Air Arm between 1930 and 1940 one wonders how the government and the country were able to tolerate such a swindle and end up so utterly empty-handed.

Besides its airplanes, it was the function of the Air Arm to organize and command anti-aircraft artillery. There was the same dearth in that field as there was of aircraft proper. On May 10, 1940, we had neither high altitude artillery nor artillery for close-range fighting. No batteries of 90 millimeter guns, a few batteries of 75 millimeter guns, many of them dating from the last war, and a maximum of one hundred batteries of 25 millimeter guns, some of which were kept behind the fighting zone, and most of which had no more than 100 rounds per gun. A lamentable situation!

One can say that only the Sea Arm was ready for war. Since 1920, methodically, patiently, the French fleet had been progressively modernized. Psychologically and materially the Navy had recovered confidence. In itself, its traditions, its faith. The ships were often superior to foreign ships of the same type. The crews were disciplined, the specialists.... The Navy had retained its own aviation and .... It wished to prove everywhere it operated that it was better than the German fleet and could rival the English fleet.

Whenever it had to collaborate with the Land Army it gave proof of a comprehension, a breadth of view, a camaraderie (a brothers-in-arms feeling) to which a land soldier is happy to bear witness after observing its excellent results.

Along side the French Army there was the English Army, for the war was at first, we must not forget, a war of coalition declared on Germany by France and England to fulfil their pledge to Poland.

In 1939 there was no English Army, and little more in 1940. The expeditionary force that started to land in October 1939 consisted of 4 divisions. In May 1940 there were no more than 9 in France, divided into 3 Army Corps. Except for 4 professional divisions, the rest included only freshly formed units, bold in behavior, full of vigor and spirit, but with mediocre officering and only relatively well-trained; on the other hand, luxuriously equipped with incomparable transport material, .... but without anything necessary for modern warfare such as, for example, armored cars or anti-tank equipment.

**SECRET**

An excellent Air Arm, especially as regards pursuit, but, even combined with the French Aviation, inferior in number to the easy German formations.

There again the notorious doctrine of separation of the land and air forces. General Jort, Commander in Chief of the English Army in France, had, for instance, nothing to do with the English squadrons stationed in Champagne which were under the command of a Vice Marshal for Air who received his orders from England.

The units stationed in England were for a long time kept specially for defense of the English coast. Some came to Belgium, but we must also admit that when the fate of France was at stake in 1918, they did not take part in great numbers without counting.....

As for the British Navy, it was what it has been for centuries, the first in the world, with its traditions, a will, and a heroism to which one can only pay respect. Perhaps like the French Navy, it underestimated the importance of the air arm. Its ships suffered far more from bombs than from submarines. As long as the small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery was enough, the risk is less, but as soon as the ships are taken down, the precision of its aim and the weight of its bombs make it a terrible adversary.

Let us all, for completeness' sake that the cooperation between France and England was perfect up to May 15, 1940, if one leaves out England's inadequate preparedness as regards personnel and equipment: England could and should have done more. But that magnificent and likeable soldier, General Jort, placed himself entirely, unreservedly under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the French Army, who in turn was able, with his excellent courtesy, to smooth ruffled feelings and avoid vanity. But this lasted only until May 15th. As soon as the House Front was placed, as soon as the anticipated victory turned to defeat, the attitude of the English changed. The friendship gave way to selfishness. The Allies, Aerial, and the Blackburg, and, alas, Mers El-Keh t....

...the French and English allies the Belgian and our h...  
...the 1940

...late, and here we must speak frankly, the fault lies with the intolerable blindness of the governments of the neutral countries claiming neutrality; several cities...  
...the writer...  
...France tried to save Holland and especially Belgium...  
...that...  
...were forcibly, inevitably, the

SECRET

... of a ... drunk ... pride and ambition ...  
 ... was willing to ... contact between ...  
 ... to ... movements, no infor ...  
 ... the most ... A had ... and ...  
 ... the conviction that they would hold the Albert Canal ...  
 ... for weeks and in the Ardennes, for days ... but was what the ...  
 ... expected. What were the ...

The Albert Canal was forced the morning of May 11th, the ...  
 ... Light Infantry did not hold a single day. The Dutch ...  
 ... slipped away via Aarschot and the IJssel of Vlodrecht ...  
 ... day 11th, when the divisions of the Seventh Army were ...  
 ... to the battle of Broda and that of ... (Turnhout?)

... of disaster ... the surrender that caused half a million ...  
 ... fall ... down their arms. A ...  
 ... Those who remember the ...  
 ... in 1914-1918 ... to ...  
 ... 1940. And the worst of it is that ...  
 ... capable of fighting, who ...  
 ... for defense, cried for help and ...  
 ... their fortifications ...  
 ... They extended ...  
 ... English ...  
 ... and the ...  
 ... no organized unit ...  
 ... to counter-attack and ...  
 ... intelligence, ...  
 ... kings, understand; be informed, ...  
 ... the fate of the earth").

...

[illegible][illegible]

...the same effects.

...to be a philosophy, which is

... military ...  
... organization ...  
... by into ...

...the same service

1534



...the divisions have been quite so unfortunate. It was  
...to keep these divisions away from the active  
...in positions where they could hold a firm  
...having to manoeuvre. But the insufficient  
...obliged us to utilize everything available  
...and during a division that were routed  
...it was Series B division that was unable to  
...and later. Newly formed units were not able  
...against the German attack on the German  
...we had not acted in peacetime to

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maintain an indispensable minimum of active divisions, and because we were satisfied with mere reserves of the National Army, it was impossible to hold our positions defensively or to manoeuvre offensively.

In addition, it must be said that since 1920 the Army had never been trained for the offensive. Whenever a politician or minister made a speech he took pains to emphasize that the French Army was strictly a defensive one. This idea was firmly ingrained in the minds of the enlisted men and, perhaps, in the cadres of our army. Battles were fought on a selected battle field which had been prepared and fortified. The firing line was made at leisure. The army submitted to the will of the enemy and never attempted to impose its will on him.

The residential and divisional headquarters were well placed, far from the excitement of battle. Every soldier always found a well-defined position. When this position was lost the army was forced to operate on a terrain which was not well prepared, organized and studied out. It was difficult to withstand the impact of a young army, brimming with vigour, in which the officers marched upon the very heels of their men, in which the initiative of each man was given free rein. Disintegration was the first reaction, then chaos, then the witness of the unheard of and unforgettable spectacle of entire divisions disintegrating by groups, then down the arms, fleeing helter-skelter.

It is true that this was the exception, and other units can be mentioned in which, until the last moment, the officers kept perfect control of their nerves and their men, and forced the enemy to render honors to the remnants of troops filing before him. However, the fact that certain retreats should have occurred, in which the routed soldiers leaped in one bound from the Meuse to the Somme, is beyond our comprehension, and demonstrates how different the army of 1940 was from that of 1918.

I shall go even further. The army of May 10, 1940, was less ready for war than that of September 1939. When we first declared war, let us not forget that mobilization was carried on without either enthusiasm or opposition.

The great mass of the people felt, in a confused manner, that it was all inevitable, since Germany and its leader could not be deprived of the right to leave other nations in peace. Perhaps not every single citizen was entirely certain just where Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, were on the map of Europe, but all felt that each country would in turn undergo the same fate and that it was better to liquidate the affair immediately rather than to await the will of the new war lord.

**SECRET**

from the air side to a standstill before the German fortifications and the neutral frontiers. In France, as in England -- especially in England -- the opinion arose, spread, and took firm root, that there was to be a war of blockade, far more economic than military, where each side would remain in its respective positions, dealing a few blows, firing a little artillery, making a few air raids.

Those who pointed to the Polish campaign and its teachings were reminded that the conditions there had been quite different, which was of course true, and that the methods employed there were not practicable in the West.

Bit by bit, in the front as well as in the rear, something took place which might be termed the "demobilization of mind," if not of individuals. They adjusted themselves to a sham war. All normal activities were pursued; concrete and manufactured, agriculture was carried on normally, the theatre and the moving-pictures were as important as ever. Everything was given attention, with military training enjoying last place. Even for a few divisions, the army was nothing but a time-consuming workshop carrying on the most diversified activities, and a sort of idea of war became more and more blurred. The matter of flourishes was one for general preoccupation, and the most extraordinary formulas were devised to make these as frequent and as long as possible. The spirit at the front was certainly not bad, but it was far from being military. As for the state of mind in the rear, more interest was evinced in the latest scandal, the latest soccer game, or in the latest racing event than in what the Germans might do.

Due to our low birth rate and to our losses in the first war we were unable to muster the necessary number of divisions. However, we could at least have compensated for quantity by quality in the form of special units supported by armored vehicles, patterned after the German models.

Many individuals advocated taking this step, and one of our most distinguished statesmen became the apostle of this doctrine. The armored corps or the armored army found no receptive ear. It must be emphasized, either in government circles or in the High Command.

Some feared that this would represent the first step toward the professional army which, in all history has been the champion of democratic regimes. Others approved it only timidly with the slowness characterizing all French undertakings since the first World War.

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...in January 1938 ...  
...division was completed in December  
...result of the present  
...1939-1940.

...for the armored division to be divided to the infantry  
...the division was reorganized. The crisis of 1938 prevented us  
...in the autumn of that same year.

...two divisions mobilized at the beginning of  
...the division of orders,  
...consider the  
...when one  
...all the  
...address  
...can  
...in  
...the following year  
...although Poland  
...1939 we had  
...German armor  
...not only foreign  
...results. It was  
...and material  
...nor with war-  
...we did not manu-  
...the Northern Army  
...for this blunder.

...armored units, a quantity it not  
...important as compared with our aviation  
...essential reason for our military  
...who fought in Flanders to  
...the French Air Force was the best  
...first to be used. It can be  
...comparison with German aviation  
...the present conflict.

...the fact that the  
...integration  
...flowing of  
...between

...the fact that the  
...German air  
...where it was  
...interior, on the 11th.

SECRET

cement fortifications -- all were attacked by the Stukas and the aerial gunners. The posts of command did not function, the liaison cars and the motorcyclists were pursued on the roads. There were frantic preparations for attack and attacks at full speed and force. An added factor was the constant fear of parachutists, whose number was magnified one hundred and one thousand times by the imagination.

The losses inflicted upon us by the German Air Force were sometimes heavy; however, in most cases they were far below the casualties following an artillery bombardment in 1916 at Verdun. But the psychological effect was tremendous, particularly on the units not led by capable officers. Certain defensive positions were abandoned by their defenders even before the attack of enemy infantry was launched, solely because of the action of the air force. And yet, however decisive the Luftwaffe's action was against a column, a route, or badly concealed concentration of troops, it was not dangerous to a line of infantrymen or a hidden battery. It is true that many non-commissioned infantry and artillery officers had neither the authority nor the energy to provide their men with adequate cover before the battle.

On a few occasions when the land army had pursuit plans at its disposal, the enemy did not make an appearance. Certain movements executed in broad daylight, under cover of darkness and German patrols, were completed with no interference at all from enemy aircraft. How many times, alas, did the commanders of land armies have any such opportunity? Their requests to the army were, for the most part, ignored. The unfortunate Army Air Force commanders, conscious of the needs of their comrades on land, could only telephone, explain, beg. Nothing came of it, because the air force had nothing to send.

Let no one affirm that it was impossible to do better. Since the month of September 1939 the land army had been begging for aid, but no one heeded. Much was made of a few individual successes. There was no strenuous effort made to construct planes and to train pilots. If this had been done, we could perhaps have built in nine months a pursuit force equal to that of Germany.

I do not speak of bombing planes, for in their case we obviously could not make up for lost time. However, our fields in Morocco, our French factories, and the American factories afforded us ample opportunity to produce pursuit planes.

We were late in making our decision and the thirty-odd pursuit groups which constituted our defensive air force were sacrificed in vain. They paid with their blood for the lack of foresight on the part of our command.

SECRET

In the absence of pursuit planes we could have provided anti-aircraft artillery. We had no such weapons or had only an insignificant number of them. On May 10, 1940, we had only 1918 model "auto-cannons" with a range of 3,000-4,000 metres and some 25 MM. batteries. Nothing was done between 1930 and 1938 in France to organize an anti-aircraft artillery, either from the point of view of personnel or of material. Between 1938 and 1939 there was no longer time for that. The small number of modern guns turned out by Bourges or Creusot was simply ridiculous. There was no battery with an 8,000 to 10,000 meter range because the Army did not want to adopt the 90 MM. guns used in the Navy. It is mystifying to contemplate such petty quarrels.

Where there was artillery, especially 25 MM. guns, there was either no ammunition or a supply which lasted for a very short while. Still everyone knew the number of German planes, their method of attack, and the frequency of their attacks.

All that had been said, written, repeated for years by the responsible leaders. During a time when in Germany one could follow daily breath taking progress of that country's preparations, when military attaches warned of the impending danger and foreign observers kept us informed, in France, words, studies, plans, all formulated with great slowness, took the place of action.

The same Minister of Defense remained in his post for six years, under different titles. One had reason to believe in the existence of unified doctrine, in the execution of a plan simple, studied and logically executed. There was only a long series of unsystematic actions, and those who spoke most reasonably had the final word while pessimists were considered as trouble-makers, and astronomical sums were spent fruitlessly.

Could the General Staff -- to use a word dear to those who seek out the war-guilt -- have acquitted itself better? Assuredly, it might have, but it would have had to have the qualities of character befitting its intelligence. We have too many intelligent persons in France; we have not enough men of character. Our bureaus know how to present a plan but do not know how to carry it out, and they prefer to utilize a man whom they consider incapable rather than to clash with the person in power. When such a man has only a superficial energy, when he is surrounded by a selfish circle whose interest lies in concealing the truth from him, the ground is prepared for the 1940 disaster. This would be laughable had France not been at stake.

SECRET

in organization and equipment. The division commander stated it could at least have resisted the air attacks and even effectives the defensive arrangement necessary to resist the German army, which we knew to be nearby, even though it did not possess sufficient offensive weapons such as aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery. German could have been more successfully coped with.

The armament of the field units, individually and collectively, was almost adequate. I am referring to the 133 machine-gun, the 7.92, and the 75 MM. gun. Even these arms did not exist in sufficient quantity. Moreover, the maintenance of this material was easy and we were thoroughly familiar with it. Ammunition for these units presented no difficulty either. In spite of this, from September 1939 to May 1940 we were unable to give to our regional regiments and to our artillery troops the Detachement machine guns and the 133 machine-guns which they needed for defense against airplanes. We armed them with Saint Etienne machine-gun and 7.92, which an infantryman wanted.

As for the artillery material, neither the howitzers, the 91.5, nor the 155 long guns were available in the quantities prescribed.

If we now turn our attention to modern anti-tank and anti-aircraft arms, it is shameful to state that on the 10th of May, 1940, certain divisions left for battle without a single anti-tank arm and what is more unfortunate, without a single anti-aircraft gun.

Besides, no division had the same equipment. A "D.I.M." with arms for G.R.G., had eighty anti-tank guns, eight 25 C.A. guns, and thirty guns of the Caillien-30 type.

A "D.I.M." had forty-eight anti tank guns and four 30 MM. machine-guns. Another of the same series had only thirty-nine anti-tank guns, but on the other hand, it had six 20 MM. machine-guns.

An active Infantry division had 50 anti tank weapons and sometimes thirteen 30 MM. machine-guns. Many had only 40 anti-tank weapons and no anti aircraft. A Series A Infantry division had 40 anti tank guns but not a single anti-aircraft arm.

One Series B. Infantry division had neither anti-tank nor anti-aircraft weapons, whereas another division of the same type had 30 anti-tank weapons and no anti-aircraft.

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1. The first part of the report is a summary of the information received from the source. It is a brief, concise statement of the facts as they are known to the source. It is not a detailed account of the events, but a summary of the information received from the source.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed account of the events. It is a narrative of the events as they occurred, as reported by the source. It is a detailed account of the events, and it is the main body of the report.

3. The third part of the report is a summary of the information received from the source. It is a brief, concise statement of the facts as they are known to the source. It is not a detailed account of the events, but a summary of the information received from the source.

4. The fourth part of the report is a summary of the information received from the source. It is a brief, concise statement of the facts as they are known to the source. It is not a detailed account of the events, but a summary of the information received from the source.

5. The fifth part of the report is a summary of the information received from the source. It is a brief, concise statement of the facts as they are known to the source. It is not a detailed account of the events, but a summary of the information received from the source.

6. The sixth part of the report is a summary of the information received from the source. It is a brief, concise statement of the facts as they are known to the source. It is not a detailed account of the events, but a summary of the information received from the source.

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Then, when we saw the German materiel our eyes were opened. Whether it was combat or transport vehicles, anti-motor guns or anti-air guns, we could see that their war materiel was simple, crude, solid, designed for a war of movement; and it made this type of war possible by means of spare driving wheels, workshops, ideal personnel.

We were still living in the days of the 35 MM. horse-drawn gun, and that of the outmoded M.V.'s of our G.P., or of mounted dragoons.

Here again, let it not be claimed that we had not been informed. All our previous manoeuvres, all our inspections brought the deficiencies to light.

In certain regiments experiments were made with materiel which proved quite satisfactory. Nothing more came of those tests. Why? It remains a mystery. Time passed; the danger grew. The Minister closed his eyes to it all.

For a friend or a political opponent, it mattered little which, in the brotherhood of comrades, came to see him after having been frightened by some general, he was received with pleasant words, he was shown false figures. That was the extent of the action taken.

If the matter came up in Parliament the discussion was closed by a magnificent speech which brought applause from all unqualified quarters, and the Army, the "Great Silent Partner", had only to accept the situation or else perish.

Our military preparedness was tragically inadequate. The responsibility for this rests upon the Minister and his colleagues, whose duty it is in a democratic country to prepare for national emergencies.

As we have stated above, only the Navy was ready for the war and, in effect, did its part brilliantly.

Let us now see the PLAN OF WAR and how it was executed. The plan is strictly the creation of the military based on general policies, alliances and resources. It is modified in conformity with changes in the general situation of the nation, as the political chessboard alters.

After many vicissitudes, in 1939 the situation had become brighter: Germany and Italy were hostile, England and Poland were allies.

All the others were neutrals, either favorably disposed, such as France, or unfavorably disposed, like Spain and others, with all possible shades of neutrality.

SECRET

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Are the armaments inferior are strong, for the general situation is favorable for both sides.

The French personnel: very inferior to the German.

Material: entirely deficient.

In September of 1939, after a lightning campaign, the Polish army disappeared. Only the English army remained as a fighting force side by side with the French army. There were in France 9 English divisions with the hope of double that number by the spring of 1940.

As for the French army, there were in France approximately 80 divisions, of which about thirty were well-officered, well-trained, and in good condition. The rest needed long months to relearn the art of war.

Under such conditions the plan could scarcely be an offensive one.

A defensive plan was possible based on an economy of forces at certain points and armies reserved to meet the unexpected, from Switzerland to the Black Sea.

It seems likely that the Belgian hypothesis influenced strongly the strategic notion of the Commanding General.

After having requested in vain the right to pass through Belgium, in order to establish ourselves firmly on the eastern frontier of this country, we made the error of going to the aid of Belgium and Holland with the best French divisions and the entire English army when it was already too late. Besides, we had no reserve division at all to resist an incident on the Meuse front, where the fortifications had by no means the strength and the depth of those in Lorraine.

Well prepared by the extremely competent General-Staffs and admirably protected by a mechanized cavalry operating magnificently, the movement was executed from Namur to Tillyburg in an entirely satisfactory manner. We arrived duly on the battle field chosen by us and we received there the attack of the enemy forces, without the Belgian and Dutch Armies, which had promised to hold out for many days, offering the slightest resistance except at Liege.

Meanwhile, the Meuse front was collapsing, first at Sedan, and subsequently at Metz, Givet, and Dinant. This was the result of the lack of fortifications which should have been constructed in the Meuse valley, and of the lack of reserves which should have been available to hold out for many days.

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Therein lay the capital error of our plan of strategy. One can manoeuvre only with reserves. No reserves, no manoeuvre. Therefore, we should have been less ambitious in our plan and should have outlined more distant objectives.

It should have been a primary consideration of ours to analyse the resources at our disposition. The high command deceived itself about the strength of these resources. To confuse a division of Series 1, and even one of Series A, with a motorized division, was a sad error. These poorly trained divisions, badly prepared, inadequately armed, were capable at least of holding a fortified front; they were not able to fight on open ground, to utilize their terrain, to attack or counter-attack.

The artillery regiments in the general reserve were also of mediocre quality. They needed the advantage of additional months of training, plus a number of firing schools.

The armored divisions, finally, were obviously incomplete and without cohesion.

I realize that there was no desire to fight until 1941 and that those who predicted the German attack in 1940 were considered a bit insane. It could have been better, under these conditions, to follow a plan for 1940 and 1941, to concentrate strong reserves behind the weakest sector which was evidently the one in the North, disposing a minimum of forces where the permanent fortifications displayed evident superiority.

Instead of this, the armies deployed in a line the whole length of the front. Some of them had local successes, but did not alter the final result, and when the German tanks stormed through our lines, there was nothing to prevent its progress, to say nothing of launching counter-attacks.

The German High Command was able to execute its manoeuvre as originally planned, from Coblenz to Dunkerque. In three weeks it had put the best French units out of commission. The war was already lost by the first of June. Those who fought on the Somme and on the Aisne merely saved their honor. They could not save France.

The plan was too ambitious. The execution was varied in nature. At various sectors there was perfect order, complete discipline, firing plans rapidly sketched, troops well covered, posts of command functioning normally in spite of the intensity

SECRET

of the enemy bombardment, rapidly organized and vigorously launched counter attacks, the attacks broken against prepared points of support, unnumbering of pieces carried out without confusion, in perfect order.

This was true of the cavalry, of the motorized divisions, of the "Metropolitan" active divisions, of the North Africans and of the Colonial, of all the troops which, to express it briefly, had some sort of armor, good leadership, equipment, coupled with the will to hold firm and the desire to win.

In other sectors there was a significant slowness in the disposition of the troops, an inexcusable ignorance of the terrain, complete lack of liaison between the different branches.

Fired even before the battle, neither the infantry nor the Artillery took adequate cover; communications did not function, orders were not transmitted, and reports did not reach their destination.

Heavy aircraft went into action, minds became confused, hearts flinched. Even when the attack was made behind such an obstacle as the Meuse our forces retreated.

The German Infantry infiltrated our ranks, but it was especially the German tanks which made their mark, driving ahead without regard to their flanks. Methodically, they directed themselves to the crossroads, to the most important topographical points, cutting off telephone connections, machine-gunning isolated individuals, destroying liaison cars and supply trucks. At intervals parachute detachments came upon the scene, far in the rear, to support the action of the tanks.

Louder and louder, first in the service units, later in the combat units, the rumor was spread: "We are outflanked." Since the men in the ranks quickly realized our tragic inferiority in aircraft and in tanks, and since the non-commissioned officers had neither the authority nor sufficient knowledge to impose their will on the men, the withdrawal became a retreat, the retreat degenerated into a rout.

Alas, this was facilitated and aggravated by the mass of civilian refugees fleeing toward the West, cluttering up the villages, blocking the routes, creating disorder. The immense majority of these unfortunates were such to be pitied. They fled before the invasion, recalling the pillage, the deportations, the exacting demands of the German occupation between 1914 and 1918. They hoped to find a secure refuge somewhere in France, and each day they drove farther and farther with their heavy wagons.

**SECRET**

Report that the French soldiers were not only making their way but were also spreading terror, sowing the seeds of demoralization and encouraging desertion. Moreover, how many deserters made use of Belgian automobiles and bicycles? How many took off their uniforms to camouflage themselves as civilians? Not everyone is of the stuff of which heroes are made, and panic is contagious when the officers do not have the stamina to keep each person in his proper place.

Of course, we laid down barrages. Of course, we concentrated hundreds of men at certain points, tens of thousands at others. While the roads were fleeing toward Paris, in the yawning breach that they had opened, a few excellent divisions sacrificed themselves, unable to stop the avalanche, in an attempt to limit the destruction caused by the advance of the enemy. These divisions, just as the men who fought to the bitter end before Dunkirk, were deserving of their Waterloo. But they were too few in number. Their losses were heavy. Their efforts were in vain.

When the second act of the tragedy began, the odds were no longer even. In personnel and in materiel, the French army lost its best men in Flanders. The armies of the line and of the reserve did their duty. They inflicted serious losses upon the enemy and caused them several days of delay. It was materially impossible for them to win without air-aid, without tanks, and almost without artillery.

Beginning the 3rd of June it was purely and simply a retreat, in the face of an enthusiastic enemy, unrestrained, master of the skies and of the earth.

The enemy reached and passed the Seine and the Loire. The plateau of Langres was surrendered to him and the Jura was taken in the rear. France had nothing left but its Lorraine and Alsace armies.

The order was given at this time to give up the positions on the Maginot line and to withdraw toward the South. It can logically be queried whether it would not have been more advisable to cling to our positions in Lorraine and Alsace territory.

The fortress troops, able to offer static resistance, were unable to manoeuvre in the open field. Forced marches were imposed upon them and they were engaged in unprepared terrain. Their losses were out of proportion with the results obtained.

**SECRET**

It is probable that the defensive units and fortifications at Epinal, Toul, and Verdun, supported from the rear by Metz and Thionville and covered to the East by the undamaged installations of the RFL and of the RFA, might have permitted the 11th, 11th, and 21st armies to await the armistice in equally good, if not better condition than on the "inspired hill" or on the approaches to the Charnes.

When a game is lost, it is better not to be obstinate, and to reduce losses as much as possible, especially when these losses are paid for in French blood.

In this sinister adventure which I have just described in its general outlines, did the officers of all ranks do their duty? Their whole duty?

First of all, in the higher echelons, the French General Staff was composed of intelligent, hardworking men, who had all studied a great deal, fought in the last war, and many of whom had won fame in the colonies. They believed in the power of fire; they did not believe in the value of manoeuvring. They were static-minded rather than mobile-minded.

The information which they possessed did not reveal the German army to them in its true light. They underestimated its resources. They believed in the value of reinforced concrete and the anti-tank ditch.

Finally, however, they were jolted away from this concrete and from these ditches to be thrown forward, 50, 100, and 200 kilometers from their base of operations.

The movement was executed successfully because the General Staffs were well-prepared and were extremely well qualified, but the posts of command were too heavy and not easily moved, the communications did not function, messages arrived late, and when a new order was sent to the high officers in the front lines it was too late for action; the enemy tanks were already in position.

Then came nervousness, astonishment, and at times withdrawal to distant points in order to escape the emotions of battle. This was perhaps ideal for those with weak hearts, but lamentable from the military point of view. For then, there was no information, no communication of orders, the fighting was done blindly; absurd and impossible orders were given.

It is difficult for an officer to know where to place himself in order to command his group. I must say that I prefer those who remained too near the front to those who

SECRET

and from the fact that the man had the feeling of being led.

And I say to you that this applies to all of our countrymen. And I say to you that this applies to all of those who filled the German ranks. Many of them were like this: heroes, disbelievers, and so on.

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#### SOCIAL CAUSES

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...as this youth, inadequate in number, at least of high quality physically and morally? The must, alas, assert the contrary.

As regards physical training much was said in France, wonderful programs set up, many prizes awarded. Soccer, Rugby, and boxing matches, horse, bicycle, or automobile races became more and more popular. Does anyone think this is the sort of athletics suitable for children, boys, or men who need to strengthen and develop themselves, to get in training? It is very like the circus days of the Roman plebs.

Neither in elementary nor high schools, no more in rich families than poor, did anyone think of useful exercise, progressive, educational, often tiresome, that develops the body harmoniously and tempers the will. Neither the teachers nor the professors were concerned with it. In the one case, it did not contribute to their political influence, in the other, it had little importance as regards the "general competition" (i.e. a competition held every year among the best pupils in the senior classes of French secondary schools.)

And the result was fatal. In a racial stock that used to be robust, rusted, hard to weary, but in which alcohol and syphilis have opened suppurating wounds, the frame has grown smaller, the tissues slack, resistance has been lowered. The number of men discharged or classified for limited service has increased every year. The soldier of 1940 does not rival the one of 1914 either in endurance or training, whether he belongs to the top class or one already old. A very mediocre aptitude for marching, an even lesser capacity for work, and an insuperable need of sleep, are three characteristics of the soldier of 1940. It is not under conditions such as these that one can meet an army as young, well-trained, and enthusiastic as was the mass of German shock-troops, armored and motorized divisions, unless one is upheld by a fantastically high morale and a superhuman idealism.

Unfortunately, the idealism must be created and morale built up. There must be at the base a faith or a mystique. There must be as educators those who are convinced or who are apostles. From 1920 to 1940 victorious France, disillusioned France, the France of leisurely living had neither the one nor the other.

From 1914 to 1918 we made a superhuman effort, at first to hold, later to conquer. We came out of the test physically and morally exhausted. And our ideal was not to make use of the victory to build a better world; it was to enjoy, to enjoy in every way, including the lowest and the most stupid, mean-while working as little as possible. From the first to the last stratum of society everyone wished to have fun, or rather

SECRET



... if the instruction was not for school. People travelled for miles to see the 10, 20, or 30 meter races? They called themselves sportsmen for going to see the finals of the French Cup, or the "six days" (cycling race), or the gala night at Longchamps. They had their weekly, or even bi-weekly movies, and paid vacations. An excellent institution on the primary level - were simply an excuse for trips that were expensive in spite of their reduced prices, exhausting, and disappointing.

What had school taught these boys, these men?

Egotism first of all. .... selfishness and indulgence in envy.

Next, the negation of all spirituality, divinity, idealism. A nationalist philosophy, if one may combine those two words with all the moral and social consequences they entail. Atheism, if not proclaimed, at least encouraged. The idea of Country not merely neglected but made game of, for the benefit of the International Proletariat or to the obvious advantage of Germany, avid for revenge. At the National Congress of Teachers, the speeches made should have caused the speakers to be haled into court. Instead they won them promotion.

Did this atheistic, pleasure loving youth at least have the taste for effort, for work, and for work well done that has always characterized the French artisan or worker? Not at all. A wage-earner owed 40 hours of work. He gave them without enthusiasm, diligence, or pleasure.

This conception of modern industry kills all initiative, skill, or self-improvement. Man is no more than a part of the machine. It is really the machine that leads and that cannot be led.

Could military service better or correct this school and factory training? Certainly not when a year's service was reduced practically to four months, during which, as I was able to observe myself, some of the men did not even learn the rank of the officers.

Not a lieutenant, not a captain had his own unit that he knew and commanded; the men were pawns who ran from one instructor to the next; they never got to know the instructors, nor did the instructors get to know the men. Even the commissary unit had disappeared, under the pretext of forming..... Let us add that in many cases the Army had to make up for the

SECRET

insufficiencies of public education by teaching the rudiments of the language to an illiteracy that increased in number every year. So much time lost for military instruction proper. So many added burdens on cadres already overworked.

To sum up, a youth inadequate both from the point of view of quantity and of quality. That is what twenty years of peace following our victory had given us. Certain signs of improvement could indeed be detected. In the last years materialism was certainly on the wane. We must hope that the terrible ordeal inflicted on us will retemper the souls of French youth and restore to grown men their sense of the national life.

If from the youth which made up only a very small part of the army (2 nation ?) we pass to the nation as a whole, let us see what were the characteristics of the last years.

At the basis, a lack of authority. Here the persons chiefly to blame are the members of the government on the one hand, the men who held command on the other.

Authority cannot be delegated. It asserts itself. In France, from 1919 to 1939, it merely exhausted itself.

In the government, under whatever label, we saw only parties, we never saw France.

Personal interest, nepotism, fraud.....stifled the public interest. Free rein was given to each man's appetites, in a free-for-all, where success came to the most cunning and the least honest. The organization of each Ministry, and there were many of them, was a scandal. Ministers changed indifferently from Public Works to Colonies or to National Education. Only the bureaus were permanent, and little by little they ascended to authority.....

When a Minister remained in office for sometime, his will was merely a series of caprices constantly influenced by a concern for the electorate or else the parliamentary..... The Republic of the comrades was harrowing from the point of view of constructive action.

This bankruptcy of the government had repercussions, especially during the Popular Front, among the employers of France, large, medium, or small. There were few who considered it their duty to command with all that word implies of greatness, wisdom, and responsibility. First one must know, then one must will. A few who knew had not the civic courage to will. And we witnessed the scandalous scenes of 1938, the surrenders, the capitulations. The seizures of factories were

**SECRET**

as much the result of irresolution on the part of the directors and owners as of the lack of the agitators. Through cowardliness or weakness, those who had the power to prevent these troubles were unwilling to make a stand against them. Certain social improvements could and should have been introduced in advance.

Our reserve officers and non-commissioned officers who made up the immense majority of the cadres did not dare to give orders, whether during the simplest fatigue duty or on the most important mission. The day the war broke out they had not had time to become reconciled to authority. They were unable to keep at their posts, at their holy task, those whom they had the honor to command. Certain failures, certain routs, certain bad flights cannot be explained in any other way. Modern warfare based on aircraft and tanks subjects the human animal to a terrible trial. If the cadres are not firmly steeled to face on the mass, the mass hesitates, sways, and breaks up. It broke up at the Meuse.

After without, discipline. The same results from the other

For, if one Frenchman has never been a model of discipline, at least not in the German or Russian sense of the word. But the formula: "They grumbled, but they kept on going" used to apply to civilians as well as soldiers. In the factory, the workshop, or the store, the faultfinder used to growl at protest, but he none the less carried out, intelligently, the orders of the employer, the foreman, the engineer or the floor-walker.

For several years this conception of intelligent discipline had lost ground, to the benefit of anarchy and to the detriment of production. There was less and less observance of established rules, regulations that had been carefully thought out and had proved their worth; men indulged instead in fantastic demonstrations in which free rein was given to individualism, to the detriment of the common good.

And this observation could be made as well in the street as in a business, in a train as at a soccer match, in so-called "salient society" as at the most disorderly meeting. One might have thought that for amusement men had put chaos on a pedestal.

Whether it was a question of crossing a street, driving in the right direction in traffic, standing in line at a window, putting one's things in a place specially arranged for them, behaving properly in a railroad compartment, attending a Pull-man call or the six days of the "Vol. d'été." (Winter

**SECRET**



money they earned by the sweat of their brow. The dream of most of them was to end their days in the little house they had toiled to build in this place or that, thanks to the sustained efforts of a lifetime of hardships or privations.

At the top of the ladder, the employer had not yet given way to the corruption, large or small; he too worked hard to make his business succeed and pass it on to his son when the time came. Days were long, the week had six full days, and vacations were cut to a strict minimum.

For many manufacturers and tradesmen never left their factories, shops, or offices except for short trips, eager not to desert even in the slow season, the business they had so close to their hearts. They knew that their place was on the commanding bridge. Only in very exceptional cases did they pass the helm to a temporary head.

Our French society knew neither great fortunes nor sordid poverty. Our country was one of small bourgeoisie, urban and rural. Where the violent cracking was not a legend, where thrills came only from the chief characteristic of the French citizen. It is true that we lacked boldness, that we did not witness the great results of Chicago or Buenos Aires, but we knew how to be content with what we had, we envied our neighbor moderately, as one should, but (were ready to?) help him out too if necessary.

The war of 1914-1918 did not help to maintain this atmosphere of "little people". In the great shuffle, men who were not afraid from the Isère to the Vardar by way of Brindisi were bewildered by the kaleidoscope that unfolded too quickly before them. The coming of the Americans, American methods and goods contributed not a little to unsettle ideas. One learned to count in billions or not at all.

Then the question arose of repairing the damage caused by the war, after crying "Germany shall pay", we turned back to the East (east?) and drew on our cash boxes and paper-purses for all we were worth, every one wanted his slice, and never thought that this prosperity was artificial, that there can be no fortune that is not based on work.

Meanwhile, the shabby luxury keeps increasing the working girl cannot do without silk stockings and artificial furs in which the rabbit plays the chief part. Perfumers make fortunes; at every level, in all spheres, the spirit changed. The employer, the worker, the chief, the subordinate - every one thinks part of the time should be reserved for pleasure and work reduced to a minimum. They do not yet speak of "leisure", but the idea is in the air, and certain good-natured

SECRET

... I do not mean that our literary men, our doctors and law-ers did not work and did not provide the intellectual heritage of our country. Many followed in the path of their great forefathers, but some and observed that it was easier to make one's way, by intrigue than by work. Politics had become a career with all this work implies of compromises, adjustments, negotiations. Now many lawyers, professors, journalists discovered in themselves statesmen like the ancients, as soon as they reached the most unimportant diploma - if they had one to all - and especially as soon as they had inducted themselves into the office of an Under Secretary of State, or into the retinue of an influential woman. The Ministries, the Embassies, the Prefectural and Colonial Administrations, etc., were all crowded with young men who had not used their energy to prepare for their careers, but instead the sales of their ideas or talents. They did not make useful and profitable use of their time.

...; they made her

13. The majority of the letters were in the foreign  
language of the sender.

Robert La Follette, the first to collect the phrase "Victory  
by any means necessary" (documented) and afterwards the word  
"victorious", with his personal eloquence, allowed them to  
be used by their English and German colleagues. Naturally,  
the word "victorious" was not of the greatest name; it  
could not make them "victorious". The peace treaty was  
signed in 1919, at a time when there appeared  
from the United States a League of Nations, an excuse for  
large armies and well-aid jobs, but without any construc-  
tive work, other than abstract practical usefulness.

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And little by little the ties of 1918 drifted apart, became separated, dispersed, while German policy skillfully, tirelessly worked to loosen the cords that lay heavy on that country.

England's role during this period was inadvisable; anxious as she was to retain a hegemony on the continent, in her fear of seeing France too powerful, she sometimes openly facilitated the rise of Germany.

Italy, her hopes being dashed, claiming that she had been wronged in the distribution, began by isolating herself, before changing sides.

The question of war left a general American, who withdrew into herself, no more, in the same indiscriminate aversion those against whom her sons had fought and those to whom she felt she owed her obligation to Lafayette.

Japan, sniffing on her islands, was far more concerned with her Asiatic interest, than with the peace of Europe.

The only ones to look to France and count on France were the nations we had raised from the tomb: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Roumania. Out of loyalty as well as self interest, they all had confidence in France, her promises and her future. They counted on our support, our advice, and our example. Our civilian and military missions at first received from all of them a hearty welcome. Our industrialists and merchants were able to make interesting contracts. The spread of our culture was intensified and extended. There we were truly the winners of the Great War.

Moreover, our policy of renunciation became more and more apparent. One by one we gave up all the pledges the Versailles Treaty granted us. As we yielded, Germany increased her demands, and at our side we found no allies or supporters, on the contrary. For our domestic policies reaction on our foreign friendships. Our flirtation with the Soviets worried our friends; the outbreak of the Popular Front discouraged them.

Belgium abandoned us, denouncing her military agreements, proclaiming her strict neutrality. Italy, after resisting Germany with regard to Austria, asked us carte blanche for its Dopia. She obtained the tacit agreement of the Laval Government, but met with the absolute opposition of the Blum Government, and the policy of sanctions undermined all the agreements previously reached. Threatened by France and England, Mussolini threw himself into the arms of Germany. It is the government of alliances; it is the beginning of the Rome-Berlin Axis.

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Stalin, and perhaps the other two, but the only delay of 1940. Those are the names of princes, and Machiavelli here found his master. Which does not prevent the fact that the German-Russian-Italian collusion ruined France.

Why did France, why did the governments that held office in France between 1930 and 1939, not see, observe, and draw from their observations the necessary conclusions?

French foreign policy was out of touch. That the man in the street felt confusedly the government did not want to see at all, no matter what its affiliations or label. Warnings, cries of alarm were not lacking. Those who predicted war were called visionaries or fanatics. We neither prepared for nor avoided war.

Our single man, Maginot, had seen clearly when in spite of the opposition of a great number of men still in office today he decided to build the rampart that protected France from Switzerland to Luxembourg. This barrier certainly caused the leaders of Germany to hesitate. We should have prolonged it by an unbreakable territorial alliance with Belgium, and a methodical, complete military understanding with England. We were able to carry through neither the one nor the other. England recoiled from the military burden, and Belgium retreated before the Popular Front.

As for the nations to which we had given new life by the Versailles Treaty, and who had long remained faithful to us, they also changed their minds when they saw the echo we were taking of them, how we were abandoning them.

The Anschluss was the prologue to these successive capitulations. It is true that we had promised Austria nothing, we had even voluntarily crushed her in 1919, but we had formally (?) forbidden Germany to become bound to her economically, and we did not raise a protest when she was annexed politically.

Then it was Czechoslovakia in two acts: first the Sudeten, then the rest, in September 1938 and March 1939.

A word of epilogue on what we should have done in 1938. Permit an opponent of Munich to give his opinion. The disaster could not have been any worse, and our honor would have been saved.

When a big country like France binds herself by treaty to a little nation like Czechoslovakia, she does not disown her signature when the time of danger comes. The Czechoslovakian army had forty good divisions backed up by strong fortifications. It is practically certain that Poland would have marched with us. All we had to do was to make the Prague Government cede the Polish Poleschen. We had there a total of 80 divisions that would have put up at least twice

SECRET

the resistance of the mobilized Polish army.

The German Westwall was not finished throughout. The German General Staff had not yet at its disposal the armored and motorized mass of such troops that it had on May 10, 1940. It had its violation, it is true, but does anyone think it was better than that at that same date of May 10, 1940? Everything indicates the contrary.

Conceding that a decision could not have been reached before winter, we still expect to carry the war into the Palatinate, the borders to the banks of the Rhine. There was no need to violate Belgian neutrality, and the British army would have been just as large - and as weak - in 1948 as in 1940.

Which is the basest of surrenders, and that is the truth.

The result was that all peoples faithful to us - the Yugoslavs and the Roumanians, deliberately separated themselves from people incapable of keeping their promises, and that the whole world ... of the conspiracy of the totalitarian states. The Rome-Berlin axis became the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle. Nationalist Spain remembered who had helped and who had ruined her. America noted the blows exchanged. Such was the foreign policy - devoid of illusions, ideological dreaming, hollow phrases, or spinelessness - that led us from the most difficult of victories to the most lamentable disaster.

Our domestic policy yielded in nothing to our foreign policy. The Place Beauvau had no need to envy the Quai d'Orsay.

From 1918 to 1930 France had indulged in the luxury of all the administrations called republican, from horizon blue to the red of the Popular Front. Ministries fell like a house of cards, scandals piled up, riots even stained the streets of the capital with French blood, but always the same men remained on the same stages.

More or less marked, more or less colored with white, pink, or red, they made up the team that for twenty years shared the controls with as much incompetence as cynicism. The Republic of the comedies had free play, only to die away at last in the sinister adventure of the years 1930-1938.

The ruins the Popular Front piled up in France are immeasurable, but its greatest responsibility is that it taught the French people nothing under the pompous title of "Léonard". For half a century not waited 20 centuries in

SECRET

1. The first of these is the fact that the  
2. Government has not been able to secure  
3. the necessary funds to carry out its  
4. policy of non-interference in the  
5. internal affairs of the country.  
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7. Government has not been able to secure  
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The above information was obtained from the records maintained by the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.

...the 10 hour week brought  
...housewife. Her time spent in the  
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of the unemployment, the inevitable consequence of the  
policy followed by these reached unheard of proportions, with  
the State, the departments, and the Communes.

The difference and what is to be expected is that the minister  
Merrill was involved that had until the same time  
and the difference between the two is that the minister  
and the difference between the two is that the minister

dit the hard and lean soil. We had slid down the slope  
a high peak, and we climbed it again more slowly. In 1937  
when Frances began to talk of herself again, it took  
time to erase a new set of scars and to cover from the  
scars of the past.

And, during the last months, industry did not escape its normal rhythm. The deficit of munitions was on average, especially as the last civilisation of factories had almost completely affected the domestic world. For the time, the navy, no less the air force.

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were crushed. Production did not reach 100%. The German aircraft, tanks, those who had neither anti-tank nor anti-aircraft equipment, nor ammunition, fell out for vehicles upon the day. Those who did not want to manufacture this equipment, and especially upon those whose injurious ideology and technology create the chaos and endangered Germany.

To preach indifference. At the moment when Germany was proclaiming that it was better to have enemies than bitter was an act of treason against one's country, and here, a sin against the light. Those who did so furnished the totalitarian governments with the most marvelous success, the most magnificent assistance they could have hoped for. And truly, any sincere German who saw Germany as a place where war can bring happiness to her prosperity and her physical and moral health. She perhaps does not have freedom, but she certainly has no other. And everywhere one finds work, and a people that wishes to live and be happy. Let us remember this and learn her lesson!

### COULD WE HAVE WON?

With these social, political and military causes for the defeat, correctly presented, it is fitting to derive from them the proper lesson and conclusion.

With our inadequate manpower, our unpreparedness and our (particular) psychological attitude, could we have won, and how could we have won? I consider those who rush into a war without the least possibilities for success as insane. The politicians and the military men must, then, have believed in victory.

In the first place, could we have avoided the war? I reply quite simply: No. Sooner or later it was inevitable. I have already stated above that it would have been better to have fought in 1938 than in 1939, in 1936 than in 1938. Time certainly did not operate in our favor.

How should we have conducted the war?

**SECRET**

Let it first of all be remembered that it was the case of a war of coalition where we had the right and the duty to play the game in our own manner and to demand from our allies an effort equal to our own. All this should have been done as early as 1918, when it was quite evident that a returned Germany would stop at nothing in order to dominate Europe.

We had numerical inferiority. We should have required England to bring us at the beginning, not five, but fifteen divisions with corresponding aircraft and tanks.

Poland was surprised when she was still in process of mobilizing; she could not have done more or better than she did. She satisfied her commitments loyally and for three weeks she drew on herself the German Army which had left only a part, although an important part, of her air force, facing France.

Could we have taken advantage of that situation?

Assuredly we could have profited by it more than we did. To a small extent, certainly; to a large extent, perhaps.

On the first of September, 1939, the German Army had almost nothing on the left bank of the Sarre. From Sarrebruck to Treves, the terrain was unimpeded. It was possible to reach that point, providing that this was done rapidly and a stop was made at the Sarre. We might have done this with the admirable troops of the 6th Corps, which were thoroughly familiar with the region, and which had studied the problem in detail. To be sure, they would not have been mobilized and they would have had only their scarcely reinforced echelons. With tanks from Metz and from Verdun, that would have been sufficient for the task. Mobilization would continue on the Sarre where the bridges would have been blown up, where the barbed wire would have been stretched, and pillboxes would have dotted the surface of the earth. We could certainly have occupied the Sarre from Sarrebruck to Saarburg and got a firm hold there before the enemy could counter-attack in force. We could have held with our fire the mining and industrial basin of Sarrebruck.

The game was worth the candle, and the enemy would have had to make a forceful attack to dislodge us from that point. That is what I term the limited offensive.

All this was insufficient. It was necessary to go much farther, and for that reason to adopt a different attitude and plan of action toward Belgium.

**SECRET**

From the very first day, all intelligent men in Belgium as in France understood that the small countries of northern Europe were locked, by virtue of their geographical position, to enter the trap. However, through fear the government of some of these states had been dispensed by forcing these states to see where their interests lay, and to advance in one stretch to the northeast frontier of Belgium, or the aid to Mussolini and the Ruhr.

The objection could perhaps be raised that America might have interfered against the entrance of the French troops into Belgium as a violation of contracts and that she would have come to the back of us. In reply, I ask what all she rendered in a battle of one material for which we paid in gold francs.

It is true that we isolated a day a time as terrible as the day of the 18th of May, but we should have done it more quickly and more fully, without being inhibited by some of our own limitations.

In retreating the house near Liege in September 1918 we were able to have saved Belgium, Holland and Denmark from invasion, and on the 10th of May, 1940, we would have been in a far different position to face the German attack -- one far better than the front reached with so much difficulty by the Northern armies.

It is more remarkable to not take into consideration the fact that England, which has special interests in these northern coasts, could have less have found ways and means to mobilize and train a more adequate force than the meager divisions of its expeditionary corps, and that the English Army could have afforded is more substantial and effective aid.

However, as neither of these two solutions was envisaged or actually carried out, nevertheless, have avoided the overwhelming disaster which amazed even the Germans?

It would have been necessary in the first place to be better informed than we were. In the French General Headquarters they counted the new divisions of the enemy, but failed to make note of the tanks and the planes.

It would, however, have been logical to assume that a country like Germany, so fully industrialized, well disciplined, and hard-working, was not wasting away the months between the Italian and the French campaigns, and that we could not entirely witness the appearance of thousands of planes and hundreds of additional tanks.

SECRET

... as well as the fact that we had learned  
useful lessons from the experience of the war in  
the East and that we had learned to fight with the water  
and fire to our advantage in our fortifications.

... is possible that we might. And those who, in  
1918, in the month of May, spoke of 10,000 enemy planes  
and 10,000 tanks, were very certainly not far from the  
truth. They were not mere visionaries.

If we realized these facts in preparation, it sufficed  
only to look at our own situation to understand that we had  
only the hope of salvation: to exploit to the utmost the  
strength of our fortifications, concentrating there those  
divisions, able to manoeuvre, and disposing in the rear of  
weak points the divisions known to be experts at manoeuvring,  
mobile defense, and counter-attacking.

The fortifications were firm, even very firm, in certain  
sectors, from Lille to Langres. It was there that savings  
in personnel could have been made.

The fortifications were weak, or very weak, from  
Langres to Luxembourg. That was where the supreme effort  
would have to be made.

This was attempted. Winter came, and an exceptionally  
rigorous one, impeding the concrete and embankment works.  
At least it did not interfere with manufacturing and pro-  
duction of buildings.

But, let us take as an example the question of mines.  
To my knowledge there was no attempt made to reinforce the  
fortifications in the North by sending mines from the Army  
store, except for a few hundred men allotted to each division.

We had learned in 1918 the effectiveness of German  
mines, against both tanks and men, and knew that mines are  
as easy to manufacture as shells and airplane bombs. In  
spite of this, we were still unable to provide a sufficient  
supply of these to sow the approaches to our Northern frontier  
with them. In certain sectors where the fortress troops did not  
move at all, we had no more mines than elsewhere. A lamentable  
lack of foresight!

Let us consider what might have happened on a well-  
equipped and occupied frontier, without giving our imagina-  
tion free rein.

Let us say, for example, both motorized and non-motorized,  
would enter Belgium in the last days of May. South of Namur, it  
could not go far to the Seine, while the 15th Army, once pushed

... ..



in the pillboxes between Maubeuge and Sedan, as you can see the mines, arranged in depth, at a distance of some tens of meters, before the anti-tank ditches.

In the rear of the 1st and 11th Armies there were a few divisions.

The attack would be made on Sedan, just as it had been made to the left of the 11th Army.

The line of the division concerned would be pierced.

But nearby would be the reserves who could fill in the breach, and this breach, filled on the left by the Commander of the 11th Army, would not become wider. Rocroi would hold, the Chimay Gap would hold, Maubeuge would hold.

In the places where the armored divisions of the enemy pass the Meuse, on a narrow sector, they would advance boldly from the front and attempt to spread out, but their flanks would be threatened and the fall of the pillboxes would be slow.

Now, the German generals know their job. They would not allow their lines to broaden a single inch; otherwise they lay themselves open to all sorts of attacks, before having established their positions on the amount of terrain necessary for their advance.

And in this battle, foot by foot, the mines cause the enemy as many losses as the anti-tank arms. It would be like the cavalryman coming to a sudden stop on the haunches of his mount, he was followed an easy route from Viandart to Colloigne-sur-Mer and finds a very considerable obstacle at Rocroi and at Chimay.

Let us assume that in spite of the losses, these mounted troops have passed after ten days and have progressed along the axis of their march; they would then find before them the manoeuvring army composed of all the army corps which the General Headquarters was able to muster for the battle.

This battle would be fought in Thierache or in Artois, with the exception of aircraft. Our arms would be the same. We would employ competent officers, able to fight and desiring to win.

Of course, our inferiority in aircraft would have influenced strongly the conception and execution of the plan of battle. In the light of past experience it is reasonable to suppose that the defeat, if defeat it was to be, would not have amounted to disaster. The 1st Army, the English Army.

SECRET

the Belgian army could even have been left to retreat toward the Somme. The North of France would perhaps have been lost, but the Aisne and the Somme line would have been able to hold against an exhausted enemy unable to take advantage of a dearly-bought victory.

It could have been trench warfare imposed by us on an adversary which had prepared for lightning war, and which could not accept a long drawn-out conflict.

Italy would have remained neutral.

The East could have regained hope.

America would perhaps have taken a position.

However, success goes only to those who merit it, and we did not win. We were neither on the offensive nor the defensive. We were passive. We chose the worst of all possible solutions. Our attitude with regard to our Allies was one of contempt at a time when it was necessary to give orders and to have them carried out. The Belgians would perhaps not have understood because they did not wish to fight. However, the English, whose interests coincided especially with ours, would certainly have understood and would have cooperated with us, would have played the game openly and would have known how to die, just as the English infantry has always known how to sacrifice itself.

We could then have won. We only needed the time to await the English effort, whether it be one, two, or three years. In order for us to be victorious this war had to be a long war. Germany could not afford to look forward to a long war; she counted upon a short one. As far as we are concerned, she won.

Now we are defeated. The conquerors of 1918 are the conquerors of 1940. I have tried to analyze the causes for the defeat. It is not a question of discoursing ad nauseam about them. The problem now is to rebuild France. We can do it. We must do it. It will certainly be difficult and our neighbors will not help us. But our resources are quite ample. If we know how to utilize them, so that we may elevate ourselves spiritually and materially.

All men of good will ought to contribute their efforts, without distinction of belief, of party or of ideology. We mean by this Frenchmen and not foreigners, who have already caused us trouble enough. We must not allow them to raise their heads again. We banish no one from our midst, but we

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national gold  
with a lot of silver and other  
precious metals.

SECRET

26 August 1943

Captain Philip S. Gilbert, Jr.  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,  
Headquarters XII Corps,  
Ft. Jackson, South Carolina.

Dear Captain Gilbert:

I enjoyed hearing from you and was most interested to learn of your career in the Army.

I will understand and commend your desire to get into the Ground Force, and it would appear that your application therefor was proceeding under good auspices. In my opinion it would be unwise for me to attempt to influence the course of this transfer as good intentions often cause more harm than good in such matters.

Wishing you good luck in your Army experience and hoping you secure the assignment you are seeking,

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

Mr. E. J. [unclear]  
[unclear]  
Please prepare a  
reply for the General  
[unclear]. It should  
be in line with  
[unclear] - your  
[unclear] to such request  
[unclear]  
[unclear]

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Ft. Jackson, S. C.

August 24, 1945

Dear General Donovan:

I heard unofficially some time ago that you had been appointed a Brigadier General, but I did not get it officially until the current copy of the "Kernel" came to me last week. I offer you my heartiest congratulations and tell you that I hope that your success in this war is no less than your success in the last.

Since I wrote you a few months ago I have had a rather eventful career in the Army, all of it culminating in a situation in which you might be able to give me some help. I hesitated long before writing you about this, but I decided that if you heard about it you might be able to say something in the right quarters that would be of inestimable value to me. I shall deeply appreciate anything you can do.

Here is the situation. As you may remember from the dear dead New York days, I had a Reserve commission in the Quartermaster Corps. As early as 1939, however, I decided that I should like to be in the Field Artillery, and accordingly I completed my Reserve work qualifying me for Field Artillery. I did not effect a transfer, however, because I was called on active duty with the Q. M. C. before the transfer went through. I think you know the story of my experiences between then and recently, but here they are. After a short stay at Camp Lee I was assigned to the 33rd Infantry Division as a member of the 108th I.M. Battalion. In September, 1942 I was sent to the newly activated XIX Corps as Asst. Quartermaster and Corps Transportation Officer. In April, 1943 I was sent to take the General Staff Course at the Command & General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. (Incidentally, Major Bob Wilson, now G-2 of the 78th Infantry Division, was a member of the same class.) Fortunately I did quite well at the school and was encouraged by members of the faculty to transfer to the Infantry or the Field Artillery. Shortly after I got back to the Corps I was relieved from the Quartermaster Section of the Corps Headquarters and made an Assistant G-3 of the Corps. The reason for this transfer, I have been told, was that I had demonstrated a capacity for combat and tactical work which the Corps could use to better advantage in the G-3 Section. Then last week I was told that if I still wanted to go over to the Field Artillery the Corps Commander would approve it. As a result I put in my formal application for detail to the Field Artillery, a copy

of which I enclose. The Corps Commander, Major General William H. Simpson, put on this application a very strong personal endorsement, recommending approval, and forwarded it to Second Army, from which it will go to Headquarters Army Ground Forces.

Now I have very little doubt that in view of General Simpson's strong endorsement Second Army will approve the application. What I am afraid of is that Army Ground Forces may refer it to the Quartermaster General who will stop it on the ground that officers cannot be spared from the I.M.C. That might have been true at one time, but recently it was announced that there was an excess of officers in all arms and services. I am afraid, though, that it might be stopped down there in Washington by the Quartermaster General or, less likely, by the Chief of Field Artillery, or the Army Ground Forces.

I do not know whether or not you are in a position to help me out on this or not. My application is now on its way through the official channels, but a suggestion from you might be worth more than all the official channels put together. If you can make a suggestion in the right places it might help enormously, and I should be tremendously grateful. I rather think that you can understand my desire to stay in tactical and combat work, something which the Quartermaster Corps can afford only in limited measure.

My best regards to you and to Dick Heppner, if he is still there. I had hoped to give you these regards personally, in response to the kind invitation in your last letter, but we have been so very busy supervising the training of our Divisions (the 26th, 78th, 100th and 106th) that I have had no time off from duty for going any place. If I do get to Washington I shall certainly call on you if I may.

Sincerely yours,

*Phil E. Gilbert Jr.*

**HEADQUARTERS XII CORPS**  
**Ft. Jackson, S. C.**

10 212

20 August 1943

**SUBJECT:** Application for Detail in Field Artillery.

TO : Commanding General,  
 Army Ground Force,  
 Washington 25, D.C.  
 (Two Honorable)

1. Pursuant to provisions of AG 605-145, application is hereby made for detail in Field Artillery from the Quartermaster Corps.

**A. EARLIER EXPERIENCE:**

- a. Born January 11, 1913, Chicago, Illinois.
- b. Graduated Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, A.B., Phi Beta Kappa, 1936.
- c. Graduated law school of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., LL.B., 1938.
- d. Member of New York Bar, Attorney at Law, New York, N. Y., 1939-1944.

**B. RECORD OF SERVICE:**

June 4, 1941 - Assigned Series 10, Field Artillery Reserve Education Course.

September 4, 1941 - Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant, Quartermaster Corps Reserve.

October 4, 1941 - December 11, 1941 - Attended school, Field Artillery Section, Headquarters Second Corps Area.

January 10, 1942 - Reported for active duty, Camp Lee, Va.

January 11, 1942 - February 27, 1942 - attended Reserve Officers' Instructor Course and Motor Operations School, Camp Lee, Virginia.

February 28, 1942 - August 11, 1942 - Assigned 13th Infantry Detachment, Camp Forrest, Tennessee as Acting Commanding Officer, Company C, 1942 Quartermaster Battalion (attached), assigned to Division Transportation Officer, and Adjutant and 1st, 1942 Quartermaster Battalion.



June 25, 1942 - Promoted to 1st Lieutenant.  
 September 1, 1942 - August 6, 1943 - Assigned Headquarters III Corps, Columbia, S. C., as Assistant Quartermaster and Corps Transportation Officer.  
 February 11, 1943 - Promoted to Captain.  
 April 19, 1943 - June 19, 1943 - Attended 19th General Staff Course, Command & General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Academic Rating: Excellent.  
 August 6, 1943 - date - Assistant G-3 and Liaison Officer, Headquarters III Corps, Fort Jackson, S. C.

4. This detail would be to the advantage of the Government and in the best interests of the Government, and would benefit the service for the following reasons:

a. In my capacity as Assistant G-3 and Liaison Officer, Headquarters III Corps, my work is largely with Officers and units of the Combat Arm. If I were a member of the Field Artillery, a Combat Arm, my duties as Assistant G-3 and as Liaison Officer would be expedited.

b. As a civilian and as a Reserve Officer before reporting for active duty, I applied to the Field Artillery and transferred sections of Headquarters First Corps Area and Headquarters Second Corps Area for transfer from the Quartermaster Corps to the Field Artillery. I was instructed first to complete the Series 10 Course in Field Artillery and to attend a school conducted by the Field Artillery Section of Headquarters Second Corps Area. I successfully completed the Series 10 Course in Field Artillery and attended the school until December 12, 1941, when I received orders to report for active duty at Camp Lee, Virginia. Since reporting for active duty I have, by observation and study, kept my interest in and knowledge of Field Artillery alive.

c. Extended active duty has demonstrated to me and to my superiors that my abilities are in the field of tactics and combat, not in administration and service. I believe I should be a more efficient officer in the branch of the service in which I am qualified and in which my interest and ability lie.

WILL S. GILBERT, JR., G-426779  
 Captain, U.S.A.

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

RECEIVED  
JUN 14 11 13 AM '43

ADDRESS ONLY  
"CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION"  
IN YOUR REPLY REFER TO  
FILE NUMBER AND DATE OF THIS LETTER

Office of Management Services  
25th and E Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Director of Personnel

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Sir:

Reference is again made to the letter of April 14, 1943 from the Acting Director of Personnel requesting early disposition of the appeal of Mr. Donald S. Gillmer from the Commission's finding as a result of personnel investigation that he is unsuitable for Federal employment.

This is to inform you that the Commission has completed consideration of Mr. Gillmer's appeal and has reached the decision that the previous unfavorable action may be reversed in part. Mr. Gillmer's finding of unsuitability for the position of Assistant Chief, Material Record Section, Visual Investigation Branch, Office of Coordinator of Information from Office of Management Services has been affirmed but the law against his further employment in the Federal service has been removed, which action permits him to become a candidate for such other Government service as he may be found qualified to undertake.

Mr. Gillmer is being currently advised concerning the action taken in his appeal.

By direction of the Commission:



11.201  
30.1.1943

April 8, 1943

Aviation Cadet Daniel S. Gillmor  
4423 Butterworth Place  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Cadet Gillmor:

I am writing this in reply to your letter to me of April 1, 1943.

It is not, of course, possible for me to make any statement regarding the charges involved in your pending appeal before the U. S. Civil Service Commission. These charges, I understand, relate to your activities prior to your employment by this agency and are not matters concerning which I have personal knowledge.

I am glad, however, to be able to tell you that our records show that during the time you were employed by the Coordinator of Information as Assistant Chief of the Reports Section of our Visual Presentation Branch from February 19, 1942 to April 4, 1943, the performance of your duties was eminently satisfactory, and that no question has been raised in connection with your employment with regard to your ability, loyalty, or devotion to the war effort.

Yours sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Brig. Gen., AUS  
Director

LEE:BLACK

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION  
INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: James B. Opsata  
TO: Colonel William J. Donovan  
SUBJECT: Letter from Daniel S. Gillmor

DATE May 15, 1942

Attached is a letter handed to me by Mr. Gillmor last week when he was in my office. In accordance with his conversation with you, I explained to him that as soon as we heard the results of his investigation from the Civil Service Commission I would get the report and bring it to you personally for review.

The final report on Mr. Gillmor has not been completed, but as soon as it is I will get in touch with you.

Attachment

DANIEL S. GILLMAN

En. 1311

171 Madison Avenue

New York, N. Y.

May 7, 1947

Col. William Donovan  
Co-Ordinator of Information  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Col. Donovan:

I understand that the investigation which you ordered the Civil Service Commission to carry out has now been completed and that the results thereof will shortly be turned over to you for your study.

About a week ago I had a talk with Mr. Daniels and he suggested that I drop you this note.

Even though the investigators who questioned me seemed to be rather prejudiced in the manner of their questioning, I think you will agree with me that there is nothing in the testimony which shows that I am anything but a loyal citizen of the United States and, on the contrary, there is a great deal which shows that I am a desirable government employee and could be particularly of service in your office.

In going over back issues of my magazine and my past activities, I have rather come to the conclusion that my main mistake has been to speak out too soon and thus arouse the enmity of many persons whose opinions later have come around to my own.

When I talked with you on the phone you expressed regret in not being able to see me and promised me my day in court. Now that the investigation has been completed I would like very much to see you and talk over with you how I may be of further service, particularly because I have a few ideas in mind which might be of help. Also, I suppose that there are some questions you would like to ask me in order to give the matter as full a hearing as possible before you make your decision.

I am naturally hoping as promised that I would not refer this matter to any one else and that I would await your decision. I admit waiting is a nuisance. I have not often engaged in and therefore I am able to restrain my spontaneous impatience only because you have been so fair in dealing with me. I can and will wait as long as is your judgment it is necessary, but I hope this will not be much longer.

Sincerely,

*Daniel S. Gillman*  
Daniel S. Gillman

## COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

SECRET

April 10, 1942

Memorandum

To: Colonel Donovan  
 From: Atherton Richards  
 Subject: The Gillmor Case

Answering your inquiry as to the reasons given Mr. Gillmor for his dismissal on April 6th, please be advised that in the conversations the writer held with Mr. Gillmor it was repeatedly stated that his severance from the Coordinator's staff was due to his non-acceptability to the Military Service. Gillmor was given to understand that in the review conducted of all personnel prior to their gaining permanent status in the Coordinator's Office, the Military Service had bluntly informed us that so long as he, Gillmor, was a member of the Coordinator's staff it would be impossible for them to conduct business with the Coordinator's Office.

All of the writer's conversations directly with Mr. Gillmor were held with Mr. deRochemont, head of the Pictorial Records Section, present.

Information as to Mr. Gillmor's unacceptability was conveyed to the writer Friday afternoon, April 3d, at about 5:30 by Mr. Kimbel. Mr. Kimbel stated that he had been called on the telephone by Commander Riheldaffer of Navy Intelligence and first asked as to whether there was a Mr. Gillmor in the Coordinator's office. On being told that there was, Mr. Kimbel was informed that the Navy would immediately cease to have any relations with the Coordinator's Office because of Mr. Gillmor's Communistic activities.

After informing the writer of this situation, Mr. Kimbel attempted to get Commander Riheldaffer on the telephone so that Mr. Kimbel and I might go to see him immediately. Word came back that the Commander had left the office for the day.

Saturday morning, April 4th, Mr. Kimbel proceeded to the office of Naval Intelligence and was shown an extensive file on Gillmor by Commander Riheldaffer and Lieutenant Commander Caskey. The statement was again repeated of the Navy's impossibility of carrying on relations with the Coordinator's Office while Gillmor was a member of its staff.

Colonel Donovan  
-2-

April 10, 1946

Later the writer was informed by Mr. Kimbel that comparable statements to the foregoing had been made by Naval Intelligence to Mr. Quay of the Liaison Office.

Prior to taking action on Mr. Gillmor, the writer discussed with Mr. Opsata and Mr. Lehman of the F.B.I. the results of the search to that date which the F.B.I. had made on Mr. Gillmor. Mr. Lehman stated that their study indicated there was no question as to Gillmor's communistic affiliations and advocacy of the doctrine.

AR

( THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS TO BE DELIVERED

IMMEDIATELY TO COL. WILLIAM J. DONOVAN BY COURIER- ACKNOWLEDGE.

COL. WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

ET. REGIS HOTEL

NEWYORK CITY, NEWYORK

THE APPOINTMENT OF DANIEL S. GILLMOR WAS MADE UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 8564 WHICH IN BRIEF AUTHORIZED THE EMERGENCY APPOINTMENT OF INDIVIDUALS NOT HAVING CIVIL SERVICE STATUS WHEN CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBLES WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO FILL URGENT NEEDS. THE E. O. 8564 HAS BEEN SUSPENDED SINCE MARCH 16, 1942 BY THE NEW WAR SERVICE APPOINTMENTS UNDER E. O. 9063.

EMERGENCY APPOINTMENTS MAY BE TERMINATED BY NOTIFYING THE APPOINTEE IN WRITING SHOULD HIS CONDUCT OR CAPACITY NOT BE SATISFACTORY. THE REGULATION V OF THE WAR SERVICE APPOINTMENTS UNDER E. O. 9063 TO WHICH YOU REFERRED IN OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING: REGULATION V- APPOINTMENT, . . . . . SECTION 3.

TRIAL PERIOD- EXCEPT FOR PERSONS APPOINTED FOR A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF ONE YEAR OR LESS, THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF SERVICE SHALL BE CONSIDERED PART OF THE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION.

\*\*\*\*\* IF AND WHEN AFTER A FULL AND FAIR TRIAL THE CONDUCT OR CAPACITY OF THE TRIAL APPOINTEE BE NOT SATISFACTORY TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, THE APPOINTEE MAY AT ANY TIME THEREAFTER DURING THE TRIAL PERIOD BE SO NOTIFIED IN WRITING AND SUCH NOTICE SHALL TERMINATE HIS SERVICE."

IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, I SHALL NOTIFY MR. GILLMOR THAT THE ACTION TAKEN WILL BE "DISCIPLINARY PROBATIONARY INVESTIGATION" RATHER THAN "DISCIPLINARY ACTION".

JAMES H. COOPER

CHIEF, PERSONNEL DIVISION 4/9-19/34 BC



WTT

(PLEASE TELETYPE THE FOLLOWING TO THE NEW YORK OFFICE,  
TO BE DELIVERED TO COLONEL DONOVAN AT THE ST. REGIS HOTEL  
IMMEDIATELY:)

GILLMOR APPOINTED FEBRUARY 19, 1942 UNDER EXECUTIVE  
ORDER 8384, AS TEMPORARY APPOINTEE, AND SUBJECT TO  
CHARACTER CLEARANCE BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. ALL  
SUCH APPOINTEES AUTOMATICALLY BROUGHT UNDER NEW WAR  
SERVICE REGULATIONS (EFFECTIVE MARCH 16, 1942),  
ACCORDING TO DEPARTMENTAL CIRCULAR 323 FROM THE COMMISSION.  
UNDER THESE, REGULATION V (APPOINTMENT) PROVIDES THAT  
THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF SERVICE SHALL BE A "TRIAL PERIOD"  
EXCEPT FOR THOSE APPOINTED SPECIFICALLY FOR A YEAR OR  
LESS, AND SAYS "IF AND WHEN AFTER A FULL AND FAIR TRIAL  
THE CONDUCT OR CAPACITY OF THE TRIAL APPOINTEE BE NOT  
SATISFACTORY TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, THE APPOINTEE  
MAY AT ANY TIME THEREAFTER DURING THE TRIAL PERIOD BE  
NOTIFIED IN WRITING AND SUCH NOTICE SHALL TERMINATE  
THE SERVICE".

REGULATION VII (REMOVAL) ALSO PROVIDES THAT CIVIL  
SERVICE RULE XII DISCHARGE FOR CAUSE ONLY, ON DELIVERY  
OF CHARGES, SHALL APPLY EXCEPT TO THOSE SERVING A  
TRIAL PERIOD AND THOSE APPOINTED SUBJECT TO A CONDITION  
WHICH IN THE DISCHARGE NOT COMPLIED WITH. NECESSARY  
IMPLICATION IS THAT THOSE IN TRIAL PERIOD MAY BE  
DISCHARGED WITHOUT CAUSE, AND WITHOUT DELIVERY OF CHARGES  
Etc.

EVEN IF GILLMOR WERE PERMANENT EMPLOYEE, APPROVED  
BY COMMISSION AND WITH CIVIL SERVICE STATUS, HE COULD BE  
DISCHARGED BY APPOINTING OFFICER FOR ANY CAUSE "FOR GOOD  
OF THE SERVICE", AFTER DELIVERY OF CHARGES TO HIM IN  
WRITING, AND OPPORTUNITY TO HIM TO REPLY TO REMOVING  
OFFICER IN WRITING, NO FURTHER HEARING AND NO APPEAL  
AND HE HAS POWER OF PROSECUTION ONLY IN PROVIDED  
POWER OF COMMISSIONER WHEN PRESENT. COMMISSIONER MAY  
DISCHARGE WITHOUT CAUSE WHEN OFFICER THAT PROSECUTE

SERVICE RULE XII (DISCHARGE FOR CAUSE ONLY, ON DELIVERY OF CHARGES, ETC.) SHALL APPLY EXCEPT TO THOSE SERVING A TRIAL PERIOD AND THOSE APPOINTED SUBJECT TO A CONDITION IMPOSED BY THE COMMISSION NOT COMPLIED WITH. NECESSARY IMPLICATION IS THAT THOSE IN TRIAL PERIOD MAY BE DISCHARGED WITHOUT CAUSE, AND WITHOUT DELIVERY OF CHARGES, ETC.

EVEN IF GILLMOF WERE PERMANENT EMPLOYEE, APPOINTED BY COMMISSION AND WITH CIVIL SERVICE STATUS, HE COULD BE DISCHARGED BY APPOINTING OFFICER FOR ANY CAUSE "FOR GOOD OF THE SERVICE", AFTER DELIVERY OF CHARGES TO HIM IN WRITING, AND OPPORTUNITY TO HIM TO REPLY TO REMOVING OFFICER IN WRITING. NO FURTHER HEARING AND NO APPEAL MAY HE HAVE. COPIES OF PROCEEDINGS MUST BE FURNISHED EMPLOYEE OR COMMISSION UPON REQUEST. COMMISSION MAY INVESTIGATE REMOVAL WHERE PROOF OFFERED THAT PROCEDURE REQUIRED WAS NOT FOLLOWED, OR THAT REMOVAL WAS MADE FOR "POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS REASONS", AND MAY THEREAFTER CERTIFY EMPLOYEE AS ELIGIBLE FOR OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, BUT CANNOT COMPEL REINSTATEMENT. PENDING ACTION OF REMOVAL AS ABOVE, OR FOR DISCIPLINARY REASONS, EMPLOYEE MAY BE SUSPENDED FOR NOT TO EXCEED 90 DAYS.

TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES, UNDER PAY-RULES, COULD BE DISCHARGED WITHOUT CAUSE, WITHOUT DELIVERY OF CHARGES, ETC., AND WITHOUT ANY RIGHT OF APPEAL.

TURNER MESSAGE.

4/9/48 645PM ED.

PLANE ARRIVED LATE AND DELIVERED TO COLONEL DONOVAN  
AT THE HOTEL